The Big Green Monster : Noble Goals, but Far Too Many

“Where you stand depends on where you sit.” That’s a time-honored axiom of politics. Our beliefs, our jobs, our loyalties and our existence all help to shape the way we view the world and its priorities.

Once you understand that, you’re a long way toward understanding the politics of Big Green--the Environmental Protection Act of 1990. Proposition 128 on the November ballot would regulate pesticide use, phase out cancer-causing pesticides in food and chemicals that “potentially deplete the ozone layer.” It takes measures against global warming, limits offshore oil drilling and requires spill prevention and contingency plans.

Big Green also creates a new elective office of Environmental Advocate, appropriates $40 million for “environmental research” and authorizes $300 million in general obligation bonds for “ancient redwoods acquisition and forestry projects.”

Noble goals? Ah, yes. But--if only life and politics were so simple. Look beyond the ballot language and you will find a classic struggle between competing political forces, philosophies and agendas. What are they? Who stands where on Big Green? Why? What does it all mean?

With the air buzzing with conflicting advertising claims, how can Californians fathom a document that is 16,000 words long and talks about “biomass per acre”?

Let’s meander through the Big Green thicket. Watch for signs and ask questions. Then stake out your position.

First guidepost: Scientists tend to be skeptical of politicians and their motives, politicians of scientists and their data. Big Green is part of that tension. Where do voters stand?

“In a political debate, science doesn’t matter much,” argues Big Green campaign manager Bob Mulholland. It’s really how you feel about the issue.” Maybe. On an issue as daunting as this, voter approval may turn on that old quiz-show question: “Who do you trust?”

Second: When the environmentalists who created Big Green look at the world, they see a crisis that requires immediate and drastic action, regardless of the cost. That view helped spur the initiative’s comprehensive approach.

The state’s industries--including agriculture, construction, chemical and oil companies--and their friends in government see that approach as fraught with economic hazards. Without the ability of industries to plan and “do business,” said one state official, California cannot generate jobs “and the economy weakens. Our ability to address environmental issues is doomed. Only a wealthy economy can address these issues.” That argument is at the heart of the opposition to Big Green.

There’s more. The environmental debate has raged in California politics for a long time. Environmental and economic interests fought over Proposition 65, the anti-toxics initiative on the November, 1986, ballot.

Like Proposition 128, the Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986 was supported by a coalition of Democratic politicians and environmental groups. Proponents positioned the initiative as an attack on businesses that produced most of California’s hazardous waste; it used a crowd of celebrities to communicate its message to voters. That worked.

Millions of dollars were spent by the initiative’s opponents, including oil and chemical companies and farmer groups, who argued that Proposition 65 was ambiguous and fraught with loopholes. That didn’t work. Despite an all-out assault by California business--or because of it--Proposition 65 passed with 63% of the vote.

But that doesn’t mean Big Green is a shoo-in. There are differences between the two initiatives and their politics.

“Normally, an initiative goes on the ballot because of the Legislature’s failure to act,” speculated one observer. “Did (128) go on because the Legislature failed to act, or because it was politically motivated?” The answer is: Both.

Like Proposition 65, Big Green was positioned as a frustrated response to the inability of the Legislature and the governor--paralyzed by partisan gamesmanship and weak leadership--to come to a consensus on a critical policy issue. But the politicians behind Big Green are far more visible than those in the Proposition 65 campaign.

Big Green was to have been the linchpin of John Van de Kamp’s failed campaign for governor. And the measure cannot shake its ties to the electoral ambitions of Assemblyman Tom Hayden (D-Santa Monica). Speculation persists that the proposal was seen as having the potential to boost him into statewide politics. Did Hayden structure Big Green to become “environmental czar”?

This question remains critical to the fate of Proposition 128. Opponents’ ballot arguments and paid media include direct attacks on Hayden. Until a suit was filed requiring the “No on 128” campaign to disclose its link to chemical companies, that blunt “us-against-him” strategy seemed to have legs. Recent poll results show Hayden as a drag on the initiative’s support.

Where does Hayden stand? To prove his sincerity on the issue, will he sacrifice himself for the good of his initiative?

In November, 1988, frustration over high insurance rates overcame voter skepticism and Californians passed Proposition 103, a radical insurance reform proposal. It included a similar provision establishing an elected insurance commissioner. Is voter frustration high enough for history to repeat itself? Maybe not.

Here Proposition 65 provides another guidepost. It was simple-sounding and dealt with one identifiable subject--toxic materials. It had a single, straightforward campaign theme: “Get the polluters.” For voters, it cut to the chase.

Not so Big Green. It can’t be easily explained--even by the glitzy, half-hour video prepared by proponents. And the simplistic spots on both sides of the issue certainly aren’t adequate. When voters don’t get the message, they tend to back off.

There is a risk, argued one legislative staffer, that Big Green plays as “nothing but a shopping list tied together with some environmental concern.” If voters find something to oppose in its litany of mandates, they may turn down the whole initiative. Would several Little Greens have a better chance than one Big Green?

The complexity of Big Green practically ensures that, if the initiative makes it through the electoral process, it will land in court.

Competing initiatives on the November ballot muddy the legal and political waters even more. Up against Big Green this year are three counterinitiatives aimed directly at its provisions.

Agribusiness has qualified Proposition 135, which would step up pesticide regulation but is less sweeping than Big Green. And Proposition 135 requires that, if both pass and the agribusiness initiative receives more votes, Big Green’s pesticide restrictions would be nullified.

Proposition 130, sponsored by a group of environmentalists called Forests Forever, goes beyond Big Green’s foresting provisions, imposing strict limits on logging. Proposition 138, the timber industry’s response, bans clear-cutting but defines it in such a way that loggers would only be required to leave four mature “seed trees” standing per acre.

The timber-industry initiative is designed to cancel out both Proposition 130 and the section of Big Green dealing with protecting forests. All very clever, no? But constitutional? That’s unclear.

To make matters worse, there is some question as to whether the passage of Proposition 136, the “Taxpayers Right to Vote” Amendment, which requires a two-thirds vote to pass initiatives containing “special taxes,” would affect the implementation of Big Green.

Will Proposition 128 have an impact on the governor’s race? At this stage, it’s so close that anything could make a difference.

After hemming and hawing in the early days of the primary campaign, Dianne Feinstein endorsed Big Green. She had to--in a Democratic primary.

Republican Pete Wilson, in sync with his supporters, opposes Big Green--in part, he says, because it requires the election of an environmental regulator separate from the governor.

There are other brambles in the thicket.

How would Proposition 128 be funded? Even if the next governor is more amenable than the current one to spending or--fantasy of fantasies--raising taxes, he or she will have little room to maneuver. What happens if the economy cools? When, once again, conflicting constitutional mandates to spend and to limit spending collide head-on? Which programs get cut? Big Green may provide yet another battleground for “the two Californias.” To the California that is largely white and affluent, Big Green means an improved quality of life. To the one that is largely minority and poor, “quality of life” issues include surviving economically and staying alive. Where do these voters stand?

Minorities tend either to be split or uninterested in Big Green. There is criticism that the campaign has not reached out to these communities. Can it?

Both black and Latino leaders identified one issue that could focus minority support for Big Green: regulating urban malathion spraying. “Spraying,” one argued, “matches the Latino curve.”

But environmental and economic concerns can separate farm workers, who like the pesticide and other protections, from urban Latinos who work in light industries likely to be threatened by Big Green’s strict chemical bans.

Among blacks, there appears to be some skepticism that Big Green is “another Westside liberal thing.” Said one black leader, “The community feels kind of used and maybe abused. (They ask), ‘Why talk to me about Big Green? What does it have to with stopping violence? Crack? What about COLAs (cost-of-living adjustments)?’ ”

Should the value-judgments and policy decisions required to meet the challenges put forth in the debate over Big Green be left to the initiative process--and micromanagement by the bluntest possible instrument?

These are hard questions. But every voter has to answer them. The quality of life is deteriorating and environmental problems need to be addressed. That takes both money and political will.

And the reality is that this state is short of both.

No matter where you stand, as a famous frog once said, “It isn’t easy being green.”