A Saudi Sale Motive: Forward Basing of Arms : Defense: Pentagon aide doubts Riyadh could fend off an attack. One goal is to have weapons in place.

Warning that Iraq is likely to remain a regional threat long after Operation Desert Shield has ended, a senior Bush Administration official suggested Wednesday that one motive for a proposed $7.3-billion arms sale to Saudi Arabia is to “pre-position” weapons that U.S. forces would need if they ever return to the region.

Paul G. Wolfowitz, undersecretary of defense for policy, told lawmakers that they should harbor no “illusions” that Saudi Arabia’s small armed forces could adequately defend the desert kingdom against the massive military threats it may face in the future, from either Iraq or Iran.

Rather, Wolfowitz said, the future security of Saudi Arabia and other U.S. allies in the Persian Gulf must be based on a “coalition defense” in which the Saudis would have the capability to slow an invasion until supporting forces arrive to help them repel it.

“We would expect Saudi forces to slow and perhaps stop an attacking army long enough for reinforcements to arrive,” Wolfowitz told a joint hearing of the House Foreign Affairs subcommittees on the Middle East and arms control.

“The force we and the Saudis have in mind would then be able to operate effectively with U.S. and allied reinforcements and to provide capabilities, such as fire support and heavy armor, that we would not be able to quickly lift from the United States.”

The testimony provided the most detailed exposition to date of the rationale behind the Administration proposal to sell the Saudis $7.3 billion in weapons to be used in the current deployment and to follow with an even larger sale designed to address the country’s long-term arms needs. The combined package is expected to exceed $20 billion.

Testifying with Wolfowitz in support of the proposal, Reginald Bartholomew, undersecretary of state for international security affairs, said the Administration’s goal is to “build a Saudi and a gulf force capability that will, in effect, drive up significantly the costs to anybody looking to take a whack at them.”

“We do not want to leave the road to Bahrain open, as it was on the second of August,” Bartholomew said, referring to the date of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

Added Wolfowitz: “Some have said that once Desert Shield is over, Iraq will no longer be a threat because the U.S. and allied forces will have destroyed the Iraqi military. We cannot count on that. No outcome is likely to permanently eliminate Iraq as a regional power.”

Despite these warnings, both officials were subjected to tough questioning from lawmakers, who disputed the Administration’s assertion that all of the weapons it wants to include in the initial arms deal with the Saudis are needed in the current crisis.

Bowing to opposition from Israel’s supporters in Congress, the Administration has agreed to split its original $20-billion proposal into two parts. The first installment, to be delivered on an emergency basis, would consist of $7.3 billion worth of M-1A tanks, Patriot anti-missile systems and other sophisticated weaponry and logistic supplies.

The second installment, which would include more tanks, F-15 jet fighters and other arms that would not be delivered for another two to three years, will be submitted for congressional approval in January.

Three key supporters of Israel on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, California Reps. Howard L. Berman (D-Panorama City), Tom Lantos (D-San Mateo) and Mel Levine (D-Santa Monica), said they have serious reservations about the first part of the package, arguing that the 38,000-member Saudi army would not be able to absorb all the arms under consideration.

“They won’t be able to defend themselves against Iraq. They just don’t have the soldiers,” Berman said. “If we are merely pre-positioning equipment for our later use, then we should say that clearly.”

While neither Administration official would characterize the sale in those terms, Wolfowitz strongly suggested that many of the weapons the United States wants to sell to the Saudis are intended for use by U.S. forces in the event they have to return to the Persian Gulf.

At the start of Operation Desert Shield, U.S. forces arriving in Saudi Arabia were at a serious disadvantage because they “didn’t have the capability to stop Iraqi tanks,” Wolfowitz said.

That vulnerability was “much greater” than U.S. officials publicly acknowledged at the time and--in the event Operation Desert Shield has to be repeated--”we don’t want to be in a position of having to say that again,” Wolfowitz added.

A chief consideration in the formulation of the Saudi arms package, he said, is to “improve our ability to send and their ability to receive reinforcements” by ensuring that Saudi equipment can be used by U.S. forces.

Levine later said that Wolfowitz seemed to be “hinting” at a pre-positioned base concept, but he expressed frustration because “it is clear we are still not getting a candid explanation from the Administration of the purpose of these sales.”

Complaining that the Administration’s explanations “continue to raise more questions than they answer,” Levine said that “if the Administration is really talking about forward basing, then they should at least come to us and tell us that in private.”

Other congressional sources said it appeared from their discussions with Administration officials that pre-positioning U.S. equipment in Saudi Arabia is indeed a major aim of the proposed sales.

“In the 1980s, the Saudis built all their military bases to American specifications with the clear, if unstated, intention of making them available to U.S. forces if required. Now they are seeking to buy first-line weapons in quantities they cannot possibly use themselves,” one congressional arms expert said.

“The obvious implication,” he added, “is that they intend to warehouse it, maintain it and make sure it’s available for American use.”

Responding to concerns that the sales could erode Israel’s military edge in the region, Bartholomew noted that the United States has agreed to send two Patriot missile batteries to Israel and said that “other items were under consideration.”

Wolfowitz’s comments are likely to deepen the perception among Arab nations, especially Iraq, that the proposed arms sale is one more sign that the Saudis have become puppets of the United States, according to two Mideast experts. They declined, however, to predict the extent to which the remarks might offend Arabs or Israelis.

“To the Saudis, this arms sale is an important sign of American support--a sign to the Saudi people, to the Arabs and to the rest of the world,” said Zachary Lockman, a Harvard University associate professor of Middle Eastern history and an associate at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies.

“This is a sign that the U.S. stands behind them and won’t let anything get in the way,” Lockman said.

Lockman and Tom McNaugher, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington, agreed that the proposed sale would not be the first instance of pre-positioning U.S. military equipment in Saudi Arabia.

“It’s fair to say that we’ve sold systems with more spare parts and maintenance equipment than would be needed by the Saudis alone,” McNaugher said, citing past sales of F-15 aircraft maintenance equipment. “Such equipment probably has paid off in the current crisis.”

Times staff writer Edwin Chen contributed to this report.