The Hidden Costs of Term Limits

The U.S. Constitution says nothing directly on the subject of campaign finance. Otherwise so concerned with maintaining checks and balances on the various forms that political power can take, the framers did not anticipate the way that mass media would make it possible to exchange wealth for influence virtually overnight--and then continue to do so for years and even decades. In this area, some kind of correction is called for.

One correction would impose term limits on the Congress. Unfortunately, this correction, for all its superficial appeal and wide popularity, has many hidden costs. It engineers the defeat of legislators who would win reelection on the merit of their performance, frustrating the will of voters who want them. It treats expertise acquired through on-the-job legislative experience as worthless. Perhaps worst it favors candidates wealthy enough to take six to 12 years out of their lives without risking their own and their families’ welfare.

For these and other reasons, a constitutional amendment imposing term limits on Congress was defeated last week in the House of Representatives.

Several items in the “contract with America,” backed so heavily by freshman Republicans in the House, now either have been or are likely to be stopped in the Senate with the help of veteran Republicans. This time, however, veteran Republicans in the House itself stepped in, most especially an aroused Henry J. Hyde (R-Ill.).

Now what? Constitutional amendment should always be seen as a radical, last-resort correction. When it comes to the problem of entrenched and unresponsive political majorities, if a more conservative remedy than constitutional amendment is available it should be used. Two conservative remedies are indeed available. First, campaign finance reform: Make politics affordable and ordinary people will get into politics. Second, a strict ban on political contributions by lobbyists: Force lobbyists to argue the merits of issues rather than simply pay the bills and many an invulnerable, lobbyist-supported incumbent will instantly become vulnerable.

But if campaign finance and lobbying cannot be reformed, and perhaps they cannot be, then term limits may be the second-best correction. In that case, however, a matter patently affecting the federal government must not be parceled out for the states to settle one at a time. That would lead only to chaos. And so long as seniority rules apply in Congress, any state that unilaterally imposes term limits on its legislators guarantees that its representation will always be junior. Seniority as a fact of political life needs to be factored in.

In the best of times, term limits is a cure that may be worse than the disease. Still, by taking the trouble to think things through beforehand, Congress can at least reduce the baneful side effects of this radical change. A bum’s rush to throw the bums out is no way to run a republic.