Gen. Carl Vuono : Maintaining What It Takes To Be All That You Can Be

The United States Army is undergoing one of the most wrenching re-evaluations of mission in its 200-year history. This effort is, in essence, a search for the Army’s soul, a look back at its historical roots and forward to the role the nation’s ground forces might play in the ‘90s and into the 21st Century.

The other military services--the Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force--are also confronting change, driven by shrinking budgets and the shift from the Soviet Union as the principal threat to other, more diffuse threats, including Third World dictators and international terrorism.

But none of the other services is going through such an agonizing redefinition as the 760,000-man Army. Leading the effort is Chief of Staff Gen. Carl E. Vuono, a thoughtful, intense former artillery officer.

Vuono’s deep-set eyes and close-cropped hair give him an uncanny resemblance to University of Nevada/Las Vegas basketball coach Jerry Tarkanian. Those who have watched him during his 33-year Army career say he thrived not through force of personality but through the power of his intellect.

He said in a recent interview that the current huge deployment to Saudi Arabia will be a decisive test of his and his predecessors’ vision and planning.

In a white paper issued earlier this year, that spells out where Vuono believes the Army is headed in the next decade, the chief of staff said the new Army must be deployable, flexible and lethal. He believes the Saudi operation has proved the aptness of these standards, but acknowledges that events have yet to prove whether the Army can meet them.

Vuono declined to discuss the Mideast operation in detail, clearly concerned that the then-small Army contingent on the ground was vulnerable to the large Iraqi force massed on the Saudi border. But he expressed firm conviction that the principles he laid down for the service were sound and that the investment in equipment and training in the fat years of the early Reagan Administration were paying large dividends.

Vuono, age 55, was named the Army’s 31st chief of staff in June, 1987. He graduated from West Point and has held command positions from platoon to division level.

Question: Let’s talk about the deployment . Where has air- and sealift proven inadequate?

Answer: I wouldn’t say it’s proven inadequate yet. I think that the plan that we had in terms of the mix of air- and sealift was a good plan because . . . you’ve got to look at the threat and the force capability--you’ve got to provide to offset that threat. That’s why we need the combination of air- and sealift. We have certainly exercised that in terms of our heavy-, light-, special-operations forces. So I think the flow has gone, frankly--considering all the circumstances and the fact that we started without any long lead time or buildup time--it’s going well.

There are certainly areas we need to work on. I would like to have had the heavier forces there just as rapidly as I could have gotten them there. As you know, we’re off-loading Abrams and Bradley tanks today in the 24th Division. That’s in less than three weeks from the start of the operation for that part of the world.

Q: Some have suggested that there was a period of severe vulnerability until this equipment started to arrive. Some senior officials in this building suggested that we were ready. Even (Defense Secretary Richard B.) Cheney said if they should be foolish enough to attack we’re going to put their forces and their facilities in Iraq at risk. Could you have backed up those threats?

A: . . . . This was a joint operation . . . . We had systems in place who could have carried out what these officials have said. I will tell you this, what your objectives are, determine a great deal whether you had enough capability on the ground or not. But I think it’s an air-land-sea operation. That’s what it is. Of course we didn’t have Abrams and Bradleys on the ground, but we had a number of tank killer systems on the ground early on with our Apaches. I mentioned that to you earlier.

So I guess I would say depending on what option you pick, our job is to develop the force capability to meet that option. I will certainly be comfortable as we bring in our Abrams and our heavier forces, but I’d rather not get into that. That doesn’t do any good because you’re dealing with options.

Q: This apparent pause to let diplomacy work--that works in our favor, doesn’t it? Or at least in the favor of the ground forces--giving them a little time to get acclimatized, to get equipment in place.

A: Every day we improve our capability as we bring in our heavier forces and our sealift.

Q: One marker you’ve set out for the ‘90s Army is an emphasis on sustainment, which is going to be--considering the length of the supply lines and where we’re set up--critical in this. We can get the men over there. The equipment is on its way. What about just plain old boring sustainability? Food and water and everything else.

A: Not boring, essential.

Q: Are we prepared to sustain a substantial commitment in that environment for four months or even a year?

A: I think we are. I think it’s an area that is going to be crucial to us. As you pointed out, to provide the kind of supplies and capabilities and repair parts and so forth that we need. But I believe we have the mechanisms going into place to do that. I think we’ll draw on as much host nation support as we’ve always planned to do. But it’s not going to be the means by which we sustain the entire force. I think our ability to feed, fuel, fix forward as much as we can to keep our systems running in that kind of harsh environment will be, obviously, a challenge to the entire total force. But I think we can do it . . . .

Q: The reserve call-up seemed to make a lot of people nervous. It made them think, “This is it, we’re going to war.” Those of us who follow these things realize that was how the force was structured. Are you rethinking that at all? Do you want to keep more of these functions in the active force or change the mix?

A: Of course you know we designed the total force around just that, around the total force. Speaking for the Army, we designed it around a mix of active and reserve components with our focus in the active, mainly, on combat forces, with some support, and the great bulk of our sustainment capability, our sustainment capability within the reserve components and a lot of critical skills. So we’re executing exactly what we said we were going to execute . . . .

Now, do I believe that we’re going to reexamine the total force policy? No. We may see some adjustment in the AC/RC mix, the active component/reserve component mix, over time . . . .

Q: I can predict that you’re going to be up on the Hill next month or the month after and some congressman will say, “Jesus Christ, general. You’ve got 761,000 men under arms and you can’t deploy 100,000 without calling up 50,000 reserves. What gives? The reserves was to be for a longer term commitment--or at least that was our understanding here.”

A: That should not have been the understanding . . . .

Q: Let’s talk a little about the long-term goals in the region. First of all, what sort of residual force do you anticipate leaving there if the current crisis is satisfactorily resolved?

A: I’m not going to get into that. There are so many options that might come about. For me to start speculating on it right now, I think, would be premature.

Q: Let me ask a policy question. Can stability in the region be restored with Saddam Hussein in power, and the weaponry that he has intact?

A: I’m not going to comment.

Q: Given the size and shape of the Army that you mapped out for the next five years, and given what you see of the congressional desire to cut you farther and faster than you consider appropriate, could we have pulled this off in 1995?

A: I think that’s a very good question. My answer to that is that if we retain the kind of trained and ready Army that we have today, if it’s built, if it maintains what we’ve built around the imperatives of quality soldiers, tough training, a global doctrine, a modernized force in those areas that need to modernize, the right mix of armor, light and special ops (operations), and the right leaders--we damn well can execute something like this in five years or something like that.

But the question is, will we be able to maintain that trained and ready Army? We will--if we adhere to the plan that the Army has laid out. It’s not because I happen to be chief of staff of the Army. But it’s a logical plan that allows us to take advantage of what’s happened from an international environment standpoint, what’s happened in Europe and all that, and build down the Army into a smaller force--but one that is trained and ready.

You have to be able to get it to the fight and it has to be lethal . . . . But if you don’t do it logically, if you’re forced to make a draconian cut of personnel, you’ll have an Army that is ill-trained, ill-equipped, ill-manned and ill-prepared. We did that in Korea in the Korean War, in the early days of the Korean War. We drew down the Army after World War II rapidly. If you’ll recall, it was a draft Army, not a volunteer Army and, in June of 1950, Korea hit. We lost a lot of American soldiers, and it wasn’t their fault. I’d just tell you, that it is damn essential that we build down this force in a logical manner.

I’m not at all trying to build up a large size force. I think we’ve taken a very pragmatic view of the international environment. Sure, as we sign a CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe) agreement in Europe we can reduce our forces in Europe, but we still need some forces forward deployed. We need some forces forward deployed in Korea and elsewhere. We’ve got to have a good package in the States that can go on an operation--whether it’s Panama or Desert Shield. We need sustained reinforcements . . . . I can do this in a logical manner. But if we’re forced to take some of the deep cuts that some folks have talked about, and you’re not going to have a trained and ready Army, the nation is going to be the loser.

Q: But Congress is talking about cutting you 2.5 times as much and 2.5 times as fast as you consider--

A: That’s right, and I think that is not being responsible.

Q: What are you worried about in the short term? What are the concerns of you and your fellow chiefs as this unfolds?

A: Let me just sort of walk you through that. I’ve given a lot of attention to pre-deployment, to make sure that I had no concerns at all about the force being trained and ready. I’ve been concerned about pre-deployment to make sure that we focused in on those key areas that were going to be essential for that part of the world--things like hot weather, things like making sure that the troops were confident in their chemical protection capability, ensuring that all the little multitude of things you had to do prior to deployment are taken care of, make sure that the soldiers had great confidence that their families were going to be looked out for.

We have a married force. I must say, I’ve been really pleased. We have a very good family support system in the Army, and that’s not just me talking. As I go down and talk to Pfc. Fettig who is married and said, “Is your wife going to stay here.” And he said, “Yes, sir. Because she’s tied in with the family support and she wants to stay here.” So that’s important. So the kid goes off and he feels good. We did a lot of that.

Obviously, a great deal of effort to make sure that the reserve component call-up goes smoothly. As you know, it’s the first time we’ve done anything like this for a number of years. What we wanted to make sure on this, John, was that we were calling up the right forces; that each unit that we call up has a mission and we’re not calling anybody up unnecessarily because we are disrupting a lot of families and professions . . . . We wanted to make sure that every commander out there in those units understood what it was he was going to do so he could explain that to his soldiers. We spent a long time on that.

We spent an awful lot of time on making sure that the airlift/sealift interface was worked properly so that we had a smooth flow. Obviously, we moved the 82nd over rapidly--that’s the nation’s rapid-reaction force--to get them on the ground. Then to marry up the air- and sealift so as the 24th Division ships land, the fast sealift lands, we’ve got soldiers on the ground to get those tanks off, they’re uploaded, and get them wherever they’re needed. (Then we had to make sure) that the soldiers aren’t in-country too long before they (the tanks) come . . . and to watch that sealift and airlift, so if there is any adjustments in terms of maintenance problems and so forth, we’re able to compensate for that.

Q: Are the troops that are on the ground in Saudi Arabia today equipped and positioned so they’re ready to fight if it should come tomorrow?

A: Yes. If it would come tomorrow they’re ready. They’re trained and they’re ready to fight. I’ve got great confidence in them.

Q: Ready to hold ground or take ground?

A: You look at the mission--it’s deter and defend. But I believe that the troops are ready for whatever mission that we give them. We just have to make sure that we give them the right mission.

‘Each (reserve) unit has a mission and we’re not calling anybody up unnecessarily because we are disrupting a lot of families and professions.’ ‘If we’re forced to take some of the deep cuts that some folks have talked about, . . . the nation will be the loser.’