What Happens / POSTWAR? : TO THE ISRAELIS : Closer Ties With U.S. May Encourage Peace, Boost Arms Control

Wars usually produce unforeseen consequences, sometimes healthy, sometimes tragic. In the case of U.S.-Israeli relations, Saddam Hussein’s terror attacks with Scud surface-to-surface missiles against Haifa and Tel Aviv have united the two friends more closely than at any time in recent memory. The U.S. decision to rush Patriot air-defense missiles from Europe, manned by American crews, to Israel and its willingness to provide the Israeli Air Force with top-secret codes to tell friend from foe in the war zone are compelling evidence of the new closeness. This trust has important implications for both countries and may be a necessary step toward a postwar initiative to revive the peace process and put a cap on the Middle East arms race.

Before the Persian Gulf War, U.S.-Israeli relations were schizophrenic. On the one hand, there was steady progress in military cooperation--a relationship begun during the Reagan Administration. A memorandum of understanding defined Israel as a strategic partner and, in 1987, Israel was declared a major non-NATO ally. The memorandum, and its subsequent amendments, provided the United States with extensive access to Israel’s military infrastructure.

Cooperation also extended to weapons development and procurement. U.S. financing allowed Israel to further develop its military technology, which, in turn, benefited U.S. forces. In 1983, the United States purchased $9 million in military supplies from Israel; in 1988, the figure had risen to $240 million.

On the other hand, political relations had suffered greatly from the first days of the Bush presidency. Israel was increasingly reluctant to cooperate with the United States on the Palestinian problem. Persistent U.S. criticism of Israel’s handling of the Palestinian uprising in the occupied territories--the intifada --came from both the Administration and Congress--with occasional threats to cut back on U.S. aid. Israelis noted with concern that Secretary of State James A. Baker III had never visited Israel. Rumors persisted that both Baker and George Bush himself were “Arabists”--more interested in Arab oil issues than Israeli security.

While it is true that, until the war began, senior Administration officials did not show the same warmth toward Israel that had come to be expected from Ronald Reagan and his secretary of state, George P. Shultz, it would be unwise to characterize their attitude as anti-Israeli. Rather, the Administration was overwhelmed in its first 18 months with unfolding dramas in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and China, and had little time to focus on pursuit of a Middle East peace process. Furthermore, the gridlock in the Israeli coalition and the vicissitudes of Palestinian politics must have reminded Bush and Baker of their unpleasant memories of the 1982-83 Lebanon crisis, in which both were deeply involved.

The situation did not improve following Iraq’s Aug. 2 invasion of Kuwait. While the United States agreed to send emergency military assistance to Israel, it also signed a $7-billion arms agreement with Saudi Arabia, forgave Egypt’s $7-billion debt and joined in U.N. Security Council resolutions criticizing Israel for the Oct. 8 death of 17 Palestinians during rioting.

Now, however, both the United States and Israel find they need each other more than ever. This may be a harbinger of a new maturity in the relationship--essential in view of the problems both countries will face in the aftermath of the war.

In the short run, Israel will need to cope with potential military threats from well-armed Arab neighbors and from within its own borders and the occupied territories. In addition, the Jewish state is facing the largest and most important immigration since its founding--more than one million Soviet Jews are likely to arrive in Israel in the next few years. While this influx represents a tremendous asset, it is putting great pressure on Israel’s infrastructure and its already-strapped economy. Last week, Israel requested $10 billion in new U.S. aid over the next five years to cover its increased defense needs and the cost of settling the Soviet immigrants.

But, most important, the Palestinian problem will not go away. On the one hand, Israel’s pessimism about the Palestine Liberation Organization’s willingness to make peace appears to have been validated. For this reason, the United States is unlikely to press Israel to make a leap of faith in trusting the Palestinians or to accept anything other than iron-clad security guarantees. On the other hand, having rallied international support--including a significant Arab contingent--in defense of international law, the United States will be strongly pressured to focus on the Palestinian problem.

However, the Palestinian problem cannot be decoupled from the larger Arab-Israeli conflict. Indeed, a principal incentive to renew a peace initiative is the increasingly hazardous cost of an unchecked regional arms race. Every previous Middle East war has been followed by efforts of the local countries to absorb the lessons of the fighting and acquire new weapons. In the past, the superpowers and their allies were the primary sources of these arms--in part, because the regional conflicts reflected the Cold War.

Now that the United States and the Soviet Union are acting in concert, will postwar regional arms-control arrangements be possible? There is some reason for hope--provided such proposals are linked to a peace process. Recent statements by both U.S. and Soviet officials have made reference to postwar arms-control options. While the most sweeping arms-control proposals may not be viable in the early postwar period, a wide spectrum of other initiatives are.

Included in this category could be informal “understandings” or “red lines,” multilateral supplier agreements on restrictions of weapons of mass destruction, and constraints on the transfer of certain conventional technologies--such as surface-to-surface missiles. There are already examples in the Arab-Israeli context: the well-known red lines between Syria and Israel, which neither side willingly violates. They provide a code of conduct that, in the absence of any political breakthrough, acts as a buffer to prevent the two sides from inadvertently drifting into a war.

In the past, arms-control initiatives contributed to the peace process between Israel and Egypt. The 1974-75 Sinai disengagement agreements laid the groundwork for Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem in 1977--and the subsequent Camp David Accords.

Once a political dialogue between Israel and its neighbors is under way, arms-control arrangements will become a necessary part of the process. At the same time, however, it should be noted that when Israel evacuated the Sinai, in 1982, U.S. military assistance to Egypt and Israel increased. This is not inconsistent with the goals of a regional settlement because states may, understandably, feel the need for extra security precautions when negotiating with an adversary.

Any future Arab-Israeli peace arrangements would have to include the most detailed, comprehensive plans for force limitations in the West Bank, Gaza, the Golan Heights and, ultimately, Jordan. No Israeli government will ever agree to the evacuation of the current occupied territories unless there is a clear sense of what direction such arms-control agreements will take.

If a peaceful resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict were ever achieved, more formal arms-control arrangements to deal with nuclear and chemical weapons--as well as conventional-force reductions and regional arms-supply agreements--could be considered. These types of arms-control schemes are most likely to succeed after a political breakthrough.

Certainly both Bush and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir understand that there must be some forward political momentum in the Middle East once Iraq has been defeated militarily. Failure to take the initiative in both the peace process and controlling the arms race will result in further deadly misfortune for both countries and for the entire region. Their new-found friendship is, thus, timely and essential.