PERSPECTIVE ON NUCLEAR ARMS : Potential for Nuclear Nightmare Still Exists : A post-Cold War world faces a new peril centered on global instability and spread of dangerous technologies.

Even though the United States and Russia have just concluded the most far-reaching nuclear arms reduction treaty in history, the danger that nuclear weapons will actually be used is growing rather than declining.

George Bush and Boris Yeltsin’s START II accord does represent an important step in winding down the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race. Ironically, however, the end of the Cold War coincides with the emergence of a new set of nuclear risks, centered on international instability and the spread of dangerous technologies.

The threat of a superpower nuclear war--with Europe caught in the middle--has all but evaporated. But the stability that was a byproduct of the Cold War’s balance of terror is also disappearing. Nuclear know-how, technology and perhaps even arms are spreading into a world that is increasingly fragmented and chaotic.

It is one thing, for example, for Somalia to be paralyzed by gangs of young, drug-crazed “technicals” armed with modern automatic weapons. It would be another were the warlords to acquire a few low-yield tactical nuclear weapons. This might seem far-fetched, but in the case of the war in the Balkans, for example, is it unrealistic to assume that Serbia, facing the threat of Western military intervention, would not consider obtaining its own nuclear deterrent?

Dr. Strangelove, meet Mad Max.

“Sleep-walking through history,” is how Sam Nunn, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, has described the lack of attention that the West has devoted to the emerging problem of nuclear chaos

Nunn’s accusation is correct. Accordingly, if we want to avoid a world of nuclear road warriors, Bill Clinton’s Administration, working closely with key allied governments, will have to move quickly to adapt the arms control process to a new, less stable and predictable era.

Four areas for action stand out:

The first is to build on START II to achieve the gradual denuclearization of the former Soviet empire. It is one thing to agree on new nuclear cuts in Russia’s missile arsenal; it is another to actually begin the process of dismantling the country’s huge nuclear Establishment. As Nunn and his Senate colleague, Richard Lugar, reported following a visit to Russia last month, a lack of funds has prevented the Russian military from beginning the expensive and time-consuming process of deactivating and disassembling nuclear warheads.

There are also political obstacles. While originally agreeing to abide by nuclear arms treaties, Ukraine--where several former Soviet missile sites are situated--is having second thoughts about treaty ratification. One problem, it seems, is that Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk has told U.S. officials that a precondition to ratification is an American security guarantee directed against neighboring Russia, a political non-starter that would play into the hands of conservatives in Moscow.

Clearly worried about the slow pace of implementation, Nunn and Lugar have called for more Western financial assistance in expediting the Russian nuclear build-down. Their concern is that before too long a far more nationalistic leadership in Moscow could view nuclear arms not as a vestige of the communist past, but as an instrument of a more aggressive future.

A second priority is to tighten world-wide control on technology and materials that can be used to build nuclear weapons. The collapse of the former Soviet Union has clearly raised the risk that both sensitive know-how and materials will end up in wrong hands. Last month in Germany, police arrested two different groups of Polish smugglers said to possess bomb-grade enriched uranium. Meanwhile, there have been several reports of Third World governments attempting to acquire former Soviet nuclear components and expertise, including a recent effort by North Korea to hire several Russian nuclear scientists.

Of course, the nuclear supply problem is not limited to the former Eastern bloc. In the 1980s, Iraq was a favorite customer of renegade high-tech companies in Western Europe and North America. But with Iraq’s nuclear infrastructure mostly destroyed in the Gulf War, attention has shifted to Iran. Many of the same Western countries, especially in Germany, that profited from Iraq’s nuclear appetite are now apparently busy in Iran.

In the mid-1970s, the Carter Administration, fearing the spread of nuclear technology in that era, formed an informal Suppliers Club of Western nations, which after some trouble was finally able to agree on a strengthened regime for controlling nuclear exports. Clinton needs to reinvigorate the group, perhaps expanding it to include Russia and other Eastern states.

A third task is to dissuade additional countries from attempting to go nuclear. Even if the new Administration is able to make progress on the “supply side” of the equation, it must also reduce the demand.

A carrot-and-stick strategy appears to offer the best approach. Western aid and technical assistance could be deployed as part of a broader strategy designed to dampen any new Russian drive to renew its nuclear arsenal. But in some cases, using the stick could prove more effective. In Ukraine’s case, for example, the Administration could quietly but firmly explain that normal relations, including political and economic support, would not be possible without ratifying START II. In other situations, such as the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs, much stronger measures will probably be needed, including political isolation and economic sanctions. And if these tactics fail, the international community should not rule out the use of force.

Finally, there is the task of dealing with the increasingly dangerous nuclear power plants in the former Soviet Union. There are still 15 Chernobyl-type power reactors operating in Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania. However, the number of nuclear reactors that pose a serious safety risk is more than double this. These deteriorating facilities pose a different type of challenge than the problem of proliferation; the threat they pose to human life is just as enormous. Last June, the leaders of the world’s leading industrialized nations committed themselves to tackling this problem. Since then, little more has been said and virtually nothing has been done.

With the Cold War over, domestic challenges seem more pressing and politically rewarding. But the nuclear threat that has hung over the planet for nearly half a century has not disappeared; it has evolved into a collection of equally dangerous but more complicated problems. Willing or not, Bill Clinton will have to address the new nuclear peril. The result of America’s sleep-walking would be a real-life nuclear nightmare.