PERSPECTIVE ON ARMENIA : Charting a Course for Peace : Washington has not given this key buffer state the consideration both it and long-term U.S. interests deserve.

The Clinton Administration, if it is to avoid the failures of its predecessors, must step beyond the temporal confines of its own four-year tenure and begin assessing U.S. policy through the prism of long-range strategic interests. Such a vital readjustment requires not only political courage but a fundamental departure from now-standard American prejudices and predilections.

Armenia and its political neighborhood are a case in point.

The Soviet Union’s smallest republic has discovered during the past two years that independence is indeed an equation of benefits and burdens that are easier to fathom in the abstract than to exact in reality. Despite its people’s sufferings and sacrifices and their political maturity in refusing civil war as a means to express disillusionment with inept government, Armenia finds itself in the throes of dangerous domestic and foreign crisis. Economic collapse, hyperinflation, growing poverty, continued influxes of refugees, rail and road blockades imposed by neighboring Azerbaijan and assisted by Turkey, and the escalation of conflict in Nagorno (Mountainous) Karabakh combine with harsh winter conditions and the lasting effects of the great 1988 earthquake to paint a picture of pain and potential explosion.

Washington, for its part, has not given Armenia, this key buffer state located at a critical intersection of so many competing political and economic interests, the consideration both it and long-term American policy deserve. Instead of charting a course to enhance peace, security and geopolitical balance in the area, the United States has opted for impulsive, situational initiatives that reflect neither Armenia’s importance to achievement of these aims nor a basic understanding of the pitfalls and ultimate disaster of such a myopic approach.

As difficult as it may be, policy-makers who want the best for America in the 21st Century should be divesting themselves of old, worn stereotypes and thinking in new patterns that respond to a dramatically rearranged global environment. They may want to build a balanced American strategy for the region, along these lines:

* Armenia, its domestic difficulties notwithstanding, is a strategically significant country at the crossroads of conflicting but potentially cooperative spheres of influence, between Iran and Turkey, Moscow and Washington, the East and the West and the great religions of the world. Still at the beginning of its road to full democratic values, real political pluralism and effective economic reforms, Armenia is worth more than occasional comforters of humanitarian assistance, however generous. If the United States is serious about stability in the region, its commitment to Armenia must be a political--and permanent--one.

* Mountainous Karabakh, the world must come to understand, is not a religious or territorial feud between Armenia and Azerbaijan. It is a legitimate quest for self-determination and sovereignty by that entity’s Armenian majority and constitutes the last stage of the decolonization process inspired by the Soviet Union’s dissolution. International rejection of Azerbaijan’s military “final solution” to this question, appreciation of the juridical grounds for Karabakh’s self-government and the compelled nature of its self-defense, and the architecture of a peace process that invites Karabakh participation will together serve to measure the degree of success in disengaging from Stalin’s bloody legacy of “divide and conquer” politics.

* Russia, regardless of its political orientations and domestic choices, should be viewed as an equal partner in the affairs of the region and encouraged to maintain its constructive role there. A new formula must find the delicate equilibrium between reliance on Russia’s stabilizing strength and defiance of return to an imperial past. Until the United States deepens its political and economic commitment to Armenia and other nations similarly situated, it can expect nothing more.

* Turkey, an American ally whose strategic importance has waned with the winding down of the Cold War, can continue to play a productive part in the post-Soviet world if it advances in two important ways. First, official Ankara must categorically reject, not only by word but in deed, the increasingly loud voices within Turkey calling for a re-creation of the Ottoman Empire, stretching from the Adriatic to the Chinese frontier. Such a development would not only compromise the sovereignty of the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union in a contemporary reincarnation of a brutal history, but would also entail a markedly altered geopolitical reality in the region--with grave implications, first and foremost, for Washington. Second, if Turkey is ever to become a regional superpower, it must be able to demonstrate its responsible leadership by coming to terms with the ghosts in its closet and making peace with all its neighbors, including Armenia. Just as Germany has taken the road to redemption by confronting the crimes of its predecessor regime, so too should a new and improved Turkey be able to find within itself the moral fortitude to recognize the 1915 Armenian genocide and to sit at the table with Armenian authorities to hammer out a comprehensive resolution of the Armenian question.

Turkey’s self-cleansing is essential for true normalization with Armenia, and is a precondition for Turkey’s assumption of a higher mission in the region.

The United States, for its part, stands to gain from urging Turkey in these directions and away from continued military and blockade-related involvement in Azerbaijan’s war against Karabakh and Armenia. Washington should also seek to diversify its political and economic investments in the area. A strategy of placing all American eggs in the basket of one regional proxy is no strategy at all, and is as wrong today as it was in the days of the Iranian Shah.

* Iran is an Islamic republic that enjoys good neighborly relations with Christian Armenia and co-religionist Azerbaijan. It has remained neutral on the Karabakh issue and has, to its credit, resisted certain attempts to draw it into the confrontation. Iran increasingly must be looked upon not only as a force to be checked and balanced in regional and world affairs, but also as a possible participant in bilateral and multilateral initiatives for the creation of a peaceful, prosperous and secure political environment.

Those concerned about the long-term advancement of American strategic interests should find creative ways to support the many conciliation-minded moderates in Tehran, foster mutual communication and information-sharing, develop and gradually implement confidence-building measures and allow Iran to play a more responsible international role. Here as well, balance, diversification and cooperation are the keys to real geopolitical success.

American policy today is in retreat and out of tune. It is not too late, however, to begin adopting new ways for new times. Narrow political ambitions and superficial quick-fix analyses must give way to a broad and far-reaching vision that seeks to correlate national and international interests.

World peace is at issue, and Armenia is a good place to start.