NEWS ANALYSIS : FAA’s Policy Collision: Industry or Safety First? : Air travel: O.C. crash linked to 757 turbulence reveals agency torn between protecting public and airline profits.

As the Federal Aviation Administration weighed recommendations more than two years ago that it require more landing distance between Boeing 757 jetliners and planes following behind them, the agency found itself trying to serve two oft-competing masters: the welfare of the public it is charged to protect and the industry it was formed to promote.

At the root of recent revelations that the FAA had repeated warnings that 757s produced dangerous wake turbulence lies a harsh economic reality: The agency knew any landing restriction it imposed would mean flight reductions and further revenue losses for an industry that has gone $10 billion in the red since 1990.

Following the Dec. 15 crash of a corporate jet in Santa Ana that flew into 757 wake turbulence, killing all five people aboard, and a similar accident that killed eight people in December, 1992, many observers believe the FAA may have chosen the industry’s rail-thin profit margin over the public’s safety margin.

The FAA took no action on the 757 turbulence issue--until recently--despite compelling evidence from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the United Kingdom’s Civil Aviation Authority and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.

“You can make a safety recommendation, but then the economic factors come in to play,” said Leo Garodz, a former FAA manager who was among the first to bring the 757 wake turbulence problem to the agency’s attention. An FAA specialist in wake turbulence for 20 years, Garodz said his 1991 recommendations on the 757 were not made lightly, but he is sympathetic to the FAA’s plight. “You’re between the devil and the deep blue sea. On the one hand, you’ve got safety. On the other, you’ve got the industry.”

The reason for the dilemma, critics say, is easy enough to illustrate:

On average, 74 Boeing 757s land every day at Los Angeles International Airport, mostly during peak travel hours. Other jets must remain at least three miles behind. If the FAA landing distance requirement was increased by two miles and made mandatory--as some have suggested be done in the wake of the accidents--it would effectively push back all of the planes bound for the airport. To the airlines, it could mean roughly 30 fewer jets could land during peak travel days.

At an average of 200 passengers per plane, the lost revenue is significant.

And that’s just one airport--multiply that times the number of airports in the country and you can see how quickly it adds up to millions of dollars in lost opportunity.

FAA spokesman Fred O’Donnell in Los Angeles acknowledged that the agency does have twin missions: to keep the skies safe and “to foster the growth of civil aviation.” But he said it was an “oversimplification” to characterize the 757 decision-making process as a safety-versus-money matter. He said the evidence given to the FAA over the past two years, while compelling to many, was inconclusive to the FAA.

Since the fall of 1991, at least two formal reports on the potential dangers of 757 wake turbulence were presented to the FAA, in addition to anecdotal evidence garnered from pilots by NASA’s Aviation Safety Reporting System. One of the reports, a study by Garodz and Kirk Clawson, a NOAA researcher, concluded that the medium-sized 757 appeared to generate the most powerful wake turbulence they had ever measured--more powerful than aircraft nearly four times its size. The researchers recommended to the FAA that it immediately require smaller planes be kept four miles behind 757s on final approach under all circumstances and that further testing be done.

Wake turbulence occurs when a jet speeds through the air, leaving an invisible, but potentially lethal trail of horizontal cyclones that spring out from each wingtip. Such turbulence can cause even mid-sized jets to pitch violently, but it can toss around smaller aircraft like mere toys.

The most recent accident believed to have been linked to 757 wake turbulence claimed the lives of two executives of the In-N-Out burger chain when a twin-engine jet landing about two miles behind a 757 at John Wayne Airport went out of control.

Garodz said his and Clawson’s landing distance recommendations “went over like a lead balloon” because “there always is pressure from the industry to close down separation distances.”

In fact, Garodz said, when the FAA embarked on the study, which also called for testing the large Boeing 767, it harbored hopes that the results would allow it to decrease the existing separation requirements for those two aircraft. So did United Airlines, which proffered aircraft to use in the study.

“United Airlines believes the potential benefit of this scientific test--proving that airport capacity can be increased 5 to 10% by safely reducing the separation between planes--justifies its contribution of aircraft and crew members for this study,” James M. Guyette, a United executive vice president, said at the time.

Garodz and Clawson also advised the FAA that the space requirement for the 767--six miles for smaller aircraft--not be reduced.

That, too, was greeted with “less than enthusiasm,” Garodz said.

“Nobody likes delays,” he said. “They want to bring the planes closer and increase traffic flow.” To this day, the FAA says it regularly receives proposals from airline carriers, manufacturers and airports to increase the number of passengers they handle by decreasing space requirements between aircraft. The reason: because the bottom line in aircraft spacing is just that, the bottom line.

Industry experts say the distances planes are kept apart are designed to maximize the number of paying passengers filing through airports--and therefore, industry profits--while meeting acceptable safety criteria. Increasing that distance can mean reductions in flights and delays. And in the commercial aviation industry, minutes can mean millions.

According to the FAA, an average delay of just 10 minutes per flight--which would be a minor annoyance to a passenger--at an airport the size of Seattle-Tacoma International results in a combined $93-million in losses for the airlines.

In 1991, according to an FAA report, 23 of the nation’s largest airports each suffered more than $32 million in losses, solely due to delays, many of which occurred because the approach routes to those destinations were so packed with planes. The problem is, there is only so much navigable airspace to go around, and every airline wants to be in it during convenient flying hours, from dawn to dusk.

Any lengthening of distance requirements between aircraft makes for fewer flights and fewer opportunities for takeoffs and landings during optimal flying times.

“They’ll never say it, but the FAA is in the business of keeping aircraft moving,” said pilot Peter Murray, who has flown commercial jets for 28 years and regularly skippers 757s. “It basically comes down to dollars and cents.”

All of which makes hard-hit airline carriers more interested in reducing airplane separation standards, which would allow them to land more planes, more frequently, and would improve their bottom lines in tight fiscal times with existing resources.

In fact, said John O’Brien from the Air Line Pilots Assn., which often finds itself fighting for increased space between aircraft for safety reasons, “We see much more interest in doing these things when people are looking for a way to better themselves economically.”

The FAA acknowledges there is a direct correlation between the lack of navigable airspace and aircraft separation requirements, and it is an area of concern “to the FAA and the entire industry,” spokesman O’Donnell said.

Listed among the goals of the FAA’s 1991 annual report on the airport capacity problem: “More efficient spacing along the final approach path.”

“The FAA’s position is that there is insufficient capacity in this country to meet the projected needs,” O’Donnell said.

Despite the fact that the FAA has recently taken actions that suggest the 757 could be re-classified as a “heavy” jet, which could require up to two miles of increased spacing, from four miles to six miles, for smaller tailing aircraft, the agency strongly asserted that it did not sacrifice safety by ignoring the data it had received.

However, it was with no information other than the two recent crashes that prompted FAA Administrator David Hinson to issue a bulletin Dec. 22, instructing the nation’s air traffic controllers to inform pilots landing behind 757s they are following a “B-757” and should be aware of potentially heavy turbulence.

O’Donnell said the agency would never compromise the “traveling public” or the “public that lives under the flight path.” But, he said, “we do recognize that certain orders will have a definite economic impact. We have to be realistic,” he said. “We have to ask, ‘Will this create an economic hardship that will destroy the industry?’

“We are concerned about the economic viability of an air carrier and whether or not they stay in business,” he said. “But we will not compromise safety . . . just for the sake of allowing that business to stay in business.”

While the FAA looks out for airline manufacturers and carriers, O’Donnell said, the agency does not shirk from taking a tough stand. He referred to the Noise and Capacity Act of 1991, which required by the year 2000 that the industry phase out older models such as 727s, 747s and DC-9s in favor of quieter, more fuel-efficient, twin-engine aircraft such as the 757, 767 and the new 777.

“The airline industry did not like it,” said O’Donnell. “They maintained that it would force many of them out of business. Nevertheless, we felt there was a need to do that, and we did it.”

For its part, Boeing spokeswoman Elizabeth Reese said the company, which has been hit hard by recession and in February announced the phasing out of 28,000 jobs over the next two years, would need to “examine closely” any proposal to increase separation distances for the 757. In addition to the concern about increased delays, Reese said, there is another complication: Many environmentally sensitive airports, such as John Wayne in Orange County, bar aircraft classified as “heavy.” Reclassifying the 757 as a “heavy” would likely make the aircraft builder’s third most popular jet less marketable, experts say.

“Slots are few and airports are real crowded,” Reese said. “You try to get the airplanes in and out as fast as you can.”

At a minimum, aviation sources say, even if the FAA didn’t want to adopt stricter spacing requirements when it first learned of the 757’s dangerous wake turbulence problem, it was obliged to alert pilots so they could take extra precautions.

Murray, the commercial jet pilot, said air traffic controllers are very busy and frequently encourage pilots to fly under visual-flight rules, which takes much of the responsibility for maintaining a safe distance between aircraft off the controller’s shoulders.

“It’s obvious with this wake vortex problem you can’t just tell a small-plane pilot, ‘There’s a Boeing 757 in front of you, good luck. You’re on your own.’

“He has no way of knowing how far he is from the jet in front of him,” said Murray, whose son flies commuter planes. “He’s hoping he’s far enough away, but the controllers know.”

Murray, who asked that the airline carrier he flies for not be named, said he has no doubts that economic issues played a role in the decision not to act on the 757 spacing recommendations. He suspects the 757 spacing criteria may change now.

“The only possible reason for not doing it is because it means dollars and cents,” Murray said. “They’ll say, ‘This is one of the world’s busiest airports and how are we going to stretch aircraft out,’ but that’s just tough.

“This is something that needs immediate reaction. You know, all these kids are getting killed at this crosswalk. We need to put in a stoplight. We don’t want to do it; it’s going to cost a lot of money. But we’ve got to.”

O’Brien from the Air Line Pilots Assn., which represents 40,000 pilots from 38 airlines, said ALPA for years has asked that the type of wake turbulence testing done three years ago on the 757 be made a routine part of the airline certification process. But “there wasn’t great enthusiasm for that,” he said. It appears a stronger case could be made for it now, he said.

William Reynard, head of NASA’s Aviation Safety Reporting System, which twice alerted the FAA last year to the 757 problem, said the FAA does the “best it can” in weighing safety and economic issues. But he said “I think it’s intelligent at this point” that the FAA has begun further testing on the 757 and is considering creating a special category for spacing purposes.

Tim Carey, a close friend of John O. McDaniel, the pilot of the plane that crashed in Santa Ana last month after encountering 757 wake turbulence, said safety factors should far outweigh monetary ones. “I’m not an aviator, but safety comes first and nothing else should be considered,” said Carey, the captain of a container ship that regularly makes trans-Pacific runs between Los Angeles and Honolulu. “Granted, you want your company to make some profits, but I don’t see throwing in a risk factor for monetary reasons.

“Look what could have been avoided in this case,” he said.

Carey said if McDaniel, a skilled pilot by all accounts, had at least been warned about the 757 wake turbulence problem, he would have paid special attention.

“It just seems a shame that they’ve known about this for so long and didn’t say anything,” Carey said. “There’s a lot of families affected by this--a lot of wives, a lot of kids, a lot of friends, a lot of lives.”

Times staff writers Richard O’Reilly and Caroline Lemke contributed to this report.