PERSPECTIVE ON THE PERSIAN GULF : The Peril of Strange-Bedfellowship

U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf crisis has elicited little ambivalence on the part of the American public or the media. The matter appears clear-cut, as clear-cut as the message on T-shirts sprouting in shops from Westwood to Georgetown. The crudest one I have seen has Saddam Hussein’s face on the front, with a bullet hole through the forehead, and a large red bloodstain on the back. For even more bluntness, there is the shirt that displays a map, with a mushroom cloud occupying the space of Iraq, and the text: “That’s that.”

Are things that simple? Maybe not. First, let’s look at the victim.

Pre-invasion Kuwait, while a pleasant enough and generally prosperous little society, was run by the Sabah family as an elitist oligarchy that stood for absolutely nothing that our country believes in and nothing that we can sincerely, credibly, want “restored.” At most, 20% of the population possessed any political rights at all; more than half of the population--immigrants imported to do the Kuwaitis’ work, and even their Kuwait-born children--was disfranchised, with no social or political rights, as was half of the small core of the Kuwaiti citizenry--women.

Saudi Arabia, which we have pledged to defend against becoming the next victim, is not much better. There, the issue of democracy doesn’t even come up. Nobody can vote, because there are no elections. There is no constitution. Racism against migrant workers, especially Asians, is extreme and completely unrestrained. The society practices a system of gender apartheid far more rigorous than that of, say, Iran under the ayatollahs.

Does this mean that Kuwait deserved to be invaded and Saudi Arabia is not worth fighting for? Not necessarily. But we need to be clear about what we are doing. We are not defending the side that is absolutely good against the side that is absolutely evil. This is not really a situation for bumper stickers, T-shirts and jingoism. It is far more ambiguous than that. And this is important to recognize because it significantly enlarges our options.

Having reviewed the victims, let us now turn to the villain. This is not a popular thing to say right now, but Saddam Hussein is not all bad; in fact, he is not much worse than a lot of leaders who have been our closest allies.

Hussein is a dictator, no doubt about that; so were all of his predecessors, and our present allies in this face-off are not much higher on the scale of democracy. In fact, Iraq has more political participation than Saudi Arabia. It is an interesting footnote that Iraq invited and then actually broadcast President Bush’s critical address to the Iraqi people, while Saudi Arabia has blocked radio broadcasts to U.S. troops.

Even with his military adventurism and oppression, Hussein has brought relative stability to Iraq, compared to the decades of political chaos that preceded him--and may well follow if he should be overthrown. His government has not been all bad for Iraq. Partly by absorbing their energies in military enterprises, he has reduced the domestic power of the military, which previously had totally dominated civilian government. With the exception of recent religious rhetoric, an obvious ploy to seek the support of religious leaders in other Muslim countries, Hussein has always been a proponent of secular government for the Arab world. Public Puritanism combined with private debauchery--for which the Saudi elite is infamous--is not his style, but neither is the enforced secularization of an Ataturk or even a Pahlevi. Alcohol is legal in Iraq, and so is the veil, for those who choose to wear it. Hussein’s use of oil revenue, too, compares favorably with that of the Saudis or Kuwaitis. He has spent generously and intelligently on agriculture and health, partly in order to win some grudging support from the Shiites, who, as the majority, ordinarily would have opposed Sunni leadership of the country. Iraq has one of the highest literacy rates in the Arab world, and women participate at nearly all levels of society.

Hussein’s political message is not as unsophisticated as we in the West might think, watching some of his recent PR performances. It has an ideology behind it, that of the Baath Socialist Party, albeit modified by his cult of personality and his Machiavellian streak. And it contains some allegations that ring true not only to Iraqis, but to a much larger Arab audience. The oil states do possess enormous undeserved wealth, which they have spent on self-aggrandizement and luxury, while much of the Arab world lives in enormous and equally undeserved poverty and misery. Hussein’s willingness to take on Iran, and now even a superpower, is bound to win him admiration in a region where decisive leaders have been in short supply.

Internationally, too, Hussein’s policies have not been all bad. Through his war with Iran, he achieved what none else could have accomplished: He stopped the Iranian revolution and put the brakes on the expansion of radical fundamentalism, two accomplishments everyone benefitted from, and for which he got little credit.

It is becoming clear that--in large part as a result of misleading signals he received from U.S. diplomats--Hussein misjudged the situation and vastly underestimated the response his invasion of Kuwait would elicit. His behavior indicates that he wants a way out, and maybe we should give him one. We have made our point: that we won’t tolerate his expansionism, and we can bring massive resources to bear against him. Now, we should seek a solution that will be consistent with our political values. Free elections in Kuwait, for example--and for everybody who is a legitimate citizen or lifelong resident--will be much more in keeping with our values than the restoration of a dynastic order.

Outside powers have meddled with the Middle East for decades, destroying its chances for independent learning and growth by instigating a rebellion here, preventing a revolution there, keeping this ruler in place unnaturally long and cutting off another one’s tenure too soon. Middle Eastern extremism is at least in part a product of this persistent suffocation of any indigenous political development. The balance created by so much interference is artificial, and therefore never holds, but requires ever more interference, which inspires ever more unrest and resentment. Already, international measures against Iraq have a touch of overkill about them. “Why me?” Saddam Hussein must be asking himself, as he reviews world history, where states (including our own) have routinely settled boundary disputes by taking what they wanted. Now, suddenly, in 1990, the entire world is going moralistic on him, and over a remote monarchy at that, when no one put up a fight, for example, for Hungary or Poland.

Before we entangle ourselves in a high-risk, expensive and possibly dangerous war, let us consider a simpler way. Leave the sheiks in Saudi Arabia, let the Kuwaitis go home and vote, let Hussein off with what undoubtedly has been a shock, and allow at least a measure of political Darwinism in the Middle East.