Neither Palestinians nor Israelis Ready for Peace

The Middle East peace process, the most positive development in world affairs since the collapse of European communism and the brightest jewel in the tarnished crown of the Clinton Administration, is at a cross roads. Yasser Arafat has agreed to make peace with Israel, but the terms of the agreement are destroying his political authority.

On the West Bank and in Gaza, one can see the decline in Arafat’s influence. In refugee camps, in the comfortable homes of the Palestinian elite and in the offices of what Palestinians hope will one day be the government of an independent state, Palestinians talk about their disappointment with the agreement and their disillusionment with Arafat.

Israelis aren’t much happier. Agreement with the Palestinians furthered peace with Jordan, but it hasn’t brought peace to the Israeli people. Soldiers are still being attacked, terrorists are still hitting civilian targets and ordinary Israelis are still haunted by insecurities as they go about their business.

The problem is this: Israelis and Palestinians are both weary of war, but neither side is quite ready for peace. It is the same problem that has haunted the Middle East since the Six Day War: The Israelis have won a war, but they do not know how to deal with their victory, and the Palestinians do not know how to deal with defeat.

The Palestinians, as usual, are in worse shape than the Israelis. Ever since the Balfour Declaration promised a homeland to Jews during World War I, Palestinian Arabs have fought to block the growth of Jewish settlements and the establishment of the Israeli state. They failed, and now they must live with the consequences.

Economically, militarily, even politically, “independent” Palestine will look to Israel for investment, technology, markets and jobs. Furthermore, no Israeli government will recognize Palestinian independence without a security agreement that limits the power and size of the Palestinian armed forces and makes Palestine, in effect, a part of the Israeli security zone.

All this means that Arafat must be both the George Washington and the Konrad Adenauer of Palestinian history. As Washington, he must secure national independence and preside over the birth of a nation and a new political system. This won’t be easy. Many Asian and African countries have achieved independence in the 20th Century, but few have achieved prosperity and stability.

But building an independent state is the easy half of Arafat’s job. As the Adenauer of Palestine, Arafat must help his people come to terms with defeat. Just as Adenauer had to help a defeated West Germany accept its defeat and make friends with its conquerors, Arafat will have to work toward a rapprochement between a defeated Palestine and a triumphant Israel.

Any Palestinian state that Arafat gets to build will be a Rump Palestine--a state built on the remnants of territory given him by the Israelis. In the eyes of his ultranationalist enemies, Arafat’s Palestine will inevitably be Vichy Palestine, a collaborationist regime that betrays the Palestinian nation it claims to serve.

As Arafat walks the tightrope, he needs help from the Israelis and the West. The West’s job is the easy one; it is already familiar to U.S. taxpayers. Our job is to pay. Western governments and donor organizations must help the Palestinians set up a new government, compensate refugees and provide a network of social services so that Palestinian public opinion will be convinced that the benefits of cooperation outweigh the psychological satisfaction of continued hostility.

The West accepts this responsibility in principle but so far both governments and donors, worried about the lack of transparency in Palestinian accounting procedures, have been slow to deliver. This is ridiculous. As Arafat and his allies fight their political battle against nationalist and religious extremists, the Palestinian Authority must have the funds to improve the lives of ordinary Palestinians and, though it isn’t polite to say so, to buy political support with liberal offers of contracts and jobs.

The important thing is to get the money moving. Spend now, audit later. Ten years from now, nobody will care how the money was spent or whether some of it was siphoned off en route, but they will care about whether peace was advanced.

The Israelis have a tougher job. If Arafat and the peace process are to survive, the Israelis must let him win political victories that will bolster his support among Palestinians. Given their strong bargaining position, the Israelis can force their Palestinian counterparts to accept almost any concessions. It is unwise to press this advantage far; Arafat cannot effectively resist Israeli demands, but neither can he sell too many concessions to the Palestinians.

If Arafat must walk a tightrope, so must Yitzhak Rabin. The Israeli prime minister cannot make concessions that undercut Israeli security or alienate a sensitive and divided Israeli public. But he must avoid forcing Arafat to comply with demands that discredit both Arafat and the peace process among the Palestinians.

This, unfortunately, is something that will be extremely difficult for Rabin to do. Israeli public opinion has been conditioned first by the Holocaust, then by 50 years of Middle Eastern warfare. With terrorist attacks continuing, Israelis cannot easily put their siege mentality behind them. Taking risks for peace goes against the grain for many Israelis; to make concessions to a defeated enemy seems foolish to people who have spent their lives in a struggle for survival. Yet, without concessions--early withdrawals from certain settlements, generous economic terms, imaginative proposals on contested issues like Palestinian sovereignty and the status of Jerusalem--peace between Israelis and Palestinians will remain a distant dream.

Israel must learn the lesson today that the United States began to absorb after 1945: It isn’t enough to defeat your enemies--you have to make friends with them. The United States cannot quite forget Pearl Harbor, but we have had to forgive it in order to build a new relationship with Japan. Two years after the guns fell silent in Europe, the Truman Administration and the American people had to send billions of dollars to the Germans and the Italians. Today, we are helping the Russians.

These lessons came relatively easy for the United States; they will be much harder for a small country like Israel, surrounded by former enemies whose goodwill is far from assured. But facts leave Israel no choice. Despite all his weaknesses and shortcomings, Arafat is the best hope the Israelis have to reach an understanding with the Palestinians. If the Israelis don’t give him a helping hand, they will lose him--and lose the prospect of turning the peace process into a permanent peace.

Aristotle wrote that magnanimity--greatness and generosity of soul--is the greatest quality of a statesman. It is the quality of victors, and it is the quality that Israel needs if its long struggle for survival and security is toy succeed.