Dire Mischief Lies in Early Intervention : Only history can tell whether a hostile act--as in Bosnia--warranted a U.S. response.

In a secret briefing to journalists in 1940, Nazi propaganda chief Josef Goebbels commented about the early days of the Nazi party: “They could have arrested a couple of us in 1925, and that would have been that, the end.” Little did he know it, but Goebbels was foreshadowing the diplomatic doctrine that we today call early intervention.

This works on the “stitch in time saves nine” principle. It seems so simple and reasonable. Looking back, we cannot believe how the statesmen of the 1920s could have missed so many tricks. In our own day, countless observers have made the same argument about Bosnia: Had the West sent a few planes against the first stirring of Serbian aggression in mid-1992, then the whole Yugoslav tragedy would have been averted.

Acting on these ideas, the Pentagon, NATO and the United Nations are considering proposals to set up specialist military units that can be deployed to hot spots at the first sign of trouble.

These proposals, well-intentioned though they may be, are fatally flawed. They create the illusion of simple solutions to difficult problems. Advocates of early intervention suggest that a burst of well-directed fire can make the lion lie down with the lamb. Far from helping the international community to defuse tension, embracing such simplistic notions may simply make things worse.

The easy side of early intervention is the armchair discussion after the event. Let’s look at a current example to see how much more complicated it is to form judgments before the returns of history are in.

In February, Chinese construction teams did some work on an uninhabited rock in the South China Sea. Aptly called Mischief Reef, this rock is part of the Spratly Islands. With its putative large reserves of offshore oil, the archipelago is in a fierce sovereignty dispute between China, the Philippines, Indonesia and Vietnam.

How should the West respond? Was the Chinese action simply a local initiative designed to provide legitimate shelter for Chinese fishing boats? If so, no action is needed other than a mild inquiry of the Chinese authorities for background information. This was the approach followed by the Clinton Administration.

But what if a more sinister motivation is at work? China has long asserted sovereignty over the whole of the South China Sea. What if these actions were the first shot in a deep-laid scheme by Beijing to physically advance this claim? What if the Chinese were deliberately probing Western resolve in the manner of the Argentines, who in 1982 signaled their intention to invade the Falkland Islands by sending a flotilla of scrap-metal scavengers to the Falklands dependency of South Georgia? This was the position of the Philippine government, which argued forcibly for a high-profile American response to Mischief Reef.

At this stage of our knowledge, no one can say who is right. In five years’ time, it may be easy. If China emerges onto the superpower stage as a responsible, well-behaved member of the world community, the Clinton Administration will win praise for its far-sighted restraint.

But if, as this week’s nuclear test may presage, China turns into an expansionist power, the early-interventionists will have a field day: What did today’s policy-makers ignore that signaled impending Chinese belligerency? China’s naval buildup, its new submarines, its new ship-based missiles? Clinton’s restraint will then be vilified as appeasement.

Here is the crux of the matter. Without the benefit of historical hindsight, early intervention is a hoax. It gives no guidance about which of several radically different possibilities represents the correct approach to China. Bosnia is no better an example. In 1992, before the horrors of ethnic cleansing became salient, Western governments were mainly motivated by a wish to preserve the integrity of Yugoslavia in order to discourage centrifugal forces in the collapsing Soviet empire. Against this background, intervention is Bosnia, had it taken place, could equally have taken the form of action to annul the outcome of the Bosnian pro-independence referendum--an action that would have been tragically inappropriate.

Their search for a post-Cold War foreign-policy lodestar has produced all manner of plausible but essentially hollow panjandrums. Early intervention is now making its appearance on this stage. Its chief attraction is that it makes things look easy. Given hindsight, this may be so. But practical diplomacy dials with the future. If early-interventionists can establish their credentials in the arena, all well and good. Otherwise, they should be a little more circumspect in their claims.