Just Remember Iraq : Some technologies should be sold only with strings attached
What high-technology products can the United States safely sell abroad, with the reasonable expectation that they won’t be used in ways that would threaten American interests or those of its allies? The question has troubled policy-makers for decades and repeatedly thrust the Commerce, Defense and State departments into quiet but intense conflict.
Now, with the Cold War a fading memory and with lucrative federal contracts for national security-related products shrinking, pressures are growing on the Clinton Administration to ease export controls on such high-tech products as rockets and computers. Some restrictions undoubtedly ought to be lifted, but at the same time strict end-use monitoring and safeguards for key exports must be demanded.
Space technology may be among the first affected, Times staff writer Douglas Frantz has reported. A growing number of countries are interested in putting their own satellites aloft--for communications, weather observation and the like--and American companies have long experience in building launch vehicles. It would seem a natural market. The problem, of course, is that a rocket that is capable of heaving a benign satellite into orbit can also be used to send a deadly warhead streaking toward another country. Encouraging the spread and use of weapons of mass destruction is not a U.S. interest.
Harsh experience makes clear that there’s nothing fanciful about fears of technology being diverted to sinister uses. Iraq remains the object lesson from which prudent conclusions must be drawn. As the world learned a few years ago, Iraq was able covertly and within a relatively brief span of time to acquire a large arsenal of chemical weapons and was well on its way to developing a nuclear weapons capability when its invasion of Kuwait set in motion events that would ultimately bring on the destruction of much of its military might. Some of the materials for Iraq’s covert unconventional weapons programs came through open purchases on world markets. Some was obtained by ruse. The point is that many companies in many countries, including the United States, contributed to Iraq’s ability to acquire weapons of mass destruction by selling Saddam Hussein equipment and materials that were not in fact used for the non-threatening purposes that were intended.
Threats can never be entirely eliminated. But pretty clearly more refined selectivity in approving purchasers of dual use products can cut down on the chances of inadvertently arming regimes that are dangerous to their neighbors and the cause of world order. There are worthy, non-threatening buyers around the world; there are at the same time some countries--Iraq, Iran, Libya, North Korea among others--that simply are not to be trusted.
The United States should continue to press for tightened international export controls on risk-related technologies and materials, even as it moves to ease its own restrictive policies on exports long embargoed by Cold War and other strategic concerns.
Changes should come on a case-by-case basis, with after-delivery monitoring insisted upon. For example, when the United States sells Country X missiles for launching weather satellites, it must insist that its observers will be free to make sure that this is what the missiles are used for. It’s possible that this condition could cut into some sales. But it could also help assure that trade intended to serve peaceful purposes in fact doesn’t become a contributor to aggression.
