A General State of Confusion

Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf suggests that he would have done things differently. Rather than halting the war against Iraq on Feb. 27, the commander of Operation Desert Storm says that his recommendation had been “to continue the march,” to turn the rout of Iraqi forces into a “battle of annihilation.” While praising President Bush for his “humane” and “courageous” action in ordering a cease-fire after 100 hours of land warfare, Schwarzkopf makes clear that his preference was to go on grinding away at Iraq’s military machine for another 24 hours. Bush’s decision, he says, is one of those things that “historians are going to second-guess . . . forever.” The general’s comments have done nothing to lessen that prospect.

Schwarzkopf’s remarks, in an interview on public television, were swiftly and emphatically disputed by the Bush Administration. The President himself said that Schwarzkopf had been in “total agreement” with the timing of the decision to stop the fighting. Other officials professed bafflement at Schwarzkopf’s statements. These implied rebukes were softened when Bush called Schwarzkopf later to express his full support. But that generous act still leaves Schwarzkopf’s version of what he recommended unretracted and on the record, where it threatens to become a political embarrassment.

The reasons for that embarrassment can be seen in the grim flow of daily stories out of Iraq. There, Saddam Hussein’s army has been suppressing the Shiite revolt in the south with typical remorseless cruelty, slaughtering civilians and creating pathetic legions of refugees. Consider now the thrust of the comments made by Schwarzkopf--a relative novice in the game of being a public figure--in the interview with David Frost. Had the war gone on for another day, as the general says he favored, much of Iraq’s remaining military strength might indeed have been annihilated, leaving the regime in a far weaker position when it came to face the revolts by the Shiites and Kurds. In short, if the war had not ended when it did, Iraq’s immediate political future could have been altered.

But to infer that is to take a not- necessarily-safe leap into the unknown. Administration officials most involved in war policy have recollections markedly different from Schwarzkopf’s. Such things have happened before. President Harry Truman and Gen. Douglas MacArthur squabbled over what had really been said when the two met privately on Wake Island to discuss the course of the Korean War. That particular controversy ended when the White House produced notes of the meeting that MacArthur didn’t know had been made. What were Schwarzkopf’s words when he was asked to sign off the cease-fire plan? Surely there’s a record of the phone conversation in the White House. Maybe it’s time to bring it out.