National Guard Official Cites Series of Delays

The first troops Gov. Pete Wilson ordered to the Los Angeles riots were delayed for several “critical” hours by a series of decisions and breakdowns that began long before the jury in the Rodney G. King beating trial delivered its verdict, a top California National Guard general acknowledged Monday.

Brig. Gen. Daniel L. Brennan insisted that the Guard’s response compared favorably to any of its previous commitments in times of civil unrest--including the Watts riots. But Brennan, in an interview with The Times, said it could have been faster.

The general, the Guard’s second-in-command, said his force lent too much of its riot gear to local law enforcement agencies, which began asking the Guard for the equipment two weeks before the verdict. He also said the force failed to move its ammunition as quickly as it should have, in part because there are no lights on the parade ground at Camp Roberts, where the Guard stores materiel.

Brennan said the Guard generally followed its off-the-shelf activation plan for urban unrest. The field commanders’ desire to stick to that plan--by not sending in troops until fully equipped and hesitating to use soldiers before their automatic weapons could be converted to semiautomatic--contributed to the delay.

Wilson has ordered a review of the Guard’s performance, and in a television interview Monday called the Guard’s delay “inexcusable.” Brennan said the Guard, after a cursory internal review, is considering opening two more ammunition depots, one each in Southern and Northern California, and adopting a new policy against depleting its stocks by lending out equipment beyond a certain level.

Brennan also acknowledged that the Guard is not as well equipped to respond to riots today as it was in the days when the memory of civil disturbances was fresh. Until about 10 years ago, he said, all Guard members spent 16 hours a year training for civil unrest. Now, infantry and military police get that training, but most of the forces get only four hours a year.

In addition, former Gov. George Deukmejian early in his Administration eliminated a special, at-the-ready riot contingency force created in 1975 by then-Gov. Edmund G. (Jerry) Brown Jr.

Brown established that force, 1,200 strong, after a San Francisco police strike highlighted the need for a police-style unit that could respond quickly and not depend on the Jeeps, steel helmets and automatic weapons that are standard military fare. Instead, the unit was trained to travel in sedans with red lights and sirens, carry revolvers and batons and wear white, motorcycle-style helmets.

Brennan said the unit, known as the Law Enforcement Assistance Force, was eliminated because the the budget was tight and it seemed a luxury in a time of relative calm.

“We were trying to maintain these people at a higher level of readiness,” he said. “The federal government no longer wanted to pay for that. We were criticized for putting too much training on federal time into preparations for a riot situation.”

Although Brennan downplayed the importance of the decision to disband the unit, he did say that the Guard may seek federal funding to increase its riot training for all soldiers to the 16 hours a year that used to be standard.

In responding to the riots in Los Angeles, Brennan said, the Guard relied heavily on the judgment of local law enforcement officials, who at first said they did not think they would need state troops, but a few hours later were criticizing the soldiers’ tardy arrival.

“They didn’t anticipate, nor did we, the verdict, nor the rapid escalation of a riot situation,” Brennan said. “Things were escalating so rapidly that we didn’t have time to go through a normal build-up process here. We were playing catch-up in order to meet what the civil authorities were saying they needed.”

In the end, Brennan said, the breakdowns slowed deployment of the troops by two to four hours, though critics have said the delay was longer. Whatever the case, Brennan conceded that the lag--from early Thursday morning until late afternoon--was a “critical” time.

“You don’t normally call up a military unit and have them deployed and ready to go in 24 hours,” Brennan said. “They wanted us in 12. The expectation was a little unrealistic. But you can understand the need, with buildings burning and people being killed.

“It’s as if someone is hungry and they say, ‘Give us corn,’ and (we) say, ‘Well, we’ve got to plant it.”

Brennan said that in hindsight, the more immediate problem began two weeks before the King verdicts came down, when the California Highway Patrol and local law enforcement and fire agencies began requesting flak jackets and other gear as they prepared to respond in case the police officers on trial were found not guilty. At that point, the Guard was told it would be needed, if at all, only for logistic support--providing equipment and flying Highway Patrol officers to the scene.

Accepting that plan, the Guard lent so much of its gear to others that it did not have sufficient stocks on hand when its troops were called for.

Once the governor issued his order, Brennan said, “we said ‘Stop!’ No more loaning of our equipment.” But it was too late. The Guard had to borrow from other states to round out its supply.

Wilson made the decision to use National Guard troops at 9 p.m. Wednesday, the night of the verdicts. But the CH-47 helicopter unit needed to transport ammunition from Camp Roberts in San Luis Obispo County to the Los Angeles area was told to arrive at the ammunition depot at 6:30 a.m. Thursday.

One reason for the delay, Brennan said, was that local officials said the Guard would not be needed until nightfall Thursday. Another reason that the bullets and grenades were not loaded Wednesday night was that there are no lights on the parade ground where the transfer was to be made.

“The decision was, we’ll load at first light,” Brennan said. “We don’t want to load in the dark with headlights, using munitions. That’s not the right thing to do. It’s a safety hazard.”

When the helicopter did arrive, the soldiers on hand to load it realized that it lacked rollers on its cargo bed, which ease the movement of the heavy pallets of ammunition. This led to still more delay, and the 125,000 rounds of rifle ammunition, 10,000 rounds of pistol ammunition and 320 tear gas grenades were not aboard until about 9:30 a.m.

By this time, the Guard command had decided to send the chopper first to San Luis Obispo, where one-third of the ammunition was taken off to make room for flak vests, face shields and other riot gear. Also loaded at San Luis Obispo, per the activation plan, were special locking plates to prevent the M-16s from working as automatic weapons. The helicopter had to wait an extra hour while these arrived from a U.S. Army installation in Tracy, near Stockton.

The helicopter left San Luis Obispo at 11 a.m. and arrived at the Los Alamitos staging area shortly before 2 p.m.

In the meantime, the only ammunition the Guard troops had was supplied by an anti-drug unit that works in Southern California and by local police who gave some bullets to a military police unit that landed in Van Nuys.

It is still not entirely clear how important these delays were, because of confusion about just when the local officials wanted the Guard troops to move onto the streets. By 9 p.m. Thursday, 24 hours after Wilson’s decision, 1,007 members of the Guard were on patrol and another 1,993 were ready to go but had not received assignments from local officials, Brennan said.

“We were on the street within 24 hours,” he said. “That’s pretty darn good for a citizen soldier to be contacted, to get to a mobilization station, check out his gear, be given a mission to deploy to an area of L.A., and be told the rules of engagement.”

Still, Brennan said the Guard brass acknowledges room for improvement.

“We felt we could respond to any location in the state within 12 hours, to get our munitions there,” he said. “We’re going to take another look at that premise.”

Dispatched to Duty

Here is a look at some of the law enforcement personnel and troops who have been deployed or await deployment as of 5 p.m. Monday: * LAPD (about 2,500 each shift, 1,800 deployed at any one time): 5,000

* California Highway Patrol (45 to 90 officers deployed at any one time.): 280

* Los Angeles County Sheriff: 1,000

* California National Guard: 9,000

7,000 deployed on the street.

2,000 support staff.

* Federal troops (At staging areas awaiting redeployment if necessary): 4,325

Compiled by Times researcher Michael Meyers