Moscow and Beijing Forge a Common-Sense Liaison : Diplomacy: The two former enemies are settling into a nuts-and-bolts relationship of mutual advantage.

When the leaders of the Soviet Union and China met in Beijing in May, 1989, the fundamental task for Mikhail S. Gorbachev and Deng Xiaoping was to put an end to their nations’ long “period of confrontation” and work out basic principles for a new model of interaction. The communique that ended the meeting corresponded to this delicate task. The document declared that Sino-Soviet relations would now be based on the principles of peaceful coexistence and would not harm third countries’ interests. The communique touched gingerly on the most acute problems dividing the two states: the presence of Soviet troops in Mongolia and along the common border, and the regional conflicts in Cambodia and Afghanistan.

By contrast, last month, Gorbachev and Jiang Zemin, head of China’s Communist Party, issued a communique that went straightforwardly to issues of bilateral cooperation, skipping the previously divisive issues. It’s a barometer of how much closer the two neighbors have drawn.

The latest communique gives relations between the two Communist parties a prominent place, along with discussion of socialism and common problems in domestic politics. This demonstrates confidence by the Chinese leadership that Gorbachev is still, despite his political reforms, a firm adherent of socialism. Just a year ago, when developments in Eastern Europe coincided with the introduction of a multiparty system in the Soviet Union, Beijing obviously had certain misgivings on this score. It was no accident that there was no communique following the visit to Moscow by Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng in April, 1990.

The 1991 communique also reflects the desire of both sides to tell the world that neither the Soviet Union nor China has become a second-rate power and that much in world politics still depends on them. In 1989, Beijing and Moscow each put forward its own position on many international problems. Now they have adopted joint stances on such burning issues as Cambodia, Korea (which was not even mentioned before) and the Persian Gulf.

Also in marked contrast to 1989, both sides formulated in great detail their attitude toward the U.S.-Soviet disarmament talks. The closeness of their positions is calculated to prod the United States and other developed countries into accommodating the two countries’ interests and to urge them to, as the communique specifies, “drop political conditions from their economic aid packages.” This is crucial for both nations, with the Soviets seeking massive Western aid and the Chinese at risk of losing most-favored-nation trade status with the United States.

Jiang and Gorbachev both perceive a broadening of cooperation with industrialized countries as absolutely essential, but at the same time are reluctant to go too far in satisfying the demands for internal political and economic restructuring that, from the Western point of view, should accompany massive assistance.

The biggest tangible achievement of Jiang’s visit was the signing of an agreement concerning the boundaries of the eastern part of the Soviet-Chinese border, a stretch of more than 2,500 miles. Jiang stressed during his press conference that there is a good chance for a similar agreement on the western part of the common border. Talks on troop reductions along the border are moving from the level of principles to concrete steps.

There is a studied neutrality in dealing with serious differences in domestic policies in both countries, and emphasis is laid on the right of each nation to be its own boss. At this point, the most important thing Moscow and Beijing can do for one another is not to hinder the development of a partner already overburdened by mounting domestic problems. Drastic instability in one country could lead to unpredictably tragic events in the other, and that in turn could have a colossal cumulative international impact. But when China and the Soviet Union do overcome their current difficulties, their influence in the world and on each other will inevitably grow.

We also have to recognize the limits of this bilateral cooperation. Neither Moscow nor Beijing has the capability to serve the other as a primary outside economic and technological partner. Sino-Soviet cooperation will never develop to the point of renewing the “alliance against imperialism.” Moscow and Beijing are developing their ties in order to strengthen their own position in cooperation with the United States and its allies, and not for the sake of waging a struggle with them.