PERSPECTIVE ON RUSSIA : Choosing a Constitution--or Chaos : Voters will cast ballots on a wish list for the “civilized” society that reformers would like their country to become.

The most important issue before Russian voters on today’s ballot is the new constitution. If it is adopted by a large majority, it will go a long way toward providing a legal foundation for democracy and a free-market economy. It will also give the Russian government something it has sorely lacked for the last two years--and something the Soviet government never had: legitimacy.

The new constitution has come in for a lot of criticism in Russia because of the strong powers it gives the president over the Parliament, and to the central government over the regions. It’s a constitution written for Yeltsin, some critics have said. Russian opposition parties have run as much against the constitution as against the Yeltsin government itself. It is possible, although not likely, that it will be rejected by the voters.

At the center of the controversy are Articles 11, 109 and 117, which give the Russian president broad authority to dissolve Parliament and call for new elections. If Parliament rejects the president’s nomination for prime minister three times, or if it votes no confidence in the government twice, the president may then order dissolution.

In fact, this gives the president less power than it might seem. There are restrictions: The president may not dissolve Parliament over a no-confidence vote within the first year; he may not dissolve Parliament if impeachment proceedings have already been started against him (which raises the interesting prospect that a Parliament fearing dissolution could impeach first), nor may the president dissolve Parliament once martial law is in effect.

But the main restraint on the president’s power is that dissolution is rather like a hydrogen bomb: It is simply too destructive to use as a weapon in ordinary politics. If the president dissolves Parliament every time the two are at an impasse, Russians will spend half of their lives at the polls. Clearly, in practice, the executive and legislative branches are going to have to figure out how to compromise--and this means that the legislature will be stronger than it appears on paper.

The constitution’s heavy bias in favor of the federal government over the regions runs through nearly every article. Indeed, after Yeltsin’s victory over Parliament in October, more than one-third of the articles of the draft constitution were rewritten, mostly to strengthen the powers of the center and to stress the unity of Russia as a whole. A “federal treaty,” which spelled out the division of powers between the center and the regions and was attached to the draft constitution in July, was removed from the current version. Previous references to the “sovereignty” of the regions are now gone. The key item is Article 4, which states that “the constitution of the Russian Federation and the federal laws are supreme within the entire territory of the Russian Federation.”

The new Russian constitution is in many ways a praiseworthy document, especially from the Western point of view. It gives a broad definition of civil rights. It provides for an independent judiciary (indeed, in the new constitution the judiciary is far more powerful than the legislature). It creates the basis for a market economy by removing all restrictions on the movement of labor, capital and information, both within Russia and across its borders (Articles 27, 29, 71). And above all, the new constitution promises that Russian citizens may not be deprived of property, except by due process of law (Article 35), nor subjected to retroactive taxes (Article 57) or criminal penalties (Article 54). Freedom of private enterprise is guaranteed (Article 34).

But wishing something does not make it so. The new Russian constitution is one long wish list, a blueprint for the “civilized” society that Russian reformers would like their country to be. They sincerely believe that strong central authority, strong civil rights and a free market all go together. Nothing could be further in spirit from the doctrine of the American Founding Fathers, who believed that the only way to make power safe for democracy and civil liberties was to divide it and balance it. “If men were angels,” wrote James Madison, “no government would be necessary”--and no constitutions, either.

Still, Russia badly needs a constitution, and the current document is not a bad one. Given the lack of consensus among Russians over basic values, it is impossible to write a constitution with which all Russians will agree and which will serve as the basis for smooth democratic government. This document is a good start. But it is probably only the first of a long line of Russian constitutions to come over the next generation.

But what if Russians reject this one? In that case, Russia would be plunged back into the legal void of the last two years, in which the only constitutional document would be the much-mended Soviet constitution of 1977. The new Parliament, with its two houses, would have no legal basis or defined powers. The president would have no choice but to rule by decree until a new constitutional assembly could be summoned. To judge from the experience of the last one, which met throughout the summer this year, such an assembly would be paralyzed by bickering among the regions and by mistrust between the regions and the center. In short, if the Russian people reject the new constitution, Russia will be ready for chaos.

But such a rejection is unlikely. Most Russians are fed up with disorder and are likely to vote for a document that provides for a strong hand (and most of which they are unlikely to have read anyway). Moreover, the vote has been structured so that if only half of those actually voting approve, the constitution will be considered adopted. In other words, as few as one-quarter of all eligible voters will be enough. It would be surprising indeed if the constitution could not clear such a low hurdle.

What is more likely is that the new constitution will be adopted overall but rejected in some places. Some regions are refusing to vote on the constitution at all, such as Chechnya, a mountain republic in the northern Caucasus that claims outright independence from the Russian Federation. Other regions, such as the Volga republics of Tatarstan and Bashkir, may well vote “no.”

But a “yes” vote by the Russian population as a whole (which makes up 82% of the Russian Federation) will be taken by Moscow as a sign that ordinary Russians are tired of the claims of the non-Russian regions, and as a mandate to step up the pressure against them.