Let Us Never Fear to Negotiate : Iraq and U.S. hassle over Baker’s Baghdad talk date

The clock may be ticking down to that dark moment when war becomes the only way to resolve the Persian Gulf crisis.

One month from today, Iraq, if its forces remain in Kuwait, becomes subject to a U.N.-sanctioned war. That’s the target date that Security Council Resolution 678 established for compliance with the will of the world body. The resolution doesn’t compel military action at 12:01 a.m. on Jan. 16--or even at any time at all thereafter. But it seems reasonable to suggest that at that moment the world will be closer than ever to a major war if Saddam Hussein sits tight or rejects President Bush’s diplomatic overtures and, in effect, invites the conflict to be settled by force.

And that is precisely the consequence he faces. Iraq’s president must understand that if he fails to pull back his invading army from ravaged Kuwait, he runs the risk of losing all that he has achieved in his own country. He may possibly believe that he can gain from a fight against the United States, triggering an uproar throughout the Arab world against the West and Israel. That gamble could well blow up in his face. A genuine Iraqi patriot--as opposed to a megalomaniac--would realize that it is in Iraq’s interest to comply with the United Nations demand.

It may be that Saddam has already begun to reevaluate his position. Certainly the release of the foreign hostages is a good sign. But as that release postdated the Security Council resolution on the use of force, his concession cannot be seen as anything other than a confirmation of the wisdom of Bush’s policy of maintaining a credible military option. Saddam Hussein’s career indicates that he is not a man moved by moral suasion; he may not even be susceptible to rational argument. So he is more likely to regard overt concessions as a sign of weakness rather than strength.

This is not to say that Secretary of State Baker should journey to Baghdad to meet with Hussein--if such a meeting can ever be scheduled--with absolutely no room to maneuver. The President would scarcely send his top emissary on that basis; we would hardly be quarreling with Baghdad now over the need to hold the meeting well before Jan. 12 if the purpose of the talks was to do nothing more than restate each side’s position--which both understand fully already.

Indeed, the American people, who clearly support the President’s resolute policy toward Iraq, would not regard a true diplomatic negotiation as a policy failure or appeasement, as long as it resulted in a prompt Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. As for the fate of the disputed oil field and the pair of offshore islands that Baghdad covets, that’s an issue, as Bush and Baker have said repeatedly, for possible subsequent negotiations between the legitimate government of Kuwait and Saddam Hussein.

There’s no reason to trumpet the importance of having an adequate period of time for talks between Baker and Hussein if there is nothing to talk about. As John F. Kennedy once said, let us never negotiate out of fear, but let us never fear to negotiate. The Bush policy of carrying a big stick while talking is fine, but it doesn’t limit his options. One hopes that it only enhances them.