Don’t Repeat Haiti Errors in Cuba : Foreign policy: It’s a mistake to let domestic politics force a hasty strategy that becomes ‘democracy by starvation.’

With the impasse in Haiti still unresolved, the Clinton Administration now finds itself confronted with yet another crisis in the Caribbean, again involving refugees and the vexing question of how to promote democratic change against the wishes of an entrenched dictatorial leadership. Cuba is obviously different from Haiti in numerous, profound ways; however, there are enough similarities in the policy challenges presented by the two countries that Clinton policy-makers should take care not to replay in Cuba the mistakes that have dogged the Administration’s Haiti policy.

First, the Administration should not base its policy on the views and desires of one interested domestic constituency. In both Haiti and Cuba, the Administration is driven to try to effect internal political change in significant measure by domestic constituencies of perceived political importance to the Administration. Yet these same constituencies, the Congressional Black Caucus and the Cuban American community, effectively restrict the policy approaches that the Administration may employ.

With respect to Haiti, the Administration has been almost morbidly sensitive to the views of exiled President Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s U.S. supporters and hews to a strict pro-Aristide line. This approach greatly reduces the Administration’s ability to bring about a resolution of the impasse and has led the Administration to the point where the only alternative to its unsuccessful policy appears to be a military intervention.

Toward Cuba, the Administration has up to now deferred to the conservative forces in the Cuban American community and pursued a single-track, punitive policy. As the Administration revisits U.S. policy toward Cuba in the current crisis, it should acknowledge that sticking to a policy primarily constructed to please one highly interested domestic group is a mistake.

Haiti has vividly demonstrated that trying to force stubborn strongmen out of power through economic sanctions is an uncertain approach that can cause great harm to average people without any political result. Haiti initially appeared to be a good target for such an approach, much better than Cuba, in that its military leaders have few reserves of popularity and its economy was heavily dependent on the United States.

Unless the Clinton Administration really wants democracy by starvation to be its main policy legacy in the Western Hemisphere, it should respond to the current crisis in U.S.-Cuban relations by developing policy alternatives other than the reflexive imposition of still further economic sanctions. More positive and nuanced measures should be considered, including the initiation of negotiations in which the United States would consider lifting parts of the long-standing embargo against Cuba in return for concrete measures of political liberalization by Fidel Castro.

The Clinton Administration should be careful about over-escalating the war of words with Castro and placing too much emphasis on what is essentially a situation in which, apart from the refugee issue, no major U.S. interests are at stake. One of the most unfortunate features of the Haiti policy is that so much of the damage to the Administration has been self-inflicted. The Administration must keep a sense of proportion between the real significance of the crises it faces and the magnitude of its emotional and rhetorical engagement.

Haiti has made clear that in a confrontation with a Caribbean strongman, it is surprisingly easy for the U.S. government to come away the humiliated party, despite the monumental power differential in America’s favor. This occurs in part because of the difference in goals: All that the strongman seeks is a maintenance of the status quo, whereas the U.S. goal is a fundamental reordering of local power structures, a far more difficult task. It also has to do with the relative amounts of will. For the local strongman and his cronies, defiance is often a matter of personal survival; their will tends to be quite strong. For the U.S. policy-makers, the cause is only one of dozens of competing claims on their time; their will tends to be diluted.

When large, unexpected refugee flows are driving a policy crisis, the Administration must make special efforts to avoid the perception or reality of a reactive, inconsistent policy. Refugee flows from a nearby country can wax and wane with startling speed and unpredictability. The emotions they provoke in the United States are intense. Policy responses require weighing a thicket of factors, ranging from the availability of shelter sites and the cooperation of third parties to the tide of U.S. public opinion and the web of legal obligations under U.S. and international law.

It is essential that the Administration hold firmly to the new refugee policy it has set out, to persuade Cubans who are considering getting on boats that they really will not be allowed into the United States. Haitians were fairly quickly convinced this summer that those fleeing would no longer be able to get into the United States. With such a long history of guaranteed asylum in the United States, Cubans will take longer to convince that they no longer can get in. But if the Administration is forceful, consistent and patient on this issue, Cubans may eventually get the message.

Cuba and Haiti are very different countries. But if the Clinton Administration is to avoid a prolonged season of Caribbean discontents, it should extract from its frustrating efforts in Haiti the lessons that will help it avoid similar mistakes in the current crisis over U.S.-Cuban relations.