The World : Just What Should the Role of the U.S. Be in the ‘Pacific Century’?

Will the year 2000 mark the advent of the “Pacific Century,” as many experts predict? And will East Asia’s ascendance, as some of the experts assert, mean the eclipse of the United States as the region’s dominant power?

I sought answers to these questions on a recent trip to Singapore, Taiwan and Japan. For these and the other dynamic nations of the Far East, the Pacific Century has already begun. This is certainly true in the economic realm. Despite Japan’s recession, Far East economies remain the envy of their competitors and an example to less-developed countries everywhere.

But the United States has nothing to fear from a Pacific Century. Indeed, we are uniquely positioned to advance our strategic, political and economic interests--both within the region and internationally. But we can do so only if we are prepared to use our military power and diplomatic influence to help meet critical East Asian challenges in the years ahead.

Perhaps the most important challenge is Beijing’s emergence into a post-Deng era--a transition with vast ramifications not just for China but for the entire region. Deng Xiaoping’s approach of economic liberalization combined with political authoritarianism has yielded remarkable short-term results in growth. It is not, however, sustainable in the long run.

Indeed, delaying the transition to a more popularly based form of government risks turmoil when the current generation of leadership passes from the scene. The most likely scenario is a period of calm, lasting perhaps six months to two years, as the leading figures of the new generation share power. Then the internal jockeying for position will begin. One possibility is the emergence of a military dictatorship prepared to suppress political discontent and resort to regional adventurism. Even more dangerous is another possibility--that China might revert to the chaos it knew during the 1920s, when rival warlords struggled for primacy.

The United States and its allies in East Asia have a powerful interest in China’s long-term stability. This stability is best served by an approach that balances close economic ties with China and the maintenance of a credible U.S. military presence in the Far East. Our defense relationships with Japan, South Korea and the countries in the Assn. of Southeast Asian Nations will remain linchpins of Asian security--not as part of an anti-Chinese alliance but as a force for stability.

The growing economic ties between China and the outside world are the best guarantee of responsible Chinese behavior toward its neighbors. In particular, the United States must beware of counterproductive confrontations like the one over most-favored-nation status that the Clinton Administration narrowly averted. Nothing plays more directly into the hands of potential post-Deng hard-liners.

A second key Pacific challenge is the instability represented by the Korean Peninsula. Unfortunately, North Korea’s dangerous game of nuclear cat and mouse appears to have paid off. The recent agreement between the Clinton Administration and the Kim Il Jong regime represents a tacit acknowledgment of North Korea’s nuclear status. As such, it undermines both the international non-proliferation regime and peace in Northeast Asia.

North Korea’s nuclear weapons, whatever their number, constitute a direct threat to South Korea and the U.S. troops stationed there. The Clinton Administration may have gained some breathing room. But it has done so at a real cost.

The medium- to long-term strategic consequences of the agreement may be an increased, not diminished, risk of conflict on the Korean Peninsula. This places a premium on maintaining, and perhaps bolstering, U.S. military assets on the Korean Peninsula and surrounding area.

Moreover, the continuing threat of a nuclear North Korea requires that the United States review its current policy on the development of theater antiballistic missile systems. If we are willing to forgo full adherence with the international non-proliferation regime--and the Clinton Administration, regrettably, appears ready to do so--then we must also be prepared to develop the necessary tools to protect U.S. forces from nuclear attack. One thing is clear: The message of the Administration’s agreement with North Korea will not be lost on other rogue states seeking nuclear capability.

A third challenge confronting the Far East will be the region’s economic transformation. Following Japan’s export-led development model, East Asia’s economies have, in just a few decades, become global forces to reckon with. Yet, Japan’s experience also demonstrates the limits of export-led growth.

Constant trade surpluses are no substitute for strong domestic demand. Chronic trade imbalances prompt international tensions and exact costs in terms of living standards. Today, Japan is slowly moving toward a more balanced economic approach. Other East Asian economies face a similar transition. But they are well-placed to do so. Most East Asian nations have achieved economic growth without extreme inequalities of income. The existence of an emerging middle class bodes well for consumption-based growth.

Still, much remains to be done in terms of opening domestic markets and encouraging demand. Otherwise, economic imbalances will sow the seeds of political conflict. That, in turn, may undercut U.S. engagement on critical Asian security issues.

Additional liberalization of international trade and investment will be a critical part of this process. The long-overdue conclusion of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade should mark the transition toward even broader liberalization of trade and investment among the nations of the Pacific Rim. The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum provides a powerful vehicle for just such liberalization.

Last week, President Bill Clinton attended the APEC meeting in Indonesia--where he and other heads of state committed to an action agenda of trade and investment liberalization. It is in America’s interest that APEC’s approach be inclusive, not exclusive.

Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammed has been promoting the idea of an Asian multilateral organization that would include Japan--but exclude the United States. This is dangerous. Nearly 50 years after World War II, it would be tragic to attempt once again to draw an arbitrary line across the Pacific. The damage to U.S.-Japanese relations, the cornerstone of peace and prosperity in the Pacific, could be irreparable. For decades, the U.S. market has been an engine of growth for countries like Japan and Malaysia; for Japan to join an Asian trade caucus that excludes the United States would mean not just a betrayal of trust but an open invitation to a trade war.

Given the stakes, the Clinton Administration must oppose any such effort and it should not hesitate to press Japan to say no. Instead, the United States and Japan should continue working through APEC to develop and implement a flexible framework that permits members to offer freer trade and investment--not just among member states, but with other countries, including Russia.

Economic liberalization will also strengthen the regional trend toward more broadly based government. The ever more prosperous populations of the Far East are eager for a greater say in public decisions. The experience of Taiwan, which now has a per-capita gross domestic product of $11,000 and a lively multiparty system, reveals the symbiotic relationship between free markets and free government. The challenge of economic transformation is just one key test that the United States and the nations of East Asia must face together.

This commonality of interest, in turn, reflects a another fundamental truth: The United States remains, as it has been since the late-19th Century, a Pacific power. East Asians recognize this and, indeed, embrace it. Everywhere I went, Asian leaders called for more U.S. engagement, not less. They realize, as Americans should, that if the Pacific Century is to be peaceful and prosperous, the United States must be part of it.*