Good Intentions Won’t Count : Japan: Put a specialized policy team in the White House to ensure methods and goals.

Fresh from winning Diet passage of his electoral reform package this past weekend, Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa travels to Washington to meet with President Clinton on Feb. 11. What emerges from this summit meeting is likely to shape the course of U.S./Japan relations for the foreseeable future.

If the last year is an indication of what to expect, the two heads of state are likely to announce that agreements have been reached on several elements of the “framework talks.” These will include agreements on “global cooperation,” insurance, government procurement (medical and telecommunications equipment), automobiles and automobile parts. That agreements have been reached will not be noteworthy; there are always agreements in such negotiations. The problem will come months later, when the U.S. government finds that the agreements are not yielding the expected results.

In late 1994 or early 1995, a crisis will develop in U.S.-Japan relations. The United States will accuse Japan of violating the agreements reached in February, 1994. Japan will counter that it had promised only “best efforts,” not results. The Administration will be in a quandary. The question will be posed as follows: How important is it for Japan to live up to agreements as understood by the United States? --What is the United States willing to risk to ensure Japanese compliance?

Those in the Administration who emphasize the cooperative aspects of the relationship will argue that taking unilateral action against Japan is too harsh. Those who emphasize the competitive aspects of the relationship will argue that taking unilateral action is the only way to show Japan that the Administration is serious about compliance with trade pacts.

How can such a crisis be averted? For one, by ensuring that the agreements are unambiguous enough to prevent each side from attaching its own, different, interpretation. This requires several things: enough time and serious attention devoted to the negotiations by Cabinet or sub-Cabinet officials to ensure that the agreements are not the result of last-minute, all-night sessions; a detailed point-by-point confirmation by both sides of what is agreed to; a thorough review of the Japanese texts to ensure that they are identical in meaning to the English texts; a full explanation of the agreements by both sets of negotiators, together, in front of the U.S. and Japanese media to ensure that, unlike the July 10, 1993, “framework” agreement, each side does not tell its public only its own interpretation; the establishment of a formal monitoring mechanism to track progress based on mutually agreed indicators, and a clear understanding by both sides of what constitutes compliance and the consequence of noncompliance.

In the longer term, the only way to deal adequately with the “Japan problem” is for the Administration to formulate a clear, coherent and consistent policy. This policy should recognize that the Japanese economy is fundamentally different from that of our other trade partners; integrate the economic and political/security dimensions of the U.S.-Japan relationship; consider Japan in its regional and global context; plan and shape the future to maximize areas of cooperation; ensure benefits from competition, and minimize areas of conflict.

Institutionally, a centralization of U.S. policy-making toward Japan is needed. The current decentralized structure makes it easy for Japanese negotiators to divide and conquer and for the Japanese mass media to highlight even slight differences in nuance regarding what the Administration expects of Japan. An office of Japan policy in the White House staffed by Americans with extensive knowledge and experience in Japanese affairs is needed.

Japan requires focused U.S. attention that integrates the economic and political / security dimensions in a new configuration for the post-Cold War era. The heavy economic component, plus the extremely rapid response time and constant high-level attention necessary to deal adequately with Japanese issues, makes the White House a better site for the office of Japan policy than the State Department.

If the Clinton Administration continues its present path of crying wolf but having no Japan policy, it will almost certainly precipitate a crisis in the bilateral relationship by late 1994 or early 1995. By then, if it becomes clear that Japan is not adhering to agreements as understood by the United States, pressure will build to take unilateral action against Japan.

The Japanese reaction to such unilateral U.S. action is certain to be resentful and emotional. Having been fed daily doses in the mass media of U.S. decay, the Japanese will become even more convinced than ever that the United States is scapegoating Japan for its own domestic problems. The sense of being victimized and bullied will doubtless foster widespread anti-American sentiment in Japan despite the reservoir of good will toward the United States that, although on the decline, still remains.

With NAFTA and the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations completed, one can only hope that the Administration will now focus serious attention to the single greatest challenge it faces as both collaborator and competitor--Japan.