‘Unequivocal’ Pledge by Hussein Is Needed : Diplomacy: A U.S.-Soviet statement also promises ‘to promote Arab-Israeli peace.’ Moscow gives assurances of a partial Baltic troop pullout.

The allied assault on Iraq could end now if Iraqi President Saddam Hussein makes an “unequivocal commitment” to withdraw from Kuwait, the United States and Soviet Union declared Tuesday, softening the previous U.S. insistence that only an actual withdrawal would stop the war.

The statement also pledged joint U.S.-Soviet efforts “to promote Arab-Israeli peace” once the war is over, the closest the Bush Administration has come to linking the war with the Palestinian issue and an unusual bow to Moscow’s desire to take a more central role in Middle East diplomacy.

At the same time, the White House announced that Moscow has promised Bush that at least some Soviet troops would be withdrawn from the restive Baltic republics of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The statement appeared to be the first concrete pledge by the Soviet Union to remove troops from the Baltics, although Administration officials indicated that neither the number of troops nor the timing of the withdrawal was specified.

The announcements came at the close of a four-day visit to Washington by Alexander A. Bessmertnykh, the new Soviet foreign minister, aimed at ending a sudden chill in U.S.-Soviet relations caused by Moscow’s moves against the independence-seeking governments in the Baltic states and signs of Soviet backtracking on several arms control agreements.

President Bush, in his State of the Union address Tuesday evening, assessed the superpower relationship in more guarded, cautious terms than he might have used last year, when the idea of a U.S.-Soviet “partnership” was in full flower.

“Our relationship with the Soviet Union is important, not only to us but to the world,” Bush said. “But like many other nations, we have been deeply concerned by the violence in the Baltics, and we have communicated that concern to the Soviet leadership. . . . If it is possible, I want to continue to build a lasting basis for U.S.-Soviet cooperation, for a more peaceful future for all mankind.”

During his meetings with Bush and Secretary of State James A. Baker III, Bessmertnykh delivered a letter from Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev outlining in detail a new set of Soviet peace proposals for the gulf, a government spokesman announced in Moscow.

According to the spokesman, Gorbachev press secretary Vitaly N. Ignatenko, the Soviets are seeking comments from other countries before formally presenting their proposal in the United Nations or some other international forum.

“We stand on the threshold of very serious decisions,” Ignatenko told journalists at a briefing in Moscow. “From the side of the Soviet Union, there are several suggestions, initiatives. . . . The message to President Bush contains specific proposals to reduce tensions in the Persian Gulf.”

The offer of a “cessation of hostilities” based on an “unequivocal commitment” by Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait could be part of that Soviet plan. It is language that Administration officials have been careful to avoid in recent days.

But the joint U.S.-Soviet statement announcing the offer left considerable room for further interpretation. It did not define “unequivocal commitment,” and it noted that “such a commitment must be backed by immediate, concrete steps leading to full compliance” with U.N. resolutions calling for an end to Iraq’s six-month occupation of its neighbor.

Although phrased in diplomatically evasive language, the joint statement makes clear that major differences continue to exist between the United States and the Soviets over Persian Gulf policy. Soviet officials in recent days repeatedly have voiced concerns that the United States may be widening the aims of the war, seeking to destroy Iraq’s military capability, rather than merely trying to expel the Iraqis from Kuwait.

Baker, according to the joint statement, “emphasized that the United States and its coalition partners are seeking the liberation of Kuwait, not the destruction of Iraq,” and reiterated that the Administration “is not interested in expanding the conflict.”

Bessmertnykh, for his part, “took note of the American position,” a phrase that is generally used in diplomatic statements to indicate lack of agreement.

“Both sides,” the statement continued, “believe that everything possible should be done to avoid further escalation of the war and expansion of its scale.”

The carefully phrased statement appears to provide advantages for both sides, said Peter W. Rodman, a former National Security Council official now with Johns Hopkins University’s Foreign Policy Institute in Washington.

The Soviets “can present themselves to the Arabs as the champions of the Arabs, having gotten something out of the Americans--these assurances about war aims,” Rodman said. “What we get is that the Soviets are now obligated not to make mischief. They have given away a card they were threatening to play, which was to cause trouble for us on these particular points.”

At the same time, the pledge of future joint cooperation to deal with “the causes of instability and the sources of conflict, including the Arab-Israeli conflict,” could mark the closest U.S.-Soviet cooperation in Middle East peace efforts since the mid-1970s.

The two countries have been edging toward greater cooperation since the gulf crisis began. At the last Bush-Gorbachev summit, in September in Helsinki, Finland, the two presidents issued a statement saying that both countries would work to resolve “conflicts in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf.” But by contrast with the current language, the Helsinki statement did not pledge joint action and did not mention the Arab-Israeli conflict by name.

Even the current statement, however, carefully avoided any reference to a Middle East “peace conference,” a forum to which Israel has strongly objected. Although the Administration has supported a peace conference in some form in the past, it has resisted any call for one at this point, saying that a conference now would be counterproductive.

If the Soviets follow through on their “representations” that they will pull troops out of the restive Baltic republics and reopen a dialogue with elected nationalist leaders there, that could also be a major plus for the White House.

Bush has staked much on the ability of Gorbachev to continue his reform policies, and the apparent sharp turn to the right within the Soviet Union in recent weeks has deeply worried Administration officials.

Bessmertnykh delivered the Soviet assurance to Bush in their Oval Office meeting Monday, Administration officials said.

Soviet paratroopers sent by Moscow this month have killed 21 demonstrators in Latvia and Lithuania, where the democratically elected local governments have been demanding full independence from Moscow.

President Bush referred to the pledge in his State of the Union address Tuesday evening, saying: “In our recent discussions with Soviet leaders, we have been given representations, which, if fulfilled, would result in the withdrawal of some Soviet forces, a reopening of dialogue with the republics and a move away from violence.”

A senior Administration official said the Soviet assurances are significant but added that they are “quite general.”

“We’ll wait and see what happens,” he said.

Noting that the assurances, in his opinion, were similar to Gorbachev’s public pronouncements about his hope of restoring peace to the Baltic republics, the official said he was “not trying to say that there is something mystical or new about this.”

But if the Soviet withdrawal includes the roughly 1,000-man paratroop regiment sent to the Lithuanian capital of Vilnius, it would be a highly symbolic act--for that was the unit that attacked Lithuania’s television broadcasting center on Jan. 13, killing 13 civilians and one Soviet officer.

The Moscow government has already said it intends to withdraw or disband the special police commandos, known as “Black Berets,” whose actions have drawn wide protests in the Latvian capital of Riga.

The weight of the assurances appeared to lie primarily in the fact that they were made directly and formally by Gorbachev, through his new foreign minister, to Bush--a form of promise that the Soviets had not previously made on the Baltic issue.

Asked whether Gorbachev had promised to reduce troops below the level already present in Latvia and Lithuania before this month’s confrontation with Moscow, the senior Administration official shook his head negatively.

“They can only gain independence by the sufferance of the Soviet Union, and therefore we’re encouraging a dialogue,” he said.

Tensions in the Baltics were one of several reasons for Monday’s decision to postpone the U.S.-Soviet summit that had been planned for mid-February.

In Moscow, however, Ignatenko said Gorbachev did not feel that the delay in the summit reflected a deterioration in relations between the two countries. The primary reason for the delay, he said, was Bush’s inability to leave the United States because of the Gulf War, an explanation also offered by U.S. officials.

Ignatenko also provided a general description of the peace plan that Gorbachev has proposed for the gulf.

“The destruction of the country (Iraq) must be prevented,” Ignatenko said. “The multinational forces must not allow unjustified victims, especially victims among civilians,” he said.

Times staff writers Michael Parks in Moscow and John M. Broder in Washington contributed to this report.