De Klerk’s Big Gamble: Failure Could Be Bloody : South Africa: Tuesday’s referendum on the future of white rule is timed to give democracy a boost. Why hasn’t Bush been more supportive?

President Frederik W. De Klerk’s surprise decision last month to hold a referendum on the future of white rule was a well-timed, brilliant strategic move. The defeat, in mid-February, of his National Party in a parliamentary by-election had reinforced the widely held perception that white opposition to the negotiations for a new constitution was growing. If De Klerk had not acted quickly, he could have found himself in an impossible position.

This Tuesday, South African voters will be asked to respond “yes” or “no” to this question: “Do you support continuation of the reform process which the state president began on Feb. 2, 1990, and which is aimed at a new constitution through negotiation?”

A “yes” vote will clear the way for the Convention for a Democratic South Africa, a multiparty body formed last December as the vehicle for negotiations, to establish an interim government and to agree on a new democratic constitution.

A “no” vote could have calamitous consequences. De Klerk has already announced that if the referendum fails, he will resign and call new parliamentary elections. This would threaten the remarkable progress that the Convention for a Democratic South Africa has made in building trust and bridging differences among competing visions of a new South Africa. It would increase the risk of political chaos, possibly even precipitating a civil war. And it would prompt immediate calls from anti-apartheid activists for the United States and other major Western countries to reimpose strict economic sanctions on South Africa.

From the outset of the negotiations, the South African president has repeatedly assured his white constituents that he would seek a clear mandate from them before agreeing to a new political dispensation. By holding a referendum now, De Klerk desires to present white voters with a broadly defined choice.

If De Klerk had waited much longer to call the referendum, he would have been burdened with increasing demands to be specific. And therein lies a problem: As the compromises whites must make become clearer, they will become less palatable. By winning on Tuesday, De Klerk almost certainly hopes to avoid the need to go back to his constituents later.

Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress are aware of the dilemma facing De Klerk. And for that reason they have called on whites to vote “yes,” even though they strongly oppose in principle the idea of “whites-only” elections.

De Klerk has vigorously campaigned across the country for a “yes” vote. After complaining about the wording of the referendum question, the Conservative Party launched a drive designed to heighten white fears of black majority rule. The conservatives received a psychological boost last week when former President Pieter W. Botha came out against the government. But the problem for the conservatives is that their proposed solution--a partition of the country into separate black and white states--is hopelessly unrealistic.

Although most analysts expect the referendum to pass, it is difficult to gauge the measure of its success. South Africa does not allow public-opinion polls to be taken during an election campaign. A pre-campaign poll estimated that a majority of white voters supported De Klerk, but it also found a large number of voters who would not disclose their position.

If De Klerk wins by a significant margin, probably 55% or more, it would gag his critics and give him the mandate he needs to continue negotiations with the ANC and other black groups. The parties to the Convention for a Democratic South Africa would probably reach an agreement on arrangements for an interim government within the next few months. The overall pace of reform would accelerate rapidly. And a new, non-racial constitution could be in place by late 1993.

A decisive “yes” vote would compel conservatives to make some very difficult choices. If the Conservative Party chose to remain outside the Convention for a Democratic South Africa, as it has done so far, it would find itself increasingly marginalized. The majority of conservatives would probably opt instead to join the Convention process and attempt to bargain for stronger protections of white freedom and property. But others, including possibly members of the South African police and military, might defect to far-right paramilitary groups that are committed to using violence to block a transition to majority rule. But it is doubtful that they could prevent a transition to democratic rule.

If whites vote “no,” and new parliamentary elections are held, the situation in South Africa would become volatile. Black leaders could find it harder to resist demands from young militants for a resumption of nationwide civil-disobedience campaigns, perhaps even the armed struggle. Hard-liners within the police and defense forces would almost certainly press for tough security measures. And the world would once again be forced to confront the possibility of a South African race war. In the United States, the Bush Administration would be called to account for having been so quick to accept De Klerk’s repeated assurances that the process of change in South Africa was “irreversible.”

With the stakes involved so high, what should the United States be doing? First and foremost, President George Bush and Secretary of State James A. Baker III should spell out the consequences of an attempt to halt the process of change in South Africa. If whites vote against reform, the Administration should be prepared to reinstate immediately all the sanctions it has lifted. Such a warning would help to remind whites why they voted so decisively against the Conservative Party and elected De Klerk president in late 1989.

At the same time, U.S. political leaders should send a bipartisan message to South Africa that they are ready to begin a concerted effort to lift state and local sanctions against South Africa and assemble a serious package of targeted aid and investment incentives as soon as an interim government is in place.

Inexcusably, an Administration package of threats and incentives are not already on the table. But there is still time for the President to show that a democratic South Africa is the only future that he will abide.