THE BALKANS : Behind the NATO Bombs: Appeasement of Serbia

As NATO warplanes thundered in the Balkans last week, the Clinton Administration looked to be on a roll. Three weeks ago, its Croatian surrogates smashed the Serb militia in the Krajina, destroying the myth of Serbian invincibility and putting the U.S. back in charge in the Balkans. There won’t be any more nasty cracks from French President Jacques Chirac about filling a vacuum as leader of the Free World; for now, at least, Bill Clinton dominates the NATO alliance.

It was as if Clinton had gotten hold of one of Ronald Reagan’s old scriptwriters. When China handed Clinton another diplomatic win--releasing dissident Harry Wu in time for Hillary Rodham Clinton to attend the Beijing International Women’s Conference--it was a sweet week for an Administration that could use the relief.

But let’s not get carried away. A number of problems remain before Clinton can ride off into the sunset.

The Bosnian government, for starters. The “51-49” division of Bosnia’s territory--51% to the Croats and Muslims, 49% to the Serbs--has never been popular in Sarajevo. Fifty-one percent for the Croat-Muslim “federation” sounds like a pretty good deal, but it’s much less than meets the eye.

Under the Clinton plan, the 44% of Bosnia’s prewar population that is Muslim will end up squashed into about 20% of the territory. Croats do better. With less than a fifth of the prewar population, they end up with 30% of the land. The Serbs also do well. With slightly over 30% of the population, they stand to get about half the land. True, the U.S. plan requires that the Serbs give up some of the 70% of Bosnia they currently control, but this is still a win.

The Bosnian government always hated this plan and only accepted it to spite the Serbs. Accepting the plan made the Muslims look cooperative, but since the Serbs wouldn’t sign, the Muslims didn’t have to worry. Now the Serbs say they are basically willing to accept this package; will the Bosnian Muslims--and their political supporters in the U.S. Congress--still accept what is essentially a negotiated surrender?

This brings us to the next problem: the question of principle. The West, and especially the United States, defined its Bosnia position in terms of principles and international law. OK, but now what? Are we trying to make peace with men like Radovan Karadzic or are we trying to arrest them for war crimes? Are the Bosnian Serb leaders and fighting men--many of whom are rapists, murderers and ethnic cleansers--going to be arrested and tried for their crimes? If the answer is no, we have abandoned our principles. But if the answer is yes, we have a long way to go. The Bosnian Serbs might be ready for a reasonably generous negotiated peace, but they aren’t ready for unconditional surrender--and air strikes alone won’t bring them to this point.

Our newfound partnership with Slobodan Milosevic, leader of Serbia and, by most accounts, the chief instigator of the Bosnian war, reveals just how muddled our position has become. Late in the week, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke reported jubilantly that Milosevic had agreed to act as the spokesman and ultimate decision-maker for the Bosnia Serbs in a new round of negotiations.

It was easy to see why this news made Holbrooke happy. For more than a year now, the more radical Bosnia Serbs have been at odds with the Serb government in Belgrade. The Yugoslav Serbs don’t care very much about how many rocky valleys and low-grade sheep meadows their Bosnian cousins get or don’t get from the Muslims. Seventy percent of Bosnia, 50% of Bosnia, the Serbs of Serbia don’t care.

They care very much, however, about the economic consequences of the U.N. sanctions that have isolated Serbia and wrecked its economy. Clearly, if Milosevic has taken control of the Bosnian Serb negotiating team, peace has come closer.

But hold on for a minute here. Does anybody still remember what this war is about? The war broke out because the Bosnian Serbs wanted to secede from Bosnia and join a Greater Serbia that would be ruled from Belgrade by--Milosevic. The Bosnia Muslims and Croats didn’t want this to happen, and the United States backed that position. Supposedly, this is a war to keep the Bosnia Serbs separate from Milosevic’s Serbs. So who are we trying to put in control of the Bosnia Serbs?

Milosevic.

Hello?

Here’s the deal behind the new, “tough” NATO policy in the Balkans: The Serbs get to keep most of their conquests, and their “special relationship” with Belgrade gets the blessing of the Western world. Milosevic gets his Greater Serbia in fact, if not in name. The spin doctors want to call this a victory, but let’s get real. This is appeasement with air strikes. First bomb Vienna to show how tough you are, then let Hitler take Czechoslovakia.

It is a terrible settlement for the Muslims, much worse than the one that National Security Adviser Anthony Lake and President Bill Clinton denounced as an immoral, cynical sellout in 1992. But it remains the best settlement possible without massive ground intervention.

So, you may be asking, why all the air strikes? Was it to “bomb the Serbs to the negotiating table?”

No. They were already there. The so-called “parliament” of the rebel Serbs had agreed to talk peace on the basis of the latest U.S. peace plan.

Last week’s wave of air strikes was about spin. “NATO Bombs Bosnia” is a prettier headline than “U.S. Bows to Belgrade Demands.”

The Great and Terrible Wizard of Oz launching the air strikes doesn’t want anybody to look at the little man behind the curtain giving in to Milosevic.

If this brings peace, so be it. Ending this terrible war on almost any terms is better than continued bloodletting.

But don’t hold your breath. The Bosnia Serbs, rattled by the fall of Krajina, went too far in their latest attacks on Sarajevo. They unified the West--briefly--behind vigorous air strikes. But don’t forget, up until last week the Serbs brilliantly exploited the inconsistencies and contradictions among the Western nations. Milosevic is even cannier than his Bosnian allies. As the focus, hopefully, shifts from the battle front to the peace table, the Serbs have plenty of cards left to play. Peace negotiations are likely to be long and drawn out, and the U.S. still hesitates between its principled distaste for what the Serbs have done and its pragmatic awareness that its choices are limited.

The fat lady isn’t singing yet in Bosnia, she’s not even warming up offstage. The last act of this harrowing tragedy is likely to be both depressing and long.*