U.N. Sleuth Credits Allied Data on Iraq

United Nations inspectors trying to uncover Iraq’s far-flung nuclear program could not have begun to accomplish their task without sensitive intelligence provided by the United States and its Gulf War allies, the chief U.N. nuclear sleuth told Congress on Thursday.

In his most detailed public account of the U.N. inspection effort, David A. Kay told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that “without that data, we would not have been able to operate” against a determined campaign of Iraqi deception. He said this included bulldozing vital facilities and filing serial numbers off equipment that could be used in Iraq’s concerted nuclear weapons program.

Kay, a nuclear expert with the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, warned that only if nations share their most prized secrets can they control the spread of nuclear weapons.

His comments were made as the Senate considered the Omnibus Nuclear Proliferation Control Act of 1991, designed to “put some brains, backbone and teeth into our nuclear non-proliferation policy,” according to its chief sponsor, Sen. John Glenn (D-Ohio).

Kay’s comments Thursday mark the first time a U.N. official has openly acknowledged the United Nations’ reliance on intelligence material culled from U.S. satellites, aircraft and military intelligence networks established during the war. Officials have said privately that the inspectors’ most recent mission, which ended after a tense standoff on Sept. 28, was guided largely by U.S. intelligence tips.

“The lesson of Iraq, where you combine that information-gathering capacity at the national level with an international inspectorate, is one that I find encouraging,” said Kay, who also complained that international efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons rely on “piecemeal regimes” for their effectiveness.

His testimony also gave unusually detailed accounts of Iraq’s efforts to hide the scope and success of its nuclear program, which had brought Iraq to within a year of possessing a crude atomic weapon. “We’ve been in facilities that were not bombed, that they have bulldozed, facilities that they have poured epoxy paint on to try to defeat our sampling methods,” Kay said. “The number of deception strategies is impressive in its breadth and skill.”

Kay added that the Iraqis, who were “already planning for weapons of increased power and sophistication,” may be able to continue their efforts because the “know-how remains firmly in the hands of the Iraqi personnel who directed and carried out this program.”

Despite Iraqi deception efforts, U.N. inspectors--drawing from information obtained in site visits and from 45,000 pages of documents seized in late September from two plants outside Baghdad--will soon produce a list of companies that sold Iraq vital components for its nuclear program. That list is to be provided first through the United Nations to the countries whose companies were involved in such trade. Later, Kay said, it will be provided to the Security Council, which will decide whether to release the list.

“There is no region of the world that you will find that did not contribute to that program,” Kay said. “It was a procurement network of breadth and sophistication.”

Glenn complained that “IAEA safeguards, as they are called, are neither really safe nor do they guard anything.” He said that German firms will figure prominently on the list. His bill would ban U.S. imports and government procurements from firms that the President determines are assisting a nation or group trying to acquire a nuclear explosive device or bomb material.