‘Gallant Little King’ Is No Longer a ‘Western Lackey’ : Jordan: Why has King Hussein backed Iraq? Because he believes Saddam Hussein is implementing basic principles of Arab unity.

NICOSIA, CYPRUS — The sudden change in Western assessments of Jordan’s King Hussein, from favorable to critical in six months, proves once again there are no permanent friendships, only permanent interests--or what, sometimes inaccurately, are perceived to be a country’s interests.

For years before the Gulf War, then all through its eight years and until early this year, King Hussein was, for the West, “the gallant little king,” “the wise and experienced ruler,” “a force for moderation”--because he did what the West approved of. During this period, at different times, for different groupings in different Arab countries, he was “the dwarf king,” “the Western lackey,” “the traitor to the Arabs.” The Western and the Arab perceptions of the king’s roles have now been almost reversed.

The West cannot understand why the king has taken such a strongly pro-Iraqi line on the Kuwait crisis and why he has become increasingly critical of the West. At the same time, his stand is drawing applause from Jordanians and the broad masses of the Arab people, if not from their governments. The motivations for the king’s apparent switch in policies have to be understood.

His support for Iraq now is merely a continuation of the solid and consistent support he gave that country all through the Gulf War, which also suited Western policies. He did not have to be so wholehearted in his support. He could have provided Iraq with arms for cash. He could have allowed the transport route from Iraq to Aqaba to be used, for cash, without publicly giving Jordan’s moral, political, diplomatic and propaganda support.

The king himself frequently explained why: Iraq was defending itself and all the Arabs (read Sunni Muslims) against the expansion of Iranian (read Shia Persian) territorial ambitions. The Arab sentiment is particularly strong in Hussein because he is a Hashemite, a direct descendant of the Prophet Mohammed, he personally being the 40th in the line. Mohammed was the prophet of the Arabs and the initiator of past greatness. Therefore to be an Arab is a matter of tremendous pride to the king.

Until they were driven out in 1924 by the usurping Saud family, the Hashemites once ruled Hejaz, the former kingdom where Mecca and Medina are located. From Hejaz came the 1914 Arab revolt against the Ottomans, in which the king’s beloved grandfather, King Abdullah, played a leading role. The core principle of that revolt was the assertion of Arab dignity--that the Arabs should be masters of their own destiny and that they should be united as one people.

The king and the Arabs inside and outside Jordan believe, rightly or wrongly, that these principles are being implemented by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, especially in the Kuwait crisis. But how so, since the Kuwaitis are Arabs and Sunni Muslims who stood by Iraq, especially during the Gulf War, especially financially?

The Iraqis and Jordanians reply that the Kuwaitis and Saudis did nothing more than pay protection money, which Iraq had earned by blocking Iranian subversion of their populations and expansion into their territories. The depth of contempt that modern suit-and-tie Arabs have for the traditional white-robed moneybags of the gulf, which the Kuwait crisis brought to the surface, has surprised the Arabs themselves.

In the case of Kuwait, along with its vast wealth went overweening Kuwaiti arrogance, displayed toward the expatriates who kept the hydroponic state going by manning its essential services. The largest expatriate group was the Palestinians, and since Palestinians constitute more than 60% of the Jordanian population, Jordan was always rife with anti-Kuwaiti, anti-”Gulfi” sentiment.

Hence it was almost inevitable that all groups in the Jordanian Parliament, from Communists to the Muslim Brotherhood, should vote unanimous support to the king’s policy on Kuwait. In a sense, and for the best democratic reasons, he had no choice but to support Saddam Hussein.

The future of King Hussein, the Jordanians and the Palestinians, since they have thrown in their lot with Iraq, depends on how the scenario of events evolves in the Iraq-U.S. confrontation. If, in the worst case, Iraq goes down in defeat with Saddam Hussein dead, Jordan will find itself in a truly catastrophic situation. Without Iraq’s military backing, Jordan would be helpless in the face of an invasion by Israel. There would be no way to stop Israel from bringing about an enforced “transfer,” as some Israelis call it, of the West Bank Palestinians to the East Bank, which could then be designated as the Palestinian state while the Hashemites went off into exile.

The Syrians have always considered Jordan to be part of southern Syria within “Greater Syria.” So with the area in confusion, the Syrians could strike a deal with the Israelis, giving the Syrians a slice of northern Jordan in compensation for the Israelis retaining the Golan Heights.

Of course this doomsday plan--doomsday from the Jordanian point of view--could go seriously awry. One possibility is that the people of the East Bank and the West Bank (where Jordanian flags have recently been raised) could rally round the king and fight the Israelis to the bitter end. That would be the “gallant little king’s” personal preference, but there would be heavy destruction and heavy casualties on both banks.

In a moderately grim scenario, Saddam Hussein would be eliminated but Iraq would not be devastated by U.S. air power. In that case Jordan, as an independent entity, could survive, but its main problem would then be financial. It would face bankruptcy because it has alienated its main financial backers--Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, which, furthermore, would not be willing to allow the return of the 400,000 Palestinians whose remittances contributed so much to the Jordanian economy. When faced with that utterly desperate prospect, economists in Amman have expressed the hope that, besides practicing strict austerity at home, Libya has said it would replace the defaulting financiers. But Col. Moammar Kadafi is an impulsive and unreliable person.

The best-case scenario for Jordan and Iraq would be something on the lines of “the Arab solution,” according to which Kuwait would survive as a separate entity without the Al Sabah ruling family but linked to Iraq; as of now, this seems a hopelessly unrealistic possibility. Yet it might come about if the economic burden of the massive U.S. expeditionary force compels Washington to moderate its anti-Saddam spleen. In that eventuality, King Hussein and Jordan would have been proved right and be rewarded by a “victorious” Iraq. In the absence of Palestinian remittances, Saudi Arabia, as a form of insurance, could resume some of its aid to the friend of Iraq.

Seen from the outside, Jordan would seem to be in a perilous and precarious position, and yet that is not the feeling within Jordan itself. There the mood is one of joyous nihilism: “Because of our frustration caused by the endless betrayals of our Western friends, we have chosen the option of honorable Arab defiance, and if it brings the roof down on our heads, so be it.”