U.S. Military Sea-Lift Fleet Isn’t Shipshape, Critics Say

In just 14 days, they accomplished something remarkable. Called to a crisis halfway around the world, several dozen ships moved the equivalent of a town of 50,000, plus all its vehicles, food, water and other supplies, from ports in the United States to the Persian Gulf. Over the months, they built U.S. troop strength there to 240,000.

But if the talking war in the gulf had turned into a real one in the early days of the crisis, the mammoth deployment needs of Operation Desert Shield could have become an embarrassing expose of American sea-lift capabilities, officials at the U.S. Transportation Command concede.

Poorly maintained U.S. ships broke down en route. Others reported late. The Pentagon had to charter foreign-flag vessels to ensure adequate capacity.

The sea lift has succeeded because “we’ve had an almost perfect scenario in which to do our job,” said Vice Adm. Paul D. Butcher, deputy commander-in-chief of the Transportation Command, which oversees troop deployment and supplies.

By that, Butcher means the military has had the benefit of a longer-term buildup, with the aid of many other nations, a situation that will enable the Bush Administration to nearly double troop strength in the region without adding many more cargo ships to the supply line.

Rep. Helen D. Bentley (R-Md.) has asked for a congressional investigation into what she called the “first true test” of the nation’s ability to move military forces overseas by sea since World War II.

“Operation Desert Shield has raised as many questions regarding the adequacy of sea lift as it has answered,” said Bentley, a member of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee.

As the Middle East drama passes its fourth month, many such questions are being raised about America’s ability to assure its military sufficient equipment and supplies in a crisis. And ironically, those doubts follow the massive military buildup of the Ronald Reagan Administration, which critics contend shortchanged sea lift and other conventional military forces in the rush to strengthen the U.S. nuclear deterrent.

For decades, America’s merchant marine has experienced a staggering decline. During the Vietnam War, for example, the number of U.S.-flagged commercial ships was 1,100. Today, the merchant marine numbers only 402. Airlift capabilities have increased, but 95% of equipment and supplies in military operations still move by sea.

Similarly, America’s shipbuilding industry has all but halted production of cargo ships suitable for military use. In 1980, there were 69 merchant ships under construction in 15 American shipyards. Today, there are only four shipyards available to build merchant vessels and only one, National Steel & Shipbuilding Co. in San Diego, has an order--the first anywhere in the country since 1987.

Meanwhile, the Maritime Administration’s National Defense Reserve Fleet, an aging armada of 225 cargo ships, includes so many unreliable vessels that some in Congress are pushing to scrap up to a third of the fleet.

Along the James River in Virginia, for example, dozens of pre-1946 Victory ships sway at anchor, paint peeling, their decks covered with pigeon droppings. Grass is growing on some of the wooden decks, and the occasional visitor can stare through some of the corroded planks to the water below. One ship is under state orders not to move because a pair of peregrine falcons--an endangered species--has nested in its mast.

Like crews at Suisun Bay in Northern California and Beaumont, Tex., the other two ports for the reserve fleet, maintenance crews along the James River have mixed feelings about how far the deterioration has gone.

“Maybe some of them (Victory ships) are held together with baling wire and bubble gum,” said Tom Robards, the James River fleet captain, “but it’s like a ’52 Chevy . . . it still runs.”

Another maintenance operator, however, said the ships “are old and obsolete, and not worth a damn.”

Ninety-six of the newest NDRF ships make up a so-called Ready Reserve Force, and are supposed to be ready for use by the Navy on as little as five days’ notice. But only 14 of the 41 ready reserve vessels called to duty in the gulf crisis arrived on schedule at loading ports, and four ships were 10 to 20 days late. Moreover, military officials have emphasized, the RRF includes only 17 of “roll-on, roll-off” vessels best equipped to transport tanks and other large equipment.

Two reserve ships called to duty by the Navy’s Military Sealift Command were tankers converted several years ago into hospital vessels, obviously of critical importance in the event war breaks out. One of them, the Mercy, was delayed in San Francisco Bay for more than two days by problems with the steering system and boilers. The other, the Baltimore-based Comfort, had to carry a crew of Coast Guardsmen as far as Spain so they could train the ship’s crew in how to use the lifeboats.

“We’re paying for maritime cadavers,” said Rep. Ron Wyden, (D-Ore.), co-sponsor of legislation to scrap many of the ghost ships.

“Calling a 45-year-old ship which has not run in 25 years a national defense asset makes as much military sense as reintroducing the horse to the cavalry,” Rep. William S. Broomfield (D-Mich.) complained.

“It’s a real scandal,” added Terri Hauser, an aide to Broomfield. “The last time they tested this fleet, they took two ships at random. One they filled with the wrong gas and it had to be towed back to port. The other started to sink.”

Finger-pointing over the condition of the fleet already has begun. Bush Administration officials note that a $240-million funding request for the Ready Reserve fleet last year was slashed to $89 million by Congress, and only $6.7 million was appropriated for maintenance of the 130 older vessels. After the gulf crisis began, Congress approved $225 million for the fleet this year.

Without enough U.S. cargo vessels to support Operation Desert Shield, the Pentagon has chartered 20 to 30 foreign-flagged ships each day since the sea lift began. While the use of those vessels has been militarily convenient and politically symbolic, it has illustrated how America’s national security interests depend on other nations.

“All I can say is if we didn’t have the cooperation of foreign countries, we’d be in big trouble,” said Joseph Walsh, who is heading a special congressional audit of the reserve fleet.

Not everyone agrees that America’s sea lift is in trouble. Ronald O’Rourke, a national defense specialist of the Congressional Research Service, said in an interview that “the foreign-flag charters and U.S. requests for allied sea lift help may largely reflect a strategy for minimizing charter costs and increasing allied participation rather than a shortfall of comparable U.S.-flag assets.”

Chartering a foreign-flag ship can cost $7,500 to $35,000 a day, which is often cheaper than spending $1.5 million to prepare a Ready Reserve ship for sea, or $4 million or more for a Victory ship.

“If you need a ship for one trip, it’s a lot more responsible to charter one for $10,000 a day than pay to break out one of the RRF ships,” said one Pentagon official, who asked not to be identified.

Another Pentagon official, Vice Adm. Francis R. Donavan, lauded the sea lift’s performance in the gulf crisis. “I consider it a huge success with some flaws,” said Donavan, commander of the Navy’s Military Sealift Command. “I know we moved the cargo. I know the ships performed.”

The delays that occurred were reasonable given how quickly the crisis flared, he said.

“This was an event where we had no real advance warning. We started from a cold start,” Donavan said. “Most of the time, you would plan on having 30 days warning to break out so many ships.”

But critics credit the success of mounting Operation Desert Shield as much to luck as planning.

“Operation Desert Shield . . . demonstrates that while we have been stockpiling billion-dollar glamour weapons, the U.S. merchant marine--a vital link in the supply line--has been neglected,” Rep. Jolene Unsoeld (D-Wash.) recently told a House subcommittee.

Retired Vice Adm. Albert Herberger, now a maritime industry consultant, described Operation Desert Shield as “the last wake-up call for sea lift.”

“We are lucky. So far it has not been a shooting war,” said Herberger. “Nevertheless, it has been on a scale where we know our ships were not supported well enough . . . in this case, some were 10 or 15 days late.

“It was not a life or death situation. But it could have been,” said Herberger, whose last assignment was deputy commander-in-chief of the U.S. Transportation Command--the post now held by Butcher.

In a speech that raised the specter of a Mideast crisis months before it occurred, Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) told a union gathering in Bal Harbour, Fla., on Feb. 15 that the Administration was running a “voodoo maritime policy” by relying on foreign-flagged vessels.

“Will these ships be available in a short-term, short-notice type of war?” Nunn asked. “A second big question, will these crews be reliable in a war? Suppose we have a war in the Middle East or in Africa; will the crews of Liberian ships be available? Will they be dependable? Not just Liberia but many other nations with these flags?”

Operation Desert Shield has undermined some of Nunn’s criticism. Pentagon reports show that a Liberian-flagged tanker was among the foreign vessels that performed quickly and ably under charter for Desert Shield. So were ships from Korea, Kuwait and Japan.

But the operation also underscored some of his concerns. After Japan promised $1 billion in aid to Desert Shield, for example, its first cargo shipment--800 trucks and vans sought by U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia--was delayed when the owners and crew of a Japanese freighter demanded assurances they and their vessel would be protected.

Indeed, international maritime law gives foreign seamen the right not to proceed into a war-like operations area. Some critics worry that any dependence on foreign-chartered ships could threaten supply efforts to the gulf if shooting starts.

Part of America’s dependence on foreign shipping stems from 1986 tax laws that eliminated preferences for America’s shipbuilding industry.

“In the early 1980s, the Reagan Administration started removing subsidies that made the industry less competitive in the world market,” Butcher said. “And the 1986 tax reform said: ‘Either compete or die.’ ”

U.S. commercial shipping is in critical condition, Butcher said, noting that U.S.-flagged vessels today carry only 3.9% of the nation’s imports and exports, compared to 50% in 1950.

That fact alone, according to Butcher and others, signals potential danger to U.S. national security interests.

“The leadership to resolve this problem must come from the President of the United States, who must give Congress the signal that the Administration is willing to act,” said Michael Sacco, president of the 85,000-member Seafarers International Union.

Early last year, a presidential commission similarly urged action by the White House, concluding that national security was imperiled by the decline of the nation’s maritime industry. The commission recommended spending $13 billion over the next decade--an amount it described as “trivial” compared to annual defense outlays of $300 billion.

“It’s troubling,” Butcher said. “I’m troubled by it as a transportation guy, a naval officer and an American citizen. I think this country has to ask itself if it wants to depend almost entirely on foreign ships to keep us surviving economically, during military operations as well as in peacetime.”

Krikorian reported from Los Angeles and Toth from Washington. Staff writer Douglas Frantz in Washington contributed to this story.