An Aristide Redux Sparks Fear in Haiti : Caribbean: Experts see duplicity by ousted leader. ‘It’s the same old thing,’ a diplomatic observer says.

The generals still give the orders, and their gunmen still rule the streets. But as diplomats and Haitians look to scenarios for the future, the vision isn’t pretty--especially, they say, if the United States succeeds in restoring President Jean-Bertrand Aristide.

Almost every Haitian expert and most foreign sources interviewed over a week’s time agreed that, as one leading businessman put it, “there is no other option to the (U.S.) military option” to put Aristide back in office more than 32 months after he was driven into exile by the Haitian army.

This conviction has been strengthened by Aristide’s statements this week giving qualified approval to a limited U.S. military strike to remove Haiti’s ruling army officers.

With the prospect that the deposed leader might somehow be back, sources--all of whom opposed the September, 1991, coup and have worked to end military rule--are showing signs of great caution, if not outright fear, of an Aristide government.

This concern is based on what they say have been shortsighted U.S. policies and the uncompromising opposition by the ousted president to broadening his government to include differing political and economic views from his populist and partisan approach.

“It’s the same old thing,” said a Haitian diplomatic expert who said he voted for Aristide and wants him restored “as a matter of democratic principle.”

“Aristide and his advisers in Washington (where the ousted president lives) think they can rule alone, that anyone who opposes a policy is an enemy,” he said.

His view, shared by many of those interviewed, is rooted in what is seen as duplicitous Aristide actions over the last year, particularly in insisting that he has accepted the need for a broader government.

He did this, a political analyst said, “only under American pressure and to keep American support. Now that it seems certain that he will come back, he’s the same old Aristide.”

The expert’s main example is Aristide’s failure to nominate a new prime minister to replace Robert Malval, the moderate who resigned over Aristide’s refusal to accept a broadened government.

“If Aristide had learned anything or was sincere in seeking reconciliation, he would certainly have named a prime minister acceptable to more people,” he said. “I know his advisers are telling him there’s no need now, that he will come back and do whatever he wants.”

This source, contacted after word of Aristide’s acceptance of possible U.S. military action here, said even the limited endorsement was a sign of Aristide’s ambiguous attitude.

“You note he called for a surgical strike, for the American forces to come in and get out and only to remove the military,” the analyst said. Aristide “said nothing about the structural changes we need and can only be accomplished if there is stability imposed from the outside.”

“You know what is going to happen?” he asked. “Right after he gets back and Cedras, Biamby and Francois are forced out, Aristide is going to condemn ‘American intervention’ and demand the U.S. forces leave.”

The source was referring to Lt. Gen. Raoul Cedras, the military coup leader; army chief of staff Gen. Philippe Biamby, and police commander Michel-Joseph Francois. The three are seen as architects of the coup and the brutal policies that have followed.

Other concerns, which appear to reflect class and economic distinctions as well as differing political views, are based on a belief that in the seven months of Aristide’s government, he was violently anti-business and instigated the nation’s poor--the overwhelming majority here--against Haiti’s middle and upper classes.

In reality, said a onetime Aristide associate who now has doubts, “that is an erroneous judgment of the past. There are plenty of reasons to worry about Haiti under Aristide when he comes back, but not because he was advocating violence or class warfare.

“There was less human rights abuse (under Aristide) than at any time in Haitian history,” the source said. “Economic measures were improving. The problem was his lack of a political vision, his lack of understanding of the political process and his inability to realize he was a politician and needed more than a vision from God to govern.”

Now, the source said, “Aristide believes that his only problem--the (Haitian) military--will be removed. He doesn’t understand that Haiti’s problems are far deeper than a corrupt and abusive army.”

Others said that misunderstanding goes beyond Aristide to include the Clinton Administration, which, one source said, “is now driven entirely by domestic political concerns and seems based on the idea that if the military is driven out, the United States can forget Haiti.”

Of possible U.S. military action, a political expert, once favored to be a senior Aristide Cabinet official, observed: “It is all well and good. But the Americans are totally crazy if they don’t look at the day after” the U.S. troops arrive.

A businessman, who once led an effort to reconcile Aristide with Haiti’s wealthy private sector, said, “As things stand, I don’t think his new government will be any different from his first one.”

If that assessment is correct, or even if only the anti-military sectors believe it, one diplomat said, “then Haiti is in real trouble and the Americans will only have cut off the top of the problem and not ripped out the roots.”

Under the best of circumstances, Aristide’s return will present huge challenges not only to him but to long-range U.S. interests here--the creation of a stable economic and political climate to finally remove the threat of massive Haitian migration to the United States.

While Aristide is still judged to hold the support of most of the 70% who made him Haiti’s first democratically elected president, his enemies will remain powerful and determined to protect their economic and social advantages.

He has no political party, and what little support he had in the Parliament is dissipated, one diplomat said.

Another source, who seemed to voice the prevailing mood, said that “if nothing is done beyond disbanding the military and there are no serious efforts to dismantle the old institutions, then Haiti will remain the same. In 10 years we’ll still be the mess we are.”