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PERSPECTIVE ON MIDDLE EAST PEACE : Taking Baby Steps Into a Brave New World : Angry words fly, but encouraging signs of engagement and pragmatism are making peace faintly imaginable.

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<i> Martin Indyk, executive director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, was an observer at the Madrid peace conference</i>

When Arab and Israeli delegates entered the Hall of Columns at the Madrid Peace Conference, weighed down with the baggage of their nightmarish past, they took a small step into a brave new world.

To the outside viewer, the success of this peace conference was difficult to discern. It ended in acrimonious exchanges more bitter than the opening speeches and a final admonition from “Schoolmaster of State” James A. Baker III for the failure to deal adequately with the human dimension of the conflict. It took two more days of cajoling the Syrians before the secretary of state was able to announce the commencement of direct, bilateral negotiations--the very objective of this opening spectacle.

And yet, in the end, even the recalcitrant Syrians proved willing to get away from the cameras and down to the negotiations behind closed doors. The Israeli and Jordanian-Palestinian delegations--defying Syrian objections--emerged from their initial encounter with handshakes for the cameras.

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Madrid was a climactic event generated by forces set in motion by the ending of the Cold War and the defeat of Saddam Hussein. And Madrid in turn has generated four positive elements that bode well for the negotiating process begun there.

Pragmatism: The mere presence of Palestinians in a joint delegation, seated across the table from Israel’s prime minister, was a major achievement for the Palestinians and a plus for the peace process. In five decades of conflict, the Palestinians have never shown sufficient pragmatism to secure Israeli recognition. This time they did not miss the opportunity even though it required difficult decisions and a large measure of self-restraint.

The Palestinians came to the table without the Palestine Liberation Organization, without Jerusalemites and without a settlements freeze. Their speech respected the constraints on invoking the PLO, which prevented an Israeli walkout. Of all the Arab delegates, they came closest to addressing Israel’s concerns in their recognition of Israeli suffering and their appeal for coexistence. And this approach earned them a direct response from Israel’s prime minister who addressed them as “our closest neighbors,” stressed the importance he attached to reaching an accommodation with them and appealed to them to “join us in negotiations.”

No appeal was necessary. This Palestinian pragmatism reflects their sense of weakness and urgency in the wake of the Gulf War, which discredited the PLO and undermined the intifada. And it reflects the shift in the balance of power from the Tunis-based PLO to the nationalist leadership in the territories. Madrid witnessed the partial eclipse of Yasser Arafat by Faisal Husseini and his newly empowered and legitimized team of leaders from the “inside.” They have a very large stake in changing the status quo in the territories. The negotiations on interim arrangements provide them with the opportunity to end Israel’s military government and take control of their own affairs. For 13 years the Palestinians had spurned this Camp David approach, but in Madrid they formally accepted it and announced their readiness to begin direct negotiations regardless of Syrian opposition.

Syrian isolation: Madrid also revealed Syria’s weakness. This was evident in the changed status of Syria’s former superpower patron. As President Mikhail Gorbachev emphasized by his bizarre opening speech, the Soviet Union is preoccupied with turmoil at home and content to follow Washington’s script in the Middle East.

But Syria’s isolation was more starkly revealed in its manifest failure to exercise control over the positions of the other Arab parties engaged in the peace process. By the time the parties convened in Madrid, Syria had already failed to prevent other Arab states from agreeing to engage in the multilateral talks with Israel over regional issues. Twelve Arab states have now committed to these talks, including the Saudi-led Gulf Cooperation Council. As if to underscore Syria’s failure, Foreign Minister Farouk Shareh’s reiterated Syrian opposition, only to be publicly rebuffed by the two co-sponsors and the European and Egyptian participants.

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And then, after parading before the world the crude and vicious nature of the Syrian regime, Shareh demonstrated weakness by trying, unsuccessfully, to block the commencement of bilateral talks. Syria had expected the Madrid conference to expose Israel’s isolation and bring the pressure of “international legitimacy” to bear on its policies. But Shareh’s style and tactics backfired dramatically. Syria, not Israel, emerged isolated, intransigent and the most uncomfortable with the new post-Cold War world.

This is Hafez Assad’s worst nightmare--that he has fired the starting gun in a race in which the other Arab horses are more eager to run than his and he can no longer hold them back. Previously, he had the option of insisting, by hook or by crook, on an Arab consensus that proceeded at Damascus’ pace. But now, even the Saudis, who used to do his bidding, are acting against his wishes and supporting a new Arab consensus that abandons Assad to the choice of being left behind or striving to catch up.

Shamir’s Engagement: Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir’s presence at the Madrid conference table marks a personal transformation from the naysayer who blocked peace initiatives to the leader who now embraces them. Like the Palestinians, in coming to the table Shamir had to swallow much that was unpalatable to him. He did not want an international conference, he did not want the PLO associated with the process and he strongly objected to the elevation of the Palestinian delegation to equal status. Shamir also entered the process knowing that the Bush Administration is fundamentally opposed to his most cherished beliefs--retention of Judea and Samaria and settlement of Jews there.

Yet he came to Madrid with the solid backing of the most right-wing government in Israel’s history. And he leaves Madrid, after sitting stoically through excoriations and slander, still committed to “negotiating without interruption until an agreement is reached.” His speech closed no doors and actually hinted at the possibility of territorial compromise if it was preceded by confidence-building measures and development of relations.

American Influence: It is obvious that Madrid would have never occurred without the active intervention of Baker. There can be no doubt that the parties came to the table in large measure because of the “off the table” benefits that might be gained from the United States. With the end of the Cold War, the Middle East powers have lost much of their leverage over the United States. Baker now knows that the mere threat of assigning blame and walking away--as he did again over the weekend--is sufficient to introduce flexibility into previously fixed positions.

Many in America wonder why the United States should bother with what looks more than ever like an intractable problem when so many other pressing interests at home and abroad deserve attention. What they fail to understand, however, is that the very fact that the United States needs Middle East peace less than the parties themselves, puts us at a tremendous advantage. Arabs and Israelis now have to prove to us that they want peace if they are to secure American involvement. Put simply, they now need us more than we need them.

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Madrid was hardly the transforming event that many expected. Its achievement of Arab recognition of Israel and Israeli recognition of the Palestinians was begrudging at best. Yet Madrid was a learning process for students badly in need of education. Some were quicker learners than others, but each discovered that they could make difficult compromises and still survive. And the United States, in its role as schoolmaster rather than catalyst, has proved capable of teaching each side to go beyond the constraints established by four decades of conflict and accept the previously unacceptable. The message of Madrid is faint but discernable: Middle East peace is possible.

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