U.S. Shifting to Go-Slow Plan in Event of War

In a change in U.S. military strategy, senior commanders considering a possible offensive action against Iraq now favor a slower, more methodical assault on dug-in Iraqi defenders instead of a rapid, all-out battle as soon as war begins.

The new approach, outlined by high-ranking officers here, reflects concerns that immediately launching a comprehensive air-and-ground offensive against what are now well-fortified Iraqi positions could result in unacceptably high numbers of American deaths.

At the same time, the American commanders said their revised thinking signals a new confidence that the United States has passed a critical milestone and now has in place sufficient military power to seek to control the pace of any battle.

The new accounts of a potentially slower pace of warfare suggest that American planning has undergone a significant revision in response to three months of massive military deployments by both sides and the increasingly defensive nature of Iraq’s forces in Kuwait.

Until recently, said Lt. Gen. Charles A. Horner, the Air Force commander in the region, the United States would have been forced to fight “as hard as you can as long as you can, and hope (the enemy) runs out of enthusiasm.”

But in what he described as a “whole new ballgame,” the three- star general said in a 90-minute interview that the United States has gained “the initiative” in the conflict and thus could slow the pace of battle in an effort to minimize American casualties.

“Instead of achieving success in one day or two days,” Horner said, when asked how the United States might seek to overcome Iraqi defenses, “you nibble at him. You take four days or six days--or longer.”

Another senior officer, Maj. Gen. J. H. Binford Peay III, commander of the Army’s 101st Air Assault Division, said in a separate interview he shares the view that any American offensive is now more likely to be a prolonged endeavor. “Clearly, now, with (Iraq’s) ability to dig in and defend, the mission is just unquestionably harder, I think,” the general said.

The projections, backed by other officers, contrast sharply with previous indications of how the United States might fight if its prolonged military standoff against Iraq turns into a war.

Until now, officers had emphasized the speed and ferocity of possible combat, with a Marine Corps general vowing early in the crisis to meet an assault by Saddam Hussein’s forces with “the most violent five minutes of his life.”

With the threat of an Iraqi attack now greatly diminished, the new caution appears to reflect a recognition of the difficulties of driving Iraq from Kuwait if its forces remain dug into trenches equipped with napalm rigged to be set aflame in case of attack.

In discussing the challenges of such an offensive action, the American commanders stressed that no decision has yet been made to mount such an attack. Their mission remains strictly defensive, they emphasized.

The officials also said that their thinking about an offensive operation could change, depending on the mission given to them. “Tell me what the political job is, then I’ll tell you how to do it,” Horner said. “Right now, the job of the forces here is to deter and defend.”

But they made it clear that if President Bush were to order an offensive action, the high human cost of attacking front-line Iraqi positions could require Army and Marine forces to stand back for a number of days until a prolonged aerial assault had weakened the Iraqi defenses.

“Our job gets much more difficult if you can’t knock him out from the air ahead of time,” said Peay, the Army general whose helicopter-borne division would be expected to penetrate enemy lines in a ground offensive.

Recent estimates of the number of casualties expected in an American offensive against Iraq have ranged from hundreds to many thousands. In suggesting that such an attack need not be an immediate, all-out assault, the commanders said they believe the number of casualties could be kept within what they described--without elaboration--as acceptable limits.

“It’s not a question of are you going to use the ground forces, but when are you going to use the ground forces,” said Horner, the Air Force general who served as commander of all American forces here during the first three weeks of the crisis. “And you do that at a time when you achieve your goals with far fewer casualties.”

The Iraqi defenses include dug-in lines of more than 100,000 soldiers along Kuwait’s coastline to defend against an amphibious landing and over 150,000 troops on Kuwait’s southern border.

Most are arrayed behind rows of razor wire and mine fields in trenches reinforced with steel mesh or wire. Indications that napalm and other petroleum products have been moved to the trenches have caused concern that the Iraqis may be prepared to use a defense of fire.

At the same time, U.S. officials have noted the movement of three Iraqi oil tankers to positions off the coast of Kuwait. There has been speculation that Iraq might use oil from the tankers to create a flaming slick to block a Marine amphibious assault.

With any immediate ground attack against such barriers certain to result in heavy casualties, a senior American officer said commanders would favor a range of more time-consuming “stand-back” tactics if the Iraqi forces remained “hunkered down.”

Among these tactics, Horner and others said, would be a methodical bombardment from high-altitude B-52 aircraft designed to destroy enemy tanks or bury them in blast-waves of sand.

In addition, as part of the “nibbling campaign,” American warplanes might focus their attack on the Iraqi front lines rather than risk casualties of their own against strongholds that include surface-to-air missile sites and other formidable defenses.

The purpose of what the officers said could be days of aerial bombardment along Iraqi front lines in advance of any ground assault would be to force dug-in Iraqi tanks into the open, where they would become vulnerable to American tanks, planes and troops.