How to Lead by Following : EC’s formula for Yugoslavia needs no improvement by U.S.

Like the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia has all but ceased to exist. Belgrade has been fighting the demise of its federation, however, as Moscow so far has not. The Yugoslav federal army tried and failed to prevent the secession of Slovenia. Lately, at great cost in human life, it has sought either to prevent the secession of Croatia or to seize territory for a future, larger Serbia.

How, if at all, does this violence bear on the question of diplomatic recognition for the erstwhile Yugoslav republics? At a Brussels meeting, European Community diplomats argued both sides of that question. Britain’s Lord Carrington thought recognition of the republics would provoke Serbia to worse violence. German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher argued that months of diplomacy had only led to more bloodshed. If the EC ministers would not recognize Slovenia and Croatia, Germany threatened to go it alone.

History and culture were silent partners to this discussion. Croatia, largely Roman Catholic, writes its language in the Latin alphabet. Serbia, largely Eastern Orthodox, writes its otherwise almost identical language in the Cyrillic alphabet. During World War II, there were many Croatian collaborators with the Nazis. After World War II, there were many Serbian collaborators with the post-war communist regime. A unilateral German move on behalf of Croatia would summon up the most unwelcome of ghosts. And yet, Genscher was right: Inactivity was costing more lives every day.

In the end, the EC agreed to recognize not just Slovenia and Croatia but also any of the other four Yugoslav republics that might apply for admission so long as they agreed to respect the rights of minorities, to determine borders peacefully, to accept arms control and nuclear non-proliferation agreements signed earlier by Yugoslavia, and otherwise to settle regional disputes by arbitration. If these conditions are met, recognition will come Jan. 15.

A British diplomat once quipped that the purpose of NATO was to keep the Americans in, the Russians out and the Germans down. Now that the Russians are out of Europe and the Americans on their way out, the EC has to keep Germany down on its own. In this first, key test of EC diplomacy, British reservations and French mediation seem to have succeeded in producing a formula that the United States could scarcely improve on.

The stakes for Washington are obviously much less in Yugoslavia than they are in the Commonwealth of Independent States (nee Soviet Union) with its nuclear arms. As Europe assumes more responsibility for its own defense, it will inevitably assume more responsibility for its diplomacy. In effect, the Bush Administration has been counting on it to do just that in the Balkan conflict.

How can the United States help the EC to do what the United States wants it to do? We see no better way than by simply endorsing the Brussels agreement and promising U.S. recognition to any of the Yugoslav republics that meet the EC conditions. In the Gulf War, America led. In the Balkans, a wise America will lead by following.