PERSONAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE DAY THE WAR BEGAN: JANUARY 16, 1991 : THE DIPLOMAT

Few Americans older than 50 have forgotten where they were on Dec. 7, 1941, when they heard the Japanese had attacked Pearl Harbor; or on Nov. 22, 1963, when they learned President John F. Kennedy had been shot. In each case, the event prompted both excitement and apprehension--the world had suddenly been changed and would never be quite the same again.

Many shared that reaction Jan. 16, when our Air Force first attacked Baghdad. We sensed a seminal event had occurred and we faced a more complex future. No one could foretell the course of the war, or how it would affect the long-term prospects for peace. At that moment, there were too many imponderables.

Would Iraq try to weaken the coalition by requesting a cease-fire? The United States would oppose it, but some of our closest partners may welcome a chance for renewed bargaining.

Second, if we clobbered Iraq too effectively, would we not leave it an economic and political basket case with its neighbors each striving for a slice of its territory? If, on the other hand, we get involved in a long bloody war, do we not risk alienating the whole Arab world while building up an overflow of problems?

Third, if the war long continues, will Jordan survive--or will King Hussein be replaced by a representative of Hamas, the Islamic extremist movement making gains both in Jordan and Egypt?

Fourth, if we eliminate Saddam Hussein, might not that induce a disruptive internal power fight that could leave Iraq in the same anarchic state as Lebanon?

Fifth, will Hafez Assad of Syria emerge as leader in the fight for Arab dominance? Will Iran reclaim its role as the defender of the gulf? Clashing cultures contain the seeds for a religious war that could fan the steadily spreading firestorm of Islamic fundamentalism.

So far there has been no public indication of serious planning for the days following the war. Yet the United States cannot solve these problems alone. It is under a special disqualification: It is the big brother of Israel--the one enemy all Arabs can unite against.

Moreover, we must firmly reject any pressures for a sustained U.S. presence in the area. That only gives support to the propaganda of antagonistic Arabs that we seek to dominate the gulf’s rich oil resources. We should bring our forces home as fast as possible after the U.N. resolutions have been fulfilled, leaving a U.N. force as replacement.

On a cautionary note, we would make a ghastly mistake if we become so preoccupied with the current Persian Gulf War that we gave it exclusive priority. Although the war has absorbed the attention of the American people, it is by no means the major problem faced by the world. Iraq is a Third World country, while the United States is the most powerful nation in history. There are other areas of the world as hazardous as the Middle East. Is it prudent to have the bulk of U.S armed forces mired in the Arabian desert when the Soviet empire appears to be verging on disintegration?

Even though America cannot unilaterally cure the ills of the Middle East, it should not turn its back. As soon as the shooting stops, America must arrange for the United Nations to convene an international conference to deal with the region’s festering problems--including the Palestinian issue.

Though ever since the crisis President George Bush has spoken of a “new world order,” he has used the phrase as a figure of speech. It seemed safe to assume that he would base that new order on the concept of collective security carried out through a reinvigorated United Nations. But while speaking of a new world order, the President threw away the chance to put it to a serious test.

Soon after our coalition installed the most effective economic blockade in modern times, Bush veered onto the easy road of unilateralism. Instead of trying to organize a force under the U.N. flag, he flooded the desert with American troops. Finally, by doubling deployment in the gulf, Bush effectively committed the United States to use its forces promptly, as though we were the policemen of the world--negating a new world order.

We must rethink the U.N. Charter’s whole enforcement machinery. Experience has shown that countries are not willing to assign substantial forces to an international agency for use against an unascertained foe in unascertained terrain. Thus, the kind of U.N. force provided for in Article 43 of the charter must either be small in magnitude--a few thousand troops--or we must be content with the national force of a major power (the United States) flying a U.N. flag and receiving minor support from other nations--as in the Korean War.

Must we not sadly conclude that we are still far away from the kind of new world order hoped for with the fading of the Cold War? As long as the world remains fragmented into nation-states, there will be conflicts, and it will be hard to raise substantial bodies of troops to fight for an abstraction without the galvanizing inducement of national loyalty.

Thus, though the attack Wednesday may seem to have changed the world, it may only have made possible new realignments that, in the long run, can complicate the already tangled skein of international rivalries and encourage the lamentable fugue of attack and reprisal that is a realistic but demeaning reflection on mankind’s essential humanity.