City’s War Room Was Overwhelmed, Study Concludes : Response: Jammed phone lines, antiquated equipment and ineffectual planning contributed to ‘complete ineffectiveness’ of the emergency command center, panel says.

Minutes after rioting broke out last spring, the door was opened and the lights flicked on at the city’s bunker-like war room buried four floors below City Hall.

There were paper and pencils for the clerks to use, and the coffeepot was plugged in.

Soon, phone lines were so jammed that communication with the outside world was difficult. And with no computers, the clerks had to rely on yellow Post-It notes in an attempt to keep track of the latest outbreaks of violence.

These and other conditions demonstrate how the city bungled its response to the riots and how it lacks coordination to deal with future disasters, despite the underground command center and procedures designed to switch city departments into emergency mode, according to the report issued Wednesday by the independent Webster Commission.

As the hours wore on and city employees poured inside, it became clear that the war room--more reminiscent of the days of underground bomb shelters than the high-tech headquarters one might imagine--was too small and antiquated to respond to such a crisis. Eventually, so many police supervisors were crowded inside that it was impossible to move around.

“The (center) was overwhelmed by the events that took place during the civil disorder and by its inability to gather and obtain information,” the report said. “The failure to fund emergency preparation activities and essential emergency equipment will cause needless loss of life and injury to persons and property in any future emergency.”

Mayor Tom Bradley, on a trade mission in the Far East, immediately embraced several of the Webster panel’s key recommendations, including a rewriting of the city’s emergency plans. Other city officials said they were stunned by the lack of preparation, and worry that it may also spell trouble in the event of earthquakes or other disasters.

Councilman Joel Wachs called the failure of the city’s Emergency Operations Organization “scary.” Councilman Michael Woo said: “It tells me that we are not ready to respond to other emergencies. The breakdown does not give me confidence that the city has a viable system in place.”

But others said the criticisms in the Webster report are nothing new.

A consultant’s report completed in August says the city should abandon its underground center and build a new one capable of handling the strained resources of a disaster. Calling the city’s system “woefully inadequate,” the study by VSP Associates said the center is too crowded, lacks modern communications equipment and would probably be inaccessible if a major earthquake hit.

“Los Angeles is better prepared than a lot of jurisdictions, but it’s also a lot bigger and more complicated,” said Bob Olson, who wrote the report. “L.A. has committed a lot of resources over the years but they need to commit more.”

The plan that should have been followed after the riots broke out April 29 was enacted in 1980 by the City Council. It established the Emergency Management Organization, to be headed by a board of city officials and chaired by the police chief.

The Webster panel laid blame for the failure of the management structure principally at the feet of Bradley, then Police Chief Daryl F. Gates and City Administrative Officer Keith Comrie, although the City Council was also hit for failing to review emergency plans.

The city’s ineffectual planning was epitomized by the operation center’s “complete ineffectiveness” on the first night of the riots and beyond, the panel found.

Although the center has been used for dozens of drills and has been activated for earthquakes, protests and visits of international dignitaries, the riots strained the system to its limits and pointed out numerous needed reforms.

“People imagine a computerized war room with big screens and people sitting around with headphones on,” said Sgt. Rob Gandy of the Los Angeles Police Department, coordinator of the city’s command center. “We’re a long way from that.”

Those who were in the center in the first hours of the riots complained about everything from the need for more work space to a fax machine that no one knew how to operate. Trash bins were overflowing. Televisions were too loud. Food deliveries were sporadic.

“The system couldn’t have failed more,” complained one city employee involved in emergency preparations. “It was a complete joke. It was completely crazy. I don’t want to be here for the next disaster.”

The Webster Commission report says that civil unrest received “virtually no attention” in planning by city officials, who “unfortunately” confined preparations almost exclusively to earthquakes.

The report says that Comrie should have directed management planning between emergencies, with Gates to take over during emergency operations. But Comrie said Gates always had been the one in charge of emergency preparedness.

Several City Council members said they also assumed Gates had well-laid plans for emergencies because of his reputation as a strong administrator and their knowledge that he took personal interest in emergency planning.

The Webster panel called for a “complete overhaul” of the city’s emergency preparedness system, including a broad new master plan, with clear lines of communication and priorities for emergency crews; more emergency training, which now focuses on yearly exercises that involve as few as 100 city employees, and a new emergency operations center at a more visible and accessible site, such as Exposition Park.

The center needs a new communications system and computers, and a clearly defined management plan, the report said.