Bush Rushing Into War, U.S. Experts Worry

Many of the government’s own Middle East specialists are voicing increasing concern privately that the United States is headed for all-out war with Iraq without giving other options a chance and without fully considering the long-range impact of a military conflict on U.S. interests in the volatile region.

Their views reflect a widening gap between President Bush’s inner circle of advisers, most of whom have pushed for a hard line against Iraq, and Middle East experts in the State and Defense departments, who generally favor a more cautious approach and complain that their views are too often ignored.

The latter specialists argue that Bush, by making a rigid demand that Iraq withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait before the United States will consider peace negotiations, is preempting diplomacy because he leaves Iraqi President Saddam Hussein with no escape hatch. And the President’s massive new troop deployment, they say, limits rather than expands American options in the Persian Gulf and makes more likely a war that would have tragic, long-range consequences.

“The President has left no wiggle room for Saddam Hussein, only bleak choices,” said a veteran Pentagon official with experience in the Middle East.

“You do have to use the military lever against Hussein,” he noted, but added that laying down demands that Hussein is unlikely to even consider pushes diplomacy aside and leaves war as perhaps the only alternative.

One State Department official insisted that Bush’s top advisers, in fact, have listened to regional specialists--more so on the Persian Gulf crisis than on other Middle East issues. But he agreed that a war in which Americans or other Westerners kill Arabs would have a disastrous impact throughout the Arab world.

Another senior official involved in gulf strategy cautioned that regional specialists “are always looking at the downside of issues, where losses could occur. They tend to underestimate the utility of open and direct threats, and one thing the Arabs understand and respect is force.”

The official defended the massive deployment of troops in the gulf region as a necessary action to demonstrate to Hussein that Washington is serious about forcing the Iraqis to get out of Kuwait if they continue to refuse to withdraw voluntarily.

Although economic sanctions alone will not drive Iraq out of Kuwait, the official said, “Hussein can change his goals about remaining in Kuwait. He’s not totally oblivious to the reality he’s facing, and he’s not going to commit suicide.”

Nonetheless, a senior State Department official, who has discussed the Administration’s policy with many of the department’s Middle East specialists, said 85% of the experts “think our course of action in the Persian Gulf is terrible, and they think there’s only a 5% chance things will come out all right.”

Several specialists, who agreed to be interviewed on condition they not be identified, said Bush and his closest advisers on gulf strategy have had little experience in Middle East affairs and for the most part have either ignored or not solicited the views of the government’s own experts.

After expressing his own concern about the long-term fallout from a full-scale war, one ranking Administration official with long experience as a Mideast envoy lamented that the views of those urging caution or compromise are not sought by the White House inner circle.

A common complaint of specialists at both the State and Defense departments is that the principal gulf strategists surrounding Bush have little direct knowledge about the Arab culture and mind-set and are likely to misjudge Hussein’s intentions.

“Bush and his aides don’t understand that in the Middle East, it is better to stand and fight and get clobbered than to back down in a situation like this,” a State Department official said.

“(The critical specialists) think he’s put himself in a box and has no way out because he refuses to negotiate.” Another common complaint is that Bush still has not articulated the nation’s vital interest or long-range objectives in the gulf.

At least two senior Pentagon officials deeply involved in military planning are known to be reluctant to send troops into an offensive campaign--not only because of probable high casualties but also because there is no long-term, strategic planning that takes into account the political environment in the Middle East.

Assuming there is a war, these officials ask, what happens afterward in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq? Despite Administration promises, for example, will the United States really be able to withdraw all its troops as soon as the exiled emir of Kuwait and his government are reinstalled?

The consensus of the specialists is that although almost any conceivable outcome of the crisis has a downside, a war would be the worst-case scenario even if the United States were to win a fairly quick victory. Anti-American sentiment by Arab populations could be so severely inflamed that attempts to overthrow cooperating monarchies might result.

“If we destroy Iraq, then Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates and other Arab states would fall,” said a veteran State Department official with long experience in the Middle East. “Our embassies will become fortresses, and terrorism will break out. And there will be an economic impact--all commercial contracts will go to the French and the Koreans, not to us.”

Among other issues, the specialists are concerned about:

The ability of the United States to hold the Arab coalition parties together in the event of war, especially if Bush takes the offensive. Moroccan, Syrian and Egyptian leaders have all said their forces are being deployed only for defensive purposes only.

The crumbling of relations among moderate Arab regimes that have long formed the foundation of U.S. policy in the region.

The political and military future of Iraq and the danger that Hussein’s removal would simply result in his replacement by someone shaped from the same mold, or leave a void leading to instability.

Times staff writer Norman Kempster contributed to this report.