PERSPECTIVES ON THE MIDDLE EAST : Sky-High Demands Point to War : The embargo is felt deeply in Iraq and will soon hurt more. On its own, it is likely to achieve U.N. objectives.

The United Nations embargo against Iraq, backed up by a naval blockade, is the most successful ever achieved aside from time of war. Early on, it was officially estimated that it would require a year for the embargo to work. It now appears to be working more rapidly than anticipated. In three months, civilian production is estimated to have declined by some 40%. Oil exports are nil and export earnings have dropped correspondingly. Iraq’s hoard of hard currency, necessary to sustain smuggling, is dwindling away. The economic pressure can only grow worse.

We know that such burdens must ultimately affect political judgment and political will. In time, the original objectives of the United Nations (Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and restoration of the government there) will be attained. Already, Saddam Hussein shows a willingness, if not an eagerness, to compromise. One no longer hears that Kuwait is for all eternity the 19th province of Iraq. But for some, ultimately may not be soon enough, and for others the original objectives may not be sufficient.

To the extent that those original objectives are augmented by demands that Saddam Hussein stand trial as a war criminal, that Iraq provide compensation for the damage it has done, that Iraq’s military capacity must be dismantled or destroyed, or that Saddam Hussein be removed from power, his determination to hang on will be strengthened. Some may prefer such a response in that it precludes a settlement and makes recourse to military force more likely. Nonetheless, if one avoids this list of additional demands and is satisfied with the original objectives, the probability that the economic sanctions will result in a satisfactory outcome is very high. Since the original estimate was that the sanctions route would require a year, it seems rather illogical to express impatience with them because they will not have produced the hoped-for results in six months.

In this connection one should also note the frequently expressed view that Hussein must not be “rewarded” for his aggression, but instead must be “punished.” As an expression of emotion it is understandable, but it must not obscure our sense of reality. Hussein is being punished and punished severely. He has forfeited $20 billion of foreign-exchange earnings a year--$30 billion at the current oil price. Iraq’s credit is totally destroyed. When Hussein looks across the border at Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates, they are prospering because of his actions. He is likely to be consumed by envy.

Moreover, his preponderance in OPEC is now gone. He is diplomatically isolated. His military position will slowly be degraded. His pawns in Lebanon have been wiped out by his chief Baathist rival, (Syrian President Hafez) Assad, who has immensely strengthened his own position. To allow our political rhetoric to obscure the severe punishment that has already been meted out, or to suggest that our current policy is in some way unsuccessful and that Hussein’s position is now or is potentially enviable, strikes me as misconceived.

One must recognize that to this point Saddam Hussein has remained unmoved by either appeals or international declarations. It is only the prospect that force might be used against him that has brought forth any sign of a willingness to compromise. The principal goal of the Administration in deciding on these deployments may simply be to increase the pressure on Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait.

Yet the situation is more complicated. As special Soviet envoy Yevgeny Primakov has indicated, even if Hussein is prepared to withdraw from Kuwait, he would require clear evidence that the sanctions would be terminated and that military force would not subsequently be employed against Iraq. In the absence of such commitments his incentive to withdraw is weak.

It should also be noted that Primakov’s observations were confined to the original objective of forcing an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and the restoration of the legitimate regime. Of late, some additional goals have been hinted or stated: the elimination of Iraq’s capacity to intimidate its neighbors, the removal of Iraq’s military capability, the removal of Saddam Hussein from power and the ending of Iraq’s quest for a nuclear capability. To the extent that these additional objectives are embraced, either in appearance or reality, the prospect for a voluntary Iraqi withdrawal is sharply diminished.