Gorbachev to the Rescue--the Bungling Ryzhkov Government Clings to Power : Soviet Union: By promising to resign if he couldn’t fix the reeling economy (he hasn’t), the prime minister made history. Was it just rhetoric?

Whether Nikolai I. Ryzhkov’s government should resign has long ceased to be a subject of behind-the-scenes whispers or parliamentary debate. Coal miners and street demonstrators have recently demanded nothing less than his speedy retirement as prime minister. The Soviet Parliament, as well, has voted no confidence in Ryzhkov’s performance.

How, then, does his government manage to cling to power despite these tough, and occasionally uncompromising, demands?

There is no precedent for a government in the Soviet Union to give up its power. Individual bureaucrats or ministers can--and do--lose their jobs, usually by premature retirement. But resignation of an entire government--not in a totalitarian state.

Yet precisely this possibility was raised last year when the new Supreme Soviet was formed. In presenting his plan to restore the Soviet economy to an even keel, Leonid I. Abalkin, vice premier for economic policy, said his government needed 15 months to do the job. Abalkin promised that he, along with the rest of the Ryzhkov government, would step down if the economy was still reeling when his time was up.

With fewer than three months to go, the lines for food and other necessities--if available--are longer than ever. But it is clear that Ryzhkov and his government have no intention of resigning.

Why?

For starters, President Mikhail S. Gorbachev has used his newly acquired extraordinary powers to shield his prime minister from the mounting resignation calls. But even before the Soviet president rescued him, Ryzhkov had no plans to fulfill his aide’s vow to resign, despite his government’s economic bungling.

The reason is simple: His monopoly of power, cracked but not broken, eliminates his responsibility for policies and decisions. The higher a leader rises in the political hierarchy, the more solid his claim to infallibility. The absence of a strong opposition undercuts politically motivated criticism; all other criticisms fail to reach either their target or the public.

Ryzhkov--and probably his Cabinet--do not see themselves as responsible for the piteous state of the country. This helps to explain why the demeanor of so politically unpopular a leader can appear so unruffled. Far more important, however, is Ryzhkov’s conviction that he is saving the country from chaos and economic catastrophe. This near-messianic self-perception appears to be his main weapon in battling hostile public opinion.

It is also entirely possible that Ryzhkov regularly tells Gorbachev what he’s telling himself--the government is still in control. The government is the only body capable of managing the huge and cumbersome machinery. Should it resign, trains would stop, cities would starve, people would freeze. At least this is what Ryzhkov tells us.

His confidence is not groundless. The military-industrial complex and other Soviet industrial giants--transportation and energy production--run according to traditional methods of management. The ways of the market are totally alien to them. Indeed, during the debate on the transition to a free-market system, managers of the big military plants appealed to the reformers and public not to touch the defense Establishment. These managers represent a formidable force, possibly stronger than that of the professional military. Clearly, this situation impressed Gorbachev, who quashed all “attempts at overhauling the managing structures in the country.”

Another probable consideration in keeping Ryzhkov in power is Gorbachev’s fear that the removal of the prime minister would disrupt the overall political balance and lead to a direct confrontation with Boris N. Yeltsin, the president of the Russian republic. True, the radical and totally unpredictable Russian leader has signed a peace treaty with Gorbachev, to everyone’s satisfaction. But differences between the two linger.

Gorbachev may also have concluded that letting Ryzhkov, a personification of old and new failures, go would remove one of his few remaining political buffers.

Finally, the Soviet president may simply see no acceptable alternatives to Ryzhkov. Indeed, the system is not designed to create any, since business or management, in the true sense of the terms, doesn’t exist in the Soviet Union. The absence of bright new economic managers sharply contrasts with the emergence of many new political faces, among them Gavriil K. Popov, Anatoly A. Sobchak or Sergei B. Stankevich.

Ryzhkov is both a symbol of the party’s handling of the economy and its victim. It was the Politburo--not he--that, in 1985, conceived the idea of simultaneous acceleration of economic growth and reform of the economy. Two years were spent in convulsive and fruitless activities,with the negative trends only intensifying.

Nor did Ryzhkov work out the main directions of the reform blueprint, adopted by the Central Committee’s plenary session in June, 1987. His main task was to execute the plan and he did just that, firmly and energetically.

The story of Ryzhkov, one of the best prime ministers in the history of the Soviet state, is one of a decent man who works for the common good. But he is unable to modify, let alone shed, views and convictions formed over a lifetime. That has cost him a chance of winning new credit.