PERSPECTIVE ON THE GULF CRISIS : Peace Is at Hand, Winner in Doubt : Saddam Hussein yields on the hostages, but he has already made one major point and sees other gains ahead.

With luck, the Persian Gulf crisis can now begin moving toward a peaceful resolution. If that proves true, George Bush will be credited with a successful blend of bluff and bluster that faced down Saddam Hussein. Among America’s Western partners, there will be a collective release of tensions as the war clouds disperse. Only in the Middle East will the verdict be a while in coming, and there the Iraqi dictator may yet be judged to have won on points.

This remarkable set of conclusions flows naturally from recent events. Last Friday, President Bush bowed to rising domestic alarm that had been precipitated by his Nov. 8 announcement of a major increase of U.S. troop deployments to Saudi Arabia. By proposing to send Secretary of State James A. Baker III to Baghdad and to invite Iraqi Foreign Minister Tarik Aziz to Washington, Bush effectively abandoned the option of going to war. Once diplomacy starts, only some Iraqi provocation--or utter stupidity in negotiations--could enable Bush to prepare the nation and the global coalition for war.

This point was dramatically reinforced by Hussein’s announcement that he is prepared to release all hostages. Heretofore, he has released people selectively, attempting to coax their governments out of the coalition or to play on American sympathies. Now he has apparently calculated that he can gain more benefit--a further erosion of any popular American support for war--by giving Bush one of his key demands.

Iraq’s change of policy on the hostages must be credited to the President’s firmness. But it also reflects a willingness to concede a central Iraqi point. Throughout the crisis, Saddam Hussein has attempted to define it as pitting himself as champion of the Arab people against George Bush as representative of the “imperialists and Zionists.” Thus it was critical for the United States to build a global coalition that would show the crisis as “Iraq against the world.” By the same token, it was important that any negotiating with Iraq be done by, say, the U.N. secretary general, not by the United States.

Now Hussein can trumpet to his people that the Americans came to him. This also gives him a face-saver, in U.S. recognition of his importance, should he choose to give in on the central U.S. demand of a unilateral and complete Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.

In terms of preserving credibility at home, President Bush must achieve that objective, and he is holding firm in its pursuit, as well as reiterating, along with all other top Administration officials, what increasingly seems to be a bluff: that the United States will go to war if need be.

Despite Administration assertions that there will be no flexibility in negotiations during the Baker and Aziz visits, public bargaining has been going on for months. As early as his address to the U.N. General Assembly on Oct. 8, Bush conceded that if Iraq withdraws, “there may be opportunities for Iraq and Kuwait to settle their differences permanently.” That was a not very subtle way of saying that Kuwait, on its own, could reach an accommodation with Iraq, provided the principle was respected that Iraq not appear to be rewarded for aggression.

Such an accommodation could include arrangements whereby Iraq would at least have use if not ownership of two Kuwaiti islands at Iraq’s one outlet to the Persian Gulf, as well as a greater share of the oil reserves in dispute between the two countries.

From the perspective of Bush’s standing in the United States and with allies abroad, such an after-the-fact deal between Iraq and Kuwait--provided there was “a decent interval” (as it was called in Vietnam War days)--would be lost in the applause earned by his statecraft.

From the Middle Eastern perspective, however, a diplomatic solution might be viewed quite differently. If Hussein is able to claim that he has derived benefit from negotiating with the United States, Arab leaders will take careful note. More important, they will understand that he has escaped from the crisis with his military machine, real and potential, intact. Appeasement is a well-developed art of self-preservation in the region, and Hussein could gain through leaving Kuwait what he failed to achieve by invading it.

Thus, following the crisis, it will be critical, both for security in the region and for American standing there, that the United States pursue objectives that are not part of U.N. resolutions--especially cutting Hussein’s military power down to size and dealing with his access to weapons of mass destruction. Yet, unless war begins by accident or Iraqi miscalculation, these objectives must now be pursued by other means, which probably cannot include continuing the economic embargo once Iraq has departed Kuwait.

As the current crisis shows early signs of resolution, the focus must begin to include what comes afterward. There can be no easy U.S. disengagement. International agreement must be reached to deny Iraq the tools for developing nuclear weapons. Difficult Arab-Israeli diplomacy must be given high priority.

This complex new agenda for American policy in the Middle East will be more daunting than anything this nation has ever tried to achieve in a region of inherent trouble. But, today, there is a good chance that the Bush strategy of sanctions, buildup and bluff can take us to that new agenda without a war.