Baker Text: ‘The Choice Really Is Theirs to Make’

Following is the text of Secretary of State James A. Baker III’s news conference Wednesday after his meeting with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tarik Aziz:

I have just given President Bush a full report of our meeting today. I told him that Minister Aziz and I had completed a serious and extended diplomatic conversation in an effort to find a political solution to the crisis in the Gulf.

I met with Minister Aziz today not to negotiate, as we have made clear we would not do--that is, negotiate backwards from United Nations Security Council resolutions--but I met with him today to communicate. And communicate means listening as well as talking, and we did that, both of us.

The message that I conveyed from President Bush and our coalition partners was that Iraq must either comply with the will of the international community and withdraw peacefully from Kuwait or be expelled by force. Regrettably, ladies and gentlemen, I heard nothing today that --in over six hours, I heard nothing that suggested to me any Iraqi flexibility whatsoever on complying with the United Nations Security Council resolutions.

There have been too many Iraqi miscalculations. The Iraqi government miscalculated the international response to the invasion of Kuwait, expecting the world community to stand idly by while Iraqi forces systematically pillaged a peaceful neighbor.

It miscalculated the response, I think, to the barbaric policy of holding thousands of foreign hostages, thinking that somehow cynically doling them out a few at a time would somehow win political advantage. And it miscalculated that it could divide the international community and gain something thereby from its aggression.

So let us hope that Iraq does not miscalculate again. The Iraqi leadership must have no doubt that the 28 nations which have deployed forces to the gulf in support of the United Nations have both the power and the will to evict Iraq from Kuwait. If it should choose--and the choice is Iraq’s--if it should choose to continue its brutal occupation of Kuwait, Iraq will be choosing a military confrontation which it cannot win and which will have devastating consequences for Iraq.

I made these points with Minister Aziz--not to threaten but to inform--and I did so with no sense of satisfaction. For we genuinely desire a peaceful outcome. And as both President Bush and I have said on many occasions, the people of the United States have no quarrel with the people of Iraq.

I simply wanted to leave as little room as possible for yet another tragic miscalculation by the Iraqi leadership. And I would suggest to you, ladies and gentlemen, that this is still a confrontation that Iraq can avoid.

The path of peace remains open, and that path is laid out very clearly in 12 United Nations Security Council resolutions adopted over a period of over five months. But now the choice lies with the Iraqi leadership. The choice really is theirs to make. And let us all hope that that leadership will have the wisdom to choose the path of peace.

Jim, and then Barry?

Question: Mr. Secretary, what do you, what do your allies plan to do next to bring this message home?

Answer: Well, you say, “What do the allies plan to do next,” and I think it’s important for everyone to note that this is a coalition, this is not Iraq versus the United States.

This is Iraq versus the international community. This happens to have been the first time that we’ve had an opportunity to find agreement on meeting--U.S. and Iraq.

So I don’t know what the next steps are, Jim. I do know this, that time is running on, as I said a day or so ago. After five months and 12 United Nations Security Council resolutions, it seems to me that it is almost evident that the time for talk is running out.

It’s time for Iraq to act, and to act quickly by getting out of Kuwait.

But this is a coalition, and we are seeking to implement solemn resolutions of the United Nations. And so perhaps there may be a way that the secretary general of the United Nations could use his good offices here in the remaining six or so days that we have left.

I will say that--I’ve already mentioned that I didn’t hear anything that to me demonstrated flexibility, nor did I hear any new proposals, but I would like to take note of the fact that the minister did restate their proposal that the United States pick a day for him to come to the United States and Iraq pick a day for me to go to Baghdad.

Those of you who have been traveling with us know what our answer is to that. We’ve given it over the past four or five days and I gave it to the minister tonight. We offered 15 separate days for a visit to Baghdad. The President of the United States made the proposal for face-to-face discussions. We are glad that Iraq accepted this one, because we did have six hours during which we could make our position known to them and they could make their position known to us.

But as far as next steps are concerned, it seems to me that because we are talking about a coalition and we are talking about implementing resolutions of the United Nations that perhaps there could be--I don’t know what the position of the government of Iraq would be on this--but perhaps there would be some room for us to seek the use of the good offices of the secretary general of the United Nations.

Barry?

Q: Mr. Secretary, did the Iraqi foreign minister reiterate his demands for what he calls “justice and fairness for the Palestinians?” I mean, was there any wavering in the U.S. position, as you may have expressed it to him, that the two issues are not related, are not linked?

A: No. There was--he expressed his position.

There was no change in our position, which is that the two issues are not linked. I did make the point that I don’t think that many people believe that Iraq invaded Kuwait in order to help the Palestinians. And if they did, it was another miscalculation, because it hasn’t helped the Palestinians.

I think most people believe that Iraq invaded Kuwait for Iraq’s own aggrandizement. And I think most people realize that Iraq is trying to use the Palestinian issue to shield its aggression against Kuwait which, in my view at least, remains an obstacle to broader peace in the region rather than a catalyst for achieving that broader peace.

And I made the point as well that rewarding Iraq’s aggression with a link to the Arab-Israeli peace process would really send a terrible signal, not only to genuine peacemakers in the region but also to other would-be aggressors at what we think is a defining moment in history.

Bill?

Q: Mr. Secretary, are you willing--is the United States willing--to talk again to Iraq before the January 15th deadline? And did you discuss with the President the possibility that you may still go to Baghdad?

A. I had already discussed that with President Bush, and I had already told you what our view was. And the President himself, I think, said, “There will be no trip to Baghdad.” The proposal which he originally made was, in effect, rejected by Iraq.

We offered 15 separate days. They continued to insist upon only one, the 12th of January, which we think was and still is an obvious effort to--to avoid the deadline of January the 15th. And we are not--we’re not interested in that. We think this--we think this deadline is real. And our coalition partners think the deadline is real.

Q: Did you bring it up with the President today?

A: No.

I reported fully to the President, of course.

Q: Could you run through for us--you spoke for six hours--could you give us a sense of how the discussions evolved over those six hours? What did you begin with? What did he counter with? Why did you feel it necessary after two hours to call the President?

A: Well, we broke for lunch and I think this is, I think this meeting is sufficiently important that I should call the President, and so I did, just as I did as soon as we were finished.

Q: Did you begin by reading your letter--how did. . . .

A. But I began by saying that I was here to--not to negotiate, but to communicate, as I’ve just told you, that I was here for a serious dialogue and an effort to find a political and peaceful solution, but that they should not expect that we would be prepared to walk backwards from U.N. Security Council resolutions, that the terms of those resolutions had already been--have been set. And I told the minister I wanted to handle the meeting in whatever way he wanted, and I gave him the choice and he chose for me to go first, just as he--I gave him the choice as well as to how to report to you--and he suggested that I come down here first. So that’s how we got where we are here tonight.

But let me say that I--I talked to him about how we saw the situation, about the history of the Security Council resolutions, about what I thought could happen in the event of observance of those resolutions and what I feared would happen in the event of Iraq’s non-observance of those resolutions. He then presented the position of the government of Iraq. And he will be down here in a few moments and he can--now we can’t run through six hours of dialogue here. Nobody else would get to ask any questions.

Q: One quick follow-up. How detailed were you about the extent of force that would be used against Iraq if it does not comply with the U.N. resolutions by January 15th?

A: Well, I didn’t give--I didn’t get into things like that--that would properly be in the realm of operational security matters.

I hope I--I hope I effectively made the case with respect to what at least our opinion was of the 28-nation multinational force that is there in the gulf.

Let’s go over here to Craig.

Q: Mr. Secretary, is the United States interested in any sort of phased withdrawal, be it one supervised by the United Nations? And if this withdrawal began by January 15th, will the United States guarantee there will be no military attack on Iraq?

A: Let me say--I should have said this in answer to Tom’s question--I assured the minister that if they implement the United Nations resolutions, and if they withdraw from Iraq (sic) and permit the restoration--from Kuwait--and permit the restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait, that I could assure him that there would be no military action by the United States. And that I felt that there would, under those circumstances, be no military action by any other elements of the international coalition.

On the first question, the United Nations resolutions speak for themselves. We are not here --after all, we are part of an international coalition. We are part of 28 countries, even more countries that have been helping financially and economically. And it is not up to us to walk backwards from solemn resolutions of the United Nations.

Q: Mr. Secretary, you have said in the past--you have said in the past that you would seek approval for the use of force at the highest levels. Are you now at that stage in the process in which you will be using the use of force from other governments?

A: No, but the clock is ticking on, John, and I made that point to the minister today. As far as we are concerned, we have not taken the--the President of the United States, who alone under--under--in our--who alone in our Executive Branch under our system can make that decision, has not taken that decision. And I’m not aware that any other governments have. Yes, sir.

Q: Mr. Secretary, in the remaining six days before the U.N. deadline, would you welcome an initiative by some other European allies, or even Arab countries such as Algeria, that would perhaps include sending a European foreign minister to Baghdad to seek a peaceful resolution?

A: Well, this is an international coalition, let me say it one more time and, therefore, as I’ve just indicated to you, it’s an international coalition seeking to implement solemn resolutions of the world’s peacekeeping and security body, and therefore there might, it seems to me, be some useful purpose served by perhaps the secretary general--secretary general’s good offices. But I said last night and I have said for months, we welcome any and all diplomatic efforts to solve this crisis peacefully and politically. We want it solved peacefully and politically.

I’m disappointed, of course, that we did not--did not receive any indications today whatsoever of any flexibility in the position of Iraq, so we would welcome any and all diplomatic efforts. We do think if there are efforts by the international coalition that the message should be uniform, as it has been for five months, and it should not be a mixed message. But we want a peaceful and political solution. Yes, Mary.

Q: Mr. Secretary, can you tell us--you keep saying you saw no indication of flexibility. Did the foreign minister actually tell you that Iraq intends to keep Kuwait and will not withdraw from Kuwait?

A: He did not make that statement, but he did not indicate that there was any chance that they would withdraw, Mary. But I did not see, frankly, any flexibility in their position.

Well, you can ask him questions when he gets down here.

Ralph?

Q: Mr. Secretary, did you discuss in answer--in answer to any of the discussion about the problems raised elsewhere in the Middle East by the Iraqi Foreign Minister--did you discuss the efforts the United States has made in the past to seek Arab-Israeli peace--

A: Yes.

Q: --to persuade Iraq that the United States was serious--genuinely interested--in resolving those problems?

A: Yes, we went through the--we went through a good bit of the history of the personal efforts that I made for 14 months to bring about a dialogue between Arab--between Palestinians and Israelis. We went through the--the experience of the United States--in bringing about the Camp David accords and in bringing about peace between Israel and Egypt. And we had a full discussion of that issue, a complete discussion of it.

I want to make it clear that I made it very clear throughout that there would be no linkage here of that issue to Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait, and we would not agree, as a condition of their withdrawing, to any subsequent specific steps to be taken with respect to that. But we did have--they brought it up--and we had a very full discussion.

Q: What was their answer? What was--

A: We disagree. We frankly disagree with respect to that, as I think you know. And I’ve already told you why I think linkage is a bad idea. I think that it doesn’t--it will not tend to promote peace in the region. It will tend to be read as a reward for aggressors, and it would jeopardize future peace in the region.

Mark?

Q: Mr. Secretary, what did you tell the foreign minister about the willingness of the American people to go to war and the impact of political pressure on the President’s decision-making?

A: I said don’t miscalculate the resolve of the American people, who are very slow to anger but who believe strongly in principle and who believe that we should not reward aggression, and that big countries with powerful military machines should not be permitted to invade, occupy and brutalize their peaceful neighbors. Chris?

Q: Mr. Secretary, you’ve told us what you didn’t hear. You didn’t hear any flexibility. And you told us that there was quite a bit of discussion of history. Could you tell us what you did hear? Did you hear justifications from the foreign minister? Did you hear a repeat of what they’ve been saying in public for some time?

A: I heard some things that I, quite frankly, found very hard to believe, but I’ll let him go into the detail here. But I heard, for instance, that their action in invading Kuwait was defensive in nature, that they were being threatened by Kuwait. And I will tell you the same thing I told the minister, which is I find it very hard to believe that any nation in the world will believe that. David?

Q: Mr. Secretary, even though you did spend six hours here today talking to Foreign Minister Aziz, in the past 5 1/2 months you haven’t had much contact with Iraq. What’s to prevent the historians of this conflict from concluding that there was a failure of diplomacy here and we slid toward war without trying?

A: Well, there’s been a lot of conversations with the leadership of Iraq, all to no avail. The secretary general’s already had one failed mission. There have been any number of Arab efforts to solve this crisis, all to no avail. There have been efforts by others--other Western governments. The Soviet Union has tried very hard. They’ve had meetings. We have now had a meeting.

And so, you know, people can write whatever they decide they might want to write. But the truth of the matter is we have been--we have been very, I think--the international coalition--very responsible and measured in our approach to this. We have not, as some might suggest, “gone off half-cocked.”

We have gone through the United Nations patiently working for consensus within the Security Council. And it is only after 5 1/2 months and the passage of 12 Security Council resolutions that we find ourselves at the point of use of force, David. So I think that there’s been more diplomacy exercised in this--in this crisis than in--in almost any that I can think of. And the one thing I would ask you all not to do is to equate diplomacy and appeasement. We made that mistake in the ‘30s. At least for our part, we don’t intend to make it again. Saul?

Q: Mr. Secretary, in a sense two questions. Did the foreign minister suggest Iraq might withdraw from Kuwait if there were linkage as, let us say, the French have suggested, or others have suggested? And if he did, is linkage--the principle of linkage--a reason for the loss of--and the insistence on that principle--a reason for the loss of lots of lives?

A: Well, I don’t think he said that explicitly, Saul.

I think, perhaps, it was implicit in his comments. But he’ll be here, and you can ask him. But it’s--it’s more than just the principle of linkage, as I understand their position. There would have to be agreement to conferences and that sort of thing that get you behind--that get you beyond just the simple fact of linkage. Margaret?

Q: Mr. Secretary, did Minister Aziz make a specific proposal under which Iraq would get out of Kuwait? However unacceptable it was to you, was there a specific proposal?

A: No. There was no specific proposal. He restated the positions that Iraq has stated publicly in the past. He defended their action in invading and occupying Kuwait. He explained how he feels that was justified. And again, he’ll be down here and you can ask him yourselves. Susan?

Q: Mr. Secretary, you made it clear that you were not going to Baghdad. But did you and the foreign minister talk about future diplomatic contacts at your level between the United States and Iraq, or did this one 6 1/2-hour meeting represent the conclusion of diplomatic initiatives by the United States?

A: Well, we will maintain our diplomatic contacts through our charge (d’affaires) in Baghdad until the 12th of January. I asked for and received the personal assurance of the minister that Joe Wilson and the four other Americans in our embassy there will be permitted to leave Baghdad on the 12th of January and will not be restrained from so doing. Yes, Juan?

Q: Mr. Secretary, your mood, if I may say, seems pretty somber at this point. Can you kind of describe your state of mind and your mood after what has occurred today?

A: Somber.

Q: Somber.

A: You got it.

Q: Are you advising an evacuation?

A: I’m not saying that. I’m saying--I’m telling you that we are--that we have received--we have asked for and received assurances for our remaining five diplomatic personnel to leave on the 12th of January, which is the date that you well know is very close to the January 15th deadline and happens to be the date that Iraq has been insisting on for three weeks for the meeting.

Q: What about other Americans--what about other Americans, sir?

A: Well, I think most all Americans are out of Iraq. All that want to leave are gone, as far as I know. Joanna?

Q: Mr. Secretary, can you tell us now about the letter from President Bush? Was it in fact in Arabic? What was the tone of it? Did it contain graphic military scenarios intended to intimidate?

A: I regret to inform you, Joanna, that the minister choose not to receive the letter from President Bush. He read it, very slowly and very carefully, but he would not accept it. Nor would the Iraqi Embassy in Washington accept an Arabic courtesy translation. You will have to ask the minister why he did not accept the letter.

My own opinion, for what it’s worth, and it’s only an opinion, was that he came here not authorized to accept a letter that walked away from the United Nations resolutions, which is something that we cannot and of course will not do. Yes, sir?

Q: Did they tell you or discuss the possibility of convening the United Nations again to discuss the gulf crisis? You know that President Mitterrand, he has proposed that most probably a new discussion is possible. It might be helpful. Have you discussed this eventuality with the Iraqi minister?

A: No, it did not come up in my meeting today with the Iraqi minister. I did speak to that question and that issue a day or so ago, and I believe that President Bush has spoken to it as well. I don’t know what an additional Security Council meeting at this stage could do, because what we are talking about here is faithful implementation of resolutions of the council, the last one of which says that if Iraq does not withdraw by midnight on January the 15th, force can be used to effect that withdrawal. We have had 12 resolutions--

Q: What about--

A: --of the United Nations Security Council.

Q: --of President Mitterrand’s suggestions?

A: Well, I can’t answer you question, you ought--I would refer you to President Mitterrand, but I have just said that perhaps there would be some utility in trying to use the good offices of the secretary general. Bob?

Q: Do you have any reason to believe that there is any way to avoid a war as of right now?

A: Yes. I hope there is. There’s been no decision taken for that eventuality, and as I--and I would simply refer you to my opening statement, where I made the point that I hope we do not have yet one more miscalculation by the government of Iraq. I would also refer you to the statements which President Bush and I and other members of the coalition have made over the course of the last several days or weeks, and which I repeated today to the minister again, not in a threatening way, but simply so that he would know where our head is and how we feel and what we think. And that is that this January 15th deadline, in our minds, is real. Iraq can choose to believe that or not, but it is real in our minds and in the minds of our coalition partners. We hope that they will believe that we think it’s real and that they will act to implement the solemn resolutions of the United Nations.

Q: Mr. Secretary?

A: Yes, sir. Right here.

Q: Mr. Secretary, would you regret that you would have still liked to go--even on the 12th--and meet instead of Mr. Tarik, Saddam himself--still a difference of three days?

A: The 12th--we’ve said for the last three weeks the 12th of January was unacceptable to us because it is just an effort to avoid the deadline. It’s obvious that’s why the 12th was originally suggested. We’ve said for a long time that date is unacceptable to us. It remains unacceptable to us. John?

Q: Mr. Secretary, did you spell out your vision of what the gulf would look like if they withdrew peacefully? In other words, some of the restrictions that you have talked about that must be imposed upon Iraq even if they did withdraw, did you lay that plan out for him in some way?

A: Yes, I did in my original presentation this morning, John. And I can’t--I don’t have time to go through all of that with you now, but that falls right in the--in the category of the assurance that there would not be military force used against Iraq by the United States if they withdrew from Kuwait and permitted the restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait.

Q: Did you talk about the nuclear weapons, the chemical weapons, the size of the Iraqi military, things that are a concern to many in the Western coalition beyond the occupation of Kuwait?

A: We had a full discussion of the questions of--of questions about weapons of mass destruction. I pointed out the interests of the United States as we’ve expressed before in addressing that issue, and addressing that subject. And we talked about the presence--the multinational presence there, and the fact that President Bush has said that we do not desire nor want a permanent military ground presence in the Middle East that--I mean in the gulf. That we are not--we want to see our troops come home just as fast as the security situation will allow. I mean, those are the kinds of things that we discussed, as you might expect.

Right back there?

Q: Mr. Secretary, could you just please describe to us the point at which the meeting broke off, and why and how did it happen? Was it that you finished off, did Mr. Aziz finish off, was there just nothing to talk about any more? Please describe that.

A: Well, it was simply a case, I think, that after six hours of discussion we both had pretty well made the points that we had come to make and that was it. I don’t believe that there was anything left unsaid. He said everything I think he came to say, and I had said everything that I had come to say. So, it--well I think frankly--it lasted longer than many of you might have anticipated at the beginning. Yes, sir?

Q: Mr. Secretary, you mentioned that you are going to call back these American diplomats? Will you also ask the Iraqi diplomats to leave the United States on January the 12th?

A: No. We will ask the Iraqi government to draw down their diplomatic presence in the United States on the 12th, but I--as I indicated to the minister, we would be willing to permit the presence of a small diplomatic contingent in Washington. Yes?

Q: Mr. Secretary, do you feel that if you would have accepted the fact of the linkage, there could have been a proposition of Iraq retiring from Kuwait?

A: I don’t know. Why don’t you ask the minister that because when you say accepted linkage, I’m not entirely sure exactly what you mean. And--I mean, do you mean if we had accepted--if we had indicated a willingness to go to an international conference to handle the question of the Middle East? Ask him the question.

It would be very interesting. You know what our position has been for a long time. It would set an extraordinarily unfortunate precedent, we think, and that--and would not, in the long run, contribute to peace in the region, but would contribute to instability because aggressors would be seen to be rewarded for their aggression. It’s something we simply cannot consider. Norm?

Q: Mr. Secretary, was there any single issue on which the difference between the United States and Iraq was narrowed during this 6 1/2 hours?

A: Well, let me say that I--I think that the discussions--I’ve already indicated it was a serious one. I think that the tone of it was good, Norm, under the--as good as you could expect under the circumstances. We weren’t pounding the table and shouting at each other. It was a very reasoned and, I think, responsible discussion by two diplomats who really would like to find a peaceful and political solution to this problem. But I’ve--I’ve already said to you I did not detect flexibility in the position of Iraq as they have stated it over the past several days.

Now, we--again I invite you to my opening statement. We still have six days. I just hope that they will think about this meeting, that they will focus on it, that when Foreign Minister Aziz gets back and reports to his president, that perhaps there could be some change in their position. But the--there cannot be a negotiation here because the terms of the United Nations Security Council resolutions were worked out in the debate in the United Nations, and the international coalition is bound to those resolutions.

One last question. Is that--yes?

Q: Mr. Secretary, would you be willing to meet Saddam somewhere else apart from Baghdad, if you--and was that--

A: That was not--that was not discussed. It has never been proposed by Iraq. The Iraqi proposal, as you know, for some weeks has been, “We pick a date for Baker to come to Baghdad. You pick a date for Aziz to come to Washington. And we’ll work it that way.” That’s been out there for a long, long time. There’s never been any suggestion of the other.

Thank you.