With a Demonized Enemy, Going Nuclear Seems Easy : Arms control: Americans toyed with the ‘unthinkable’ in the Gulf, proving the power of war to suppress inhibitions.

Americans were excited about Ronald Reagan’s 1981 plan for a treaty to cut superpower nuclear arsenals in half. The 1992 START treaty is being greeted largely with yawns. Apparently, Americans are no longer worried about nuclear weapons.

A nuclear bomb has not been detonated in anger since 1945, although the nations that possess them have fought dozens of wars in that time. With the Cold War behind us, nuclear war seems as remote as death by lightning strike. The nuclear states still justify the existence of their arsenals as a safeguard against attack, but most Americans seem to have concluded that they will never be used.

Yet earlier this year, at a critical moment in the Gulf War, a poll on whether to allow the use of nuclear weapons ended in a draw. It was less than two weeks into the air war, before the border rout at Khafji that presaged the easy ground war ahead, when the Gallup poll of Jan. 23-26 found Americans split 45% to 45% on this question: “Do you favor or oppose using tactical nuclear weapons against Iraq if it might save the lives of U.S. troops?” Before hostilities began, Gallup had reported that 72% of Americans opposed using nuclear weapons against Iraq.

Imagine what the shift might have been had the Iraqis offered significant resistance, if Americans had been under fire for more than 100 hours. Will our military and political leaders be able to resist popular demand for quick victories through the use of nuclear weapons? Will this demand prove to be the fatal flaw in a democratic society governed by responsive politicians?

Answers to other polls indicate that the phrase, “if it might save the lives of U.S. troops” was the key to the hawkish response. Another Gallup survey, taken Feb. 14-17, made no reference to U.S. troops but asked simply, “Do you favor or oppose the U.S. use of tactical nuclear weapons in the Persian Gulf War?” Only 28% were in favor; 66% were opposed.

During those days in late January, it did not take long for some politicians to reflect the apparently hawkish swing in public opinion. Two members of Congress actually suggested using nuclear weapons on Iraq. President Bush was more cautious, but said, “I am going to preserve all options.” Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney was more threatening: “The U.S. response (to chemical weapons) would be absolutely overwhelming and it would be devastating.”

Rep. Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.) was a voice of sanity: “If we establish a pattern out there that it is legitimate to use these kinds of weapons, our children and our grandchildren are going to rue the day. We would not want to live in a world in which we had sent a signal to every country on the planet to get nuclear weapons as fast as we can.”

Newsweek reported that Israel sent a “signal” to Washington early in the war that it was prepared to use atomic weapons to stop Iraqi missile attacks. The signal was the test-firing of a nuclear-capable missile in the Mediterranean Sea.

In 1945, the U.S. justification for dropping atomic bombs on Japan was that it would shorten World War II and limit U.S. casualties. The Gallup polls during the Gulf War reinforce the power of that argument. A large part of the euphoria was due to the war’s brevity and light American casualties. But, as U.S. political leaders learned from Vietnam, voters will rebel against a long war and heavy casualties. A leader in a future conflict may be tempted to use all options and perhaps all weapons to avoid becoming bogged down in another Vietnam. The standard for success in war has been set in the Gulf; woe to any future leader unable to meet that standard.

One of the finest characteristics of a capitalist democracy is its reluctance to go to war. In a market economy, people are conditioned to act in self-interest, avoiding unnecessary risk and cost. In 1947, President Harry Truman was told that he must “scare hell out of the country” if he wanted support for the Marshall Plan.

To persuade the voters to support huge troop deployments, expensive weaponry and war, a leader must generate a virulent hatred of the foe. Anxious to build emotional support for his policies, President Bush successfully demonized Saddam Hussein, our close associate until Aug. 2, 1990. Bush used the same tactic in Panama, where Manual Noriega, agent of the CIA for many years, was transformed virtually overnight into a pariah.

George Ball, a former undersecretary of state, has pointed out that “many thoughtful Americans . . . question whether a democracy could ever conduct a limited war. If it was necessary to indulge in hyperbolic denunciations so as to get the people to fight, a leader, carried away by his own rhetoric, might easily end up going far beyond his original objectives in order to justify his vituperation.”

Like using nuclear weapons.