Soviets Offer Joint Mideast Peace Trip : Summit: Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh proposes he and Baker make the journey together. Development points up the changing relations of the superpowers.

The prospect of an unprecedented joint U.S.-Soviet peace mission to the Middle East was raised by Kremlin officials Monday as President Bush arrived here for a two-day summit meeting with Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev.

Soviet Foreign Minister Alexander A. Bessmertnykh, declaring that “I think the time is right” for a Mideast peace conference, suggested that he and Secretary of State James A. Baker III might journey to the region together in a combined effort to nail down arrangements for such a conference.

The unexpected proposal, coming on the eve of what Bush Administration officials have called “the first post-Cold War summit,” illustrated the unpredictable changes that are transforming relations between two nuclear superpowers whose political and military rivalry dominated global politics for half a century.

But the active role the Kremlin may still be capable of playing in a major political crisis such as the Arab-Israeli conflict stands in marked contrast with its growing economic weakness.

And discussions of what Washington and its allies can do to help Gorbachev rescue his foundering nation are expected to dominate the summit.

Speaking to reporters before meeting with Baker here, the Soviet foreign minister said he believes that the proposed peace conference should definitely be held before the end of this year. He said the United States and the Soviet Union are working together “on the same platform, the same basis” in the Mideast.

The Bush Administration had no immediate comment on Bessmertnykh’s proposal to join Baker on a Mideast swing, but Bush himself, in an earlier interview with three Soviet journalists in Washington, said the Soviets’ general participation in the Mideast peace process will be “very important.”

The President portrayed Moscow’s role in the search for peace in the Middle East as reflecting what he called Moscow’s integral part in the new world order that Bush seeks to establish in the wake of the Cold War.

In the interview, Bush emphasized that despite his plans to hold a separate discussion in Moscow with President Boris N. Yeltsin of the Russian Republic, “the President of the United States primarily deals with the president of the Soviet Union.”

At the same time, Bush, apparently chiding Gorbachev for not moving the Soviet government more quickly toward democratization and popular elections, said of Yeltsin’s visit to Washington earlier this year: “He came here in a manner that is understood by Americans--and that is, backed by a very large vote. And this made quite a difference to Americans. Here’s a man who took his case to the Russian republic and won a big victory.”

A transcript of the Bush interview--conducted last Thursday for later publication--was distributed by the White House on Monday to reporters accompanying the President to Moscow.

Bush also said that:

* He sees enormous opportunity for U.S. investment in the Soviet Union, once economic and political reforms are in place, and for the two nations to work closely in political matters.

* He believes that the reforms Gorbachev had already brought about in the Soviet Union were “largely responsible for the utility of the United Nations” in the Persian Gulf crisis. And the dramatic change in Soviet thinking has made possible talk about a “new world order,” he said.

* Although there will be “a broad discussion” about reducing strategic arms even beyond the estimated 30% reduction provided by the START treaty that he and Gorbachev plan to sign here, “there won’t be any bold, new proposal on the part of the United States for a dramatic next step.”

* The associate membership in the World Bank and International Monetary Fund that the Soviets were offered by the United States and its allies at the recent economic summit in London may be expanded to full membership “sooner rather than later.”

The proposed Middle East peace conference would be co-sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union. The two nations have worked closely together on the Mideast in recent months, particularly in a concerted and ultimately successful effort to win Syria’s agreement to participate.

But before Monday, no one on either side had suggested the possibility that high-ranking U.S. and Soviet officials might go as far as to tour the Middle East together on behalf of the peace process. Until the last two years, it was official U.S. policy to try to deny the Soviet Union any position of influence in the Middle East.

Bessmertnykh’s remarks seemed calculated to put one extra degree of pressure on Israel--which has been trying for years to improve its relations with the Soviet Union--to agree to take part in the peace conference. The government of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir has not announced yet whether it will do so.

In Israel on Monday, Shamir said he thinks it will be possible to work out the obstacles blocking a peace conference during another trip to the Mideast by Baker, who last visited Jerusalem eight days ago.

And Israeli Foreign Minister David Levy said he expects Baker to return to Israel “in the next few days.” Officials traveling with Baker have left open the possibility that he may return to the Middle East later this week, after the Moscow summit meeting.

Baker would not comment Monday on Bessmertnykh’s suggestion of a joint mission to the Middle East. “I think we ought to have an opportunity to discuss the situation,” he said before starting his meeting with the Soviet foreign minister.

However, a senior Bush Administration official, speaking to reporters on condition that he would not be identified, said the United States is now hoping that Israel will at least agree “in principle” to come to the conference table.

He said the continuing disputes over who will represent Palestinians at the Mideast peace conference can be worked out later, after Israel says it is willing to participate.

“We would like to have a response, in principle, to the idea of the conference with the procedures that we have discussed,” the senior Administration official said.

He said the United States has not decided yet whether to go ahead and issue invitations to the peace conference without waiting for Israel’s acceptance.

“We have had some conversations back and forth with the Israelis, and we do not as yet have a response from them” he said. “What we decide to do, I think, would be determined in large part by whether or not we hear before we leave Moscow.”

Shamir insisted Monday that his country is not ready to reply to the Bush Administration’s call for Israel to take part in a conference.

“We do not owe any answers,” the Israeli prime minister said. “We are expecting answers from the Americans. It is a matter of clarification.” He said Israel needs more details about the makeup of a proposed Palestinian delegation before it finally decides whether to go to the peace conference.

On the eve of the two-day summit meeting, Soviet officials appeared to be particularly eager to be seen as working alongside the Bush Administration on a Mideast peace settlement.

Soviet presidential spokesman Vitaly N. Ignatenko predicted Monday that, along with the domestic Soviet situation, the Middle East will “dominate the agenda” of the summit meeting.

He said Bush and Gorbachev can start talking “in practical terms” about the convening of a Middle East peace conference.

By contrast, Baker--who seemed to be pressing hard last week to bring all the Mideast parties to a peace conference as soon as possible--sounded more cautious themes as he arrived in Moscow on the eve of the summit. “I think that there are still some issues that need sorting out,” the secretary of state said.

Baker recalled that at the end of the Persian Gulf War, he had said there was a “window of opportunity” to make peace in the Middle East. “I, for one, do not think that window of opportunity is closed,” he said Monday. However, he added, “It remains to be seen if it’s fully open.”

Today’s Schedule

10:15 a.m. (12:15 a.m. PDT): President Bush arrives at Kremlin. Ceremony in St. George’s Hall.

10:50 a.m. (12:50 a.m. PDT): Bush and President Gorbachev begin meeting, St. Catherine’s Hall.

1 p.m. (3 a.m. PDT): Working luncheon, residence dining hall.

3 p.m. (5 a.m. PDT): Bush speaks at Moscow Institute of International Studies.

3:45 p.m. (5:45 a.m. PDT): Bush meets President Yeltsin.

4:45 p.m. (6:45 a.m. PDT): Bushes and Gorbachevs tour Zurab Tsereteli Studio.

7 p.m. (9 a.m. PDT): State dinner at the Kremlin.

Source: Associated Press

What’s in the START Treaty?

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, known by its acronym, START, will reduce the number of long-range, offensive nuclear weapons of both the United States and the Soviet Union by about one-third and will cut the most threatening of the Soviet weapons--ballistic missile warheads--by more than half. The reductions will take place gradually over seven years, but the treaty will be in force for 15 years, and the two sides will have an option to extend it.

The treaty will require the two countries to reduce both the number of nuclear warheads that they have and the number of “delivery systems”--missiles and manned bombers--that carry the warheads. Many missiles and bombers are designed to carry more than one warhead.

Here is the impact of the treaty and the key elements to which both sides are obligated to adhere:

KEY COMPONENTS

Bombers: Each country is limited to 1,600 missiles and heavy bombers, known as “delivery systems.” Bombers are treated as less threatening than ballistic missiles, because they fly more slowly, must penetrate existing air defenses, and can be recalled

Warheads: Neither side may have more than 6,000 “accountable” warheads as defined in the treaty. Of these, only 4,900 can be ballistic missile warheads. No more than 1,540 of these can be carried by large land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, and only 1,100 can be carried by mobile ICBMs.

Neither side may “download” existing missiles--that is, remove some of their warheads in an attempt to get under the maximums set by the treaty--by more than 1,250 warheads. The limit is designed to reduce the danger that one side can get a sudden advantage by breaking out of the treaty and restoring the “downloaded” warheads.

Cruise Missiles: Sea-launched cruise missiles are treated separately in “politically binding” statements appended to the treaty. SLCMs with a range greater than 375 miles are limited to 800 on each side. Soviet intermediate-range Backfire bombers are similarly treated: Moscow promises to deploy no more than 500 of the planes.

Verification: Verification measures include on-site inspection of arsenals before any cutbacks begin and inspection of weapon conversion and elimination; continuous monitoring of some mobile missile factories; short-notice inspections for such purposes as insuring a missile carries the proper number of warheads; and “challenge” inspections of sites suspected of illegal activities.

THE IMPACT

U.S. Arsenal: The U.S. strategic arsenal, which currently comprises about 12,000 warheads, will be cut to about 9,500 warheads, while the Soviet arsenal--now 11,500--will shrink to about 7,200 weapons, according to calculations by the Arms Control Assn.

The Soviets could increase their totals by building larger and more capable bombers if they choose.

Soviet Arsenal: The cuts would hit the Soviets hardest because most of their warheads are mounted on ballistic missiles, which are subject to a limit of 4,900 warheads. More than half their ballistic missile warhead total of 10,371 must be eliminated (to reach the 4,900-warhead limit), for example. Overall, almost 8,000 Soviet warheads and delivery systems will be dismantled.

Advantage: Even after the treaty is put into effect, the United States will still enjoy a slight advantage, retaining 2,700 gravity-bombs and short-range attack missiles--about three times more than the Soviet Union, which will retain 900. The United States also will maintain have about 500 more air-launched cruise missiles than the Soviets.

Source: The Arms Control Assn.