NEWS ANALYSIS : Odd Couple Moscow and Tehran Drafted Peace Plan : Mideast: The joint effort was brought about by a shared anxiety over U.S. diplomatic gains in the Gulf.

The surprise peace proposal unveiled by the Kremlin on Thursday was in fact a joint effort by the Soviet Union and Iran--a diplomatic odd-coupling of two of Washington’s oldest foes with potential consequences that stretch well beyond the war in the Persian Gulf.

The extraordinary cooperation between Moscow and Tehran was brought on by a shared anxiety over U.S. diplomatic gains and long-term intentions in the Persian Gulf. But it is a pattern that could pose challenges for Washington elsewhere in the Middle East.

Although the Soviet Union has been given credit for the initiative, Soviet and U.S. officials said Tehran had played a crucial and almost equal role. “Everyone is making a big deal about the Soviets’ leadership when Iran was just as much a part of this. It was really the Iranians who got the ball rolling and worked just as hard to sell it,” said a senior U.S. official.

The effort, the only peace initiative since Iraq’s Aug. 2 invasion of Kuwait to break the grim rhythm that was carrying events toward a full-scale ground war, evolved in early February from common concerns in Moscow and Tehran over three possible consequences of the conflict:

A ground war ending with the demise of President Saddam Hussein might lead to the dismemberment of Iraq, producing instabilities that would ripple through the region for years.

A decisive coalition victory could strengthen the U.S. position in the Gulf so much that it could dominate postwar security arrangements, potentially including a long-term military presence.

Washington could emerge as the power defining a post-crisis “new world order,” shaping and controlling its framework.

Ironically, while the product of a joint effort, the Soviet-Iranian peace initiative springs from opposite foreign policy objectives.

For the Soviets, it represents growing internal pressure to back away from alliances with the West.

It also reflects the important shift in foreign policy since the departure of Eduard A. Shevardnadze as foreign minister, who overruled Arabists in his own department last August to issue a joint warning with Secretary of State James A. Baker III to Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait. Soviet conservatives used Shevardnadze’s posture on the Gulf crisis to attack him and eventually force his resignation.

Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev, who used to make foreign policy unhindered, now faces criticism from conservatives, who are not pleased with the de facto alliance with the United States against an old friend in the Arab world--at the expense of long-term Soviet interests.

For the Iranians, on the other hand, intervention in the Gulf War represents an effort to open up to the West. Indeed, it could mark the turning point of Iran’s political ostracism since its 1979 revolution.

“The Iranian motive was in part to move away from an era of self-imposed isolation,” said R. K. Ramazani, an Iranian specialist at the University of Virginia.

“They also wanted to make clear they are a major player in the Gulf. Tehran wants to be viewed as a co-broker of peace in the region. And it will be. No other country in the region has played a greater role.”

The “deal” announced in Moscow in the wee hours of Friday morning began as an “approach” rather than a specific plan. It originated in the Feb. 4 visit to Tehran of Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander M. Belonogov, who flew to the Iranian capital to probe an initiative launched by Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani on Feb. 2.

The Iranian initiative coincided with a flurry of visits to Iran by Iraqi, Algerian, French, Yemeni and Soviet officials. After 12 years of diplomatic isolation, Tehran had become the hub of mediation efforts and consultations. The Soviets and the Iranians apparently began working in tandem almost immediately, according to Soviet and U.S. officials.

While both sides agreed that Iraq must withdraw from Kuwait, both shared alarm that the punishing allied bombardment might even destroy Iraq’s structure as a state, upsetting the delicate balances of power in the region, Soviet and Middle East officials said.

Iran’s initiative had three focal points on which to build: an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, followed by withdrawal of coalition forces, and a postwar regional security arrangement involving only the Persian Gulf states.

The negotiations lasted three days, an unusually long diplomatic visit, as details were worked out on what was to become an undeclared but implicit cooperative venture.

During their talks, the Soviets and Iranians agreed on a “sequence of moves” to sell the Iraqis on a withdrawal from Kuwait in exchange for long-term guarantees, centered primarily on Iraq’s territorial integrity after the war and President Hussein’s continued leadership.

They also agreed that Moscow would try to sell the “moves” to the West, mainly the United States and Europe, while Tehran would deal with the East, including the Arab, Muslim and Third World countries and key Asian players such as China. Both would pressure Iraq.

According to Soviet officials, Moscow and Tehran thought they had reasonable prospects of success for several reasons: The aerial bombardment had exacted a heavier toll than Iraq had expected, while fears of high casualties from a ground war might sway public opinion in coalition countries, particularly the United States, when offered a peaceful alternative.

“We thought both sides might be less stubborn now than before,” said an official who was on the Belonogov mission.

Both also had important leverage over Baghdad. Moscow has been Iraq’s main arms supplier. Iran, although a longstanding regional rival that fought Iraq in a brutal eight-year war, had given refuge to more than 100 Iraqi warplanes.

Although Moscow and Tehran agreed to work within the framework of the 12 U.N. resolutions, they decided not to work through the world body in view of Baghdad’s feeling that Washington could railroad almost any resolution it opposed in the Security Council.

The Tehran talks set in motion further diplomatic travels. After a new appeal for peace by Soviet President Gorbachev on Feb. 9, Yevgeny M. Primakov was dispatched to Baghdad via Tehran on Feb. 11. Primakov, a career Mideast specialist with long experience in dealing with Hussein, had made two fruitless trips to Baghdad in the fall.

This time, however, Primakov put forward “some ideas on a way out” of the crisis to the Iraqi leader, who promised to send Foreign Minister Tarik Aziz to Moscow with a response. Primakov returned to Moscow speaking of “rays of hope.”

Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Sheik Sabah al Ahmed al Sabah then journeyed to Moscow, after which he said he believed that there was new Iraqi flexibility.

Meanwhile, Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati and other officials launched a series of talks with Arab and Muslim countries, most notably China and coalition partners Pakistan and Turkey. On Feb. 15, six days before the Moscow announcement, he arrived in the Soviet Union to see Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Alexander A. Bessmertnykh.

The result was an agreement that Moscow would attempt to undertake the difficult task of trying to hammer out agreement between Iraq and the West. Aziz arrived in Moscow--via Tehran, the route taken by all diplomats traveling in or out of Iraq--on Thursday.

The final push had begun toward the announcement made early Friday, Moscow time, that shook the Bush Administration into issuing its ultimatum.

And, most U.S. analysts agree, the fact that the Moscow formula may ultimately come to nothing should not blind American policy-makers to the importance of how it came into being.

Parks reported from Moscow and Wright reported from Washington.