Administration Split Over What to Do About Hussein

With the Persian Gulf War nearly a year behind and the presidential election 10 months ahead, the Bush Administration remains deeply split on what to do about its biggest foreign policy embarrassment--Saddam Hussein’s continued hold on power in Iraq.

The split has become increasingly apparent both in the public statements of Administration officials and in their private comments in interviews.

In public, for example, CIA Director Robert M. Gates told a Senate committee early last week of the continued danger posed by the Iraqi regime, saying that “Iraq will remain a primary (nuclear) proliferation threat at least as long as Saddam Hussein remains in power.”

By contrast, Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, in a television interview Sunday, played down the threat from Hussein.

“His stature as a significant Arab leader has been destroyed. His economy is in a shambles. He doesn’t control the north end of Iraq; the Kurds do. He has a weak control in the south, where the (Shiites) are. I think his base inside Iraq is steadily shrinking and eroding,” Cheney said on CBS’ “Face the Nation.”

“The important thing for us,” Cheney added, “is not to be overly fixated on Saddam Hussein.”

The public statements reflect substantial private differences in outlook. At the Pentagon, one senior official said, Cheney and his aides are not “sitting around wringing our hands” over Hussein’s continued hold on power. Military officials, in fact, express dismay at how concentration on Hussein has diminished attention to what they see as the substantial victory won by U.S. troops last year.

Elsewhere in the Administration, however, Hussein’s survival is seen as a major threat, both to stability in the Middle East and to the reputation for mastery of foreign policy that the President hopes to use as a key element in his reelection strategy.

As a result, Administration officials snipe at each other in private. White House aides suggest that Pentagon officials exaggerate the difficulty of deposing Hussein, while military officials blame the State Department for being lukewarm in pursuing anti-Hussein measures.

Some officials hope, as Cheney has predicted several times, that continued stringent economic sanctions against Iraq eventually will bring Baghdad’s military to see that continued support for Hussein carries too high a price for their country. Others hope for a payoff from efforts by Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iran to bring unity to anti-Hussein guerrilla groups within Iraq.

On Sunday, the New York Times quoted Administration officials as suggesting that the Saudis have pushed for a more active U.S. role in support of rebel activity inside Iraq. A source familiar with Saudi thinking, however, said that just the opposite is true: Administration officials, he said, are pushing the Saudis to do more.

Still others argue for a more active U.S. policy of using covert operations to subvert Hussein’s regime. National Security Council aides have prepared contingency plans that could be used in the event of an anti-Hussein uprising, but Administration officials say that the planning is far from the point at which any active measures might be taken.

The debate over what to do about Hussein dates back to the days immediately after the end of the war last spring. At that point, Administration officials hoped for a quick collapse of Hussein’s regime and issued statements encouraging the Iraqi military to rise up.

But the military remained loyal to Hussein, crushing a rebellion by Shiite Muslims in southern Iraq, then attacking Kurdish rebels in the north. The Administration stood by during the squashing of the Shiite rebellion, in part because both Administration officials and Saudi leaders worried about ties between the Shiites and the fundamentalist government of Iran.

In the north, Bush eventually sent troops to help the Kurds. But U.S. officials, concerned that a Kurdish rebellion would lead to a partition of Iraq, made clear that the troops were there only to stop Hussein’s troops from butchering the rebels, not to allow the rebels to carry their fight beyond their northern Iraqi strongholds.

The result has been a stalemate that is again becoming an issue.

Democrats widely predict that Bush and his aides will try another push against Hussein in the next few months in hopes of removing a major embarrassment before the fall campaign.

Administration officials see that “the Gulf victory has been tarnished, and they see the President’s position as greatly strengthened by having Saddam Hussein removed,” Rep. Lee H. Hamilton (D-Ind.), chairman of the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, said in an interview Sunday.

And Administration officials, partly in hopes of keeping pressure on Hussein, have done nothing to play down such speculation.

But while a successful move against Hussein might help Bush, a failed move would be a disaster.

One key problem centers on the great reluctance of Saudi officials to allow use of their territory in the event Bush once again decides to employ military force against Hussein. Placing U.S. forces on Saudi territory during the war created controversy within the country.

And Pentagon officials, led by Gen. Colin L. Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have long maintained that any action against Hussein would have to be backed by ground forces that could be used if needed.

Other Administration officials have expressed frustration with that position. They argue that a move against Hussein could be made covertly or by aid to rebel groups inside Iraq combined with U.S. air or logistics support.

In the past, however, such ideas always have foundered because of the lack of unity on the part of anti-Hussein groups and Hussein’s ability to eliminate any potential foes within his own armed forces.

Times staff writers Don Shannon and Melissa Healy contributed to this story.