Shamir Boxes Himself Into a Potential Trap : Israel: Grudging acceptance of a peace conference may set up its failure at a very high price.

One shouldn’t envy Yitzhak Shamir nowadays. He has led Israel to a position that in his worst nightmares he had not foreseen: The Bush Administration, showing the determination of self-confident winners, has the Israeli prime minister cornered.

It can be assumed that within a few days the Israeli Cabinet will answer the Washington-brokered peace initiative positively. Shamir and his senior ministers of the right-wing Likud bloc know perfectly well that if the answer is negative, Israel would be embarked on a collision course with the United States. Such an undesired development would bring about a strategic disaster and cause unprecedented political, military and financial complications.

Shamir prefers--so I was told by his assistants--to argue fiercely with his extreme right colleagues, who oppose the newly devised peace plan, rather than engage in a confrontation with the United States. Therefore, it is logical to conclude that, despite the remaining obstacles, a regional peace conference for negotiation of a comprehensive peace in the Middle East, as suggested by Secretary of State James A. Baker III and agreed to by the Arab countries, will be held in the autumn.

But what will happen then?

According to plan, the peace conference will be attended for a day or two by a U.N. observers and delegates from the United States and the Soviet Union, while the serious discussions take place in direct negotiations between an Israeli delegation and two separate Arab delegations: a joint Jordanian-Palestinian one and a Syrian representation. The two Arab delegations probably will repeat their old formula: peace in return for all Israeli-occupied territories. The Israeli side will refuse: No territorial concessions. Once the negotiations are deadlocked, the Middle Eastern participants will exchange mutual accusations, then pack and go home.

Most probably world opinion will blame Israel for not rising to the challenge and thus missing a historic opportunity to achieve peace with its neighbors. Washington will probably express a similar position. All U.S. administrations have supported U.N. Resolution 242, which states that Israel should withdraw from territories occupied during the 1967 War in return for a peace treaty and internationally recognizable and defensible boundaries.

Shamir’s situation today--being squeezed between his reluctant colleagues and U.S. pressure--will look easy compared to the one he may find himself in if the peace talks open and fail. Israel’s isolation might then be interpreted in the Arab countries as a simple signal: The guardian angels of Israel, especially the United States, will not rush to its help, as they did before, in time of crisis. Some Arab countries, led by Syria, may even reach the wrong conclusion that, after a failure of the peace conference, the world will tolerate a limited war, one just long enough to retrieve some portion of the occupied territories--not one that is intended for the destruction of Israel. This was exactly the Arab strategy in their successful 1973 war of surprise. After that war, Israel was forced to give back parts of the Sinai peninsula to Egypt and some of the Golan Heights land to Syria.

Some Israeli experts believe that such a scenario is indeed the ultimate strategic goal of Syria. I understand that Shamir shares these fears. But he has only himself to blame for leading Israel to the trap. A year ago he torpedoed another American peace initiative that was rather moderate and less ambitious. That plan aimed to stimulate only a direct negotiation between Israel and the Palestinians for a limited, interim agreement that would not result in the complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from the West Bank and Gaza.

Hoping to kill that Baker plan, Shamir came up with a counterproposal. While suggesting to extend the initiative to include all Arab nations, he laid mines along the road to peace. He insisted on various unimportant, marginal matters regarding procedures of the future conference. He thought that Arab leaders, led by the Syrian president, would find his proposals unacceptable and insulting. However, Hafez Assad understood what Shamir’s real intentions were and did not step on the mines. On the contrary, he showed his skills as a strategist, said yes to the U.S. initiative and, for the first time in the annals of the region, agreed to talk directly with Israel, his sworn enemy.

Still, one shouldn’t completely write off Shamir’s political skills. He might pull from his hat his last card: an early general election, which would gain him breathing space and stop, for some time, the peace momentum.