PERSPECTIVE ON THE GULF WAR : Who’s Sharing That Burden Now? : Germany and Japan were to be co-architects of the ‘new world order.’ But the war has left them shrinking to the rear.

Six months ago, most of Washington assumed that America, Japan and Germany would be marching, lockstep, to manage the post-Cold War world. President Bush talked effusively of Japan and Germany being full partners in all endeavors. And why not? Both nations are, after all, democracies. They are the world’s primary bankers. They have strong military capabilities. They are the most influential nations in the two most vital regions outside our borders. They and we have had extraordinarily close ties since we helped them recover from their devastating defeat at Allied hands in World War II.

Then Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. Sharp questions arose about how Japan and Germany really intended to participate in the “new world order.”

Tokyo and Bonn opted not to send any soldiers to the Gulf and their initial donations of money were wrung from them by massive U.S. arm-twisting. Now, under mounting U.S. criticism, it appears that Japan will up its original $4-billion ante by another $9 billion, and Germany will enlarge its previous $2.2-billion offer with another $5.5 billion. Japan may provide logistical support with troop carriers. Germany has promised military help to Israel and may permit the use of its fighter planes and antiaircraft systems sent to Turkey. In both cases, however, consistent hesitations and begrudging attitudes reveal that neither country sees itself or the world as the United States does. This spells big trouble for America’s hope of sharing the burdens of war and peace with its two most important trading partners.

We can appreciate the factors that so heavily influence the thinking and behavior of Japan and Germany. Both nations have deep-seated anti-war feelings stemming from their failed aggression and total defeat in World War II. Both have U.S.-inspired constitutions that constrain the use of force outside their borders. Both are eyed suspiciously by neighbors whenever a hint of militarism appears. Both have strong economies and effective energy policies that make fighting over oil seem absurd to them.

All of that, however, is not enough to explain the current differences. Japan and Germany are taking a far narrower view about what principles are worth fighting for. They are defining their own roles and responsibilities for maintaining peace in terms far more modest than anything contemplated here.

The United States has sent the clearest possible SOS signal, and political leaders in Tokyo and Bonn seem unable to respond. Their citizens give the impression of wanting to withdraw from an unpleasant world.

The problems may have just begun.

If the war continues for several months, both nations will be asked to ante up again and again. If U.S. casualties mount, an American outcry will ensue over our unequal sacrifice. If U.S. goals expand beyond the liberation of Kuwait, the gravest reservations will arise in Japan and Germany about continued political support.

Once the war ends, there will be massive reconstruction needs in Iraq and in nations like Egypt and Turkey, which have suffered from higher oil prices, trade disruptions and floods of refugees. No doubt, only Washington will have the status to devise a “new Marshall Plan.” But the United States will have already made its contribution in money and blood, and Japan and Germany--along with Saudi Arabia--will surely be called on for tens of billions of foreign-aid dollars. Having sat out the war, will they also lay low when it comes to an American peace plan?

Beyond the battlefield, any postwar settlement will surely need to address the Arab-Israeli conflict. In the past, Japan and Germany have been more supportive of the Palestine Liberation Organization than has Washington.

It is all too possible that after the war we will see a widening of these divisions as Tokyo and Bonn curryfavor with the Islamic world in order to avoid the backlash against the American-led coalition. Such tactics could pay commercial dividends to Japan and Germany and reduce terrorist threats to them--great temptations for both nations.

Over time, Washington, Tokyo and Bonn might reconcile their roles and relative burdens. They might resolve the intractable questions of who should lead, who should pay, and whether Japan and Germany should again play a full military role on the world stage. But there’s little room for waiting.

If America didn’t have sky-high deficits and debts, if its corporations and banks were not a shambles, if there were no crisis in the schools, no epidemic of violent crime and drugs, no crumbling roads and bridges, maybe we would say “Let’s be patient for another decade while the political adjustments take place, and in the meantime we’ll continue to bear the costs alone.” But we are not without these problems, and 10 years--even one year--is too long to wait.