LOS ANGELES TIMES INTERVIEW : Walter Mondale : Overseeing U.S.-Japan Relations at a Time of Stress and Change

It’s a long way from Minnesota to Japan, but Walter F. Mondale is right at home in Tokyo as America’s ambassador to Japan. The 67-year-old Mondale assumed the job in August, 1993, bringing with him the experience and credentials that the Japanese respect in a senior statesman. He served 12 years in Washington as a senator; four years as vice president under Jimmy Carter and was the Democrat’s presidential candidate in 1984. His self-effacing and reserved manner, coupled with his Midwestern sensibilities, go far in a country where understatement, patience and saving face are most important. But he hasn’t quite earned the nickname of “Fritz-san.”

His is a delicate task of managing and maintaining smooth relations between the United States and Japan. Fifty years after the end of the World War II, there are major strains testing this all-important Pacific relationship. Unlike previous Administrations, the Clinton Administration has hammered away, publicly and unrelentingly, on Tokyo to secure trade agreements that open up the Japanese market. The bilateral auto talks last June were especially bruising--though the two nations managed to reach an 11th-hour agreement. This year, Japan hosts the annual Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting, which begins in Osaka later this week, to discuss Pacific-Asia trade.

Meanwhile, the U.S.-Japan security agreement is under severe stress. Residents of Okinawa have long complained about the noise and presence of the U.S. military. But the alleged rape of a 12-year-old Japanese girl by three U.S. servicemen stationed in Okinawa sparked a huge demonstration. One result is that Tokyo and Washington are discussing matters relating to the security agreement.

Then there is the matter of trust. A string of recent incidents has Tokyo worried. Daiwa Bank was ordered to leave the United States because of its alleged cover-up of $1.1 billion in trading losses at its New York branch. Another detraction: The CIA reportedly tapped the phone lines of Japanese trade officials during the auto talks.

The U.S. Embassy is busy preparing for President Bill Clinton’s coming visit to Japan for the meeting of leaders of APEC member nations. He will then go on to Tokyo, for a summit meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama.

Amid the changing dynamics of post-Cold War U.S.-Japan relations, Mondale must work hard at reassuring the Japanese of the America’s continued commitment. In an interview last week at the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo’s Akasaka district, he emphasized the positive, saying the two nations “are doing wonderful things together in what we call a common agenda--health, environment, education and science. We’re spending billion of dollars in almost unprecedented cooperation.” Together in Tokyo with his wife, Joan, they keep in touch with their three grown children and three grandchildren.

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Question: The Clinton Administration has made trade a central element of its foreign policy with Japan. Doesn’t that inherently create conflict or mistrust when you become a competitor at the same time you’re trying to be cooperative?

Answer: Our policy is to include trade along with other considerations--security and political cooperation--as equally important goals. Trade is not more important than the others, but it is not less important than it once was during the Cold War, when these things had to be relegated to . . . the priority of the Soviet threat. The second thing that has to be said is that, because of the enormous trade and current-account imbalances that we suffer with Japan, and [because of] the unique and often closed nature of the Japanese economy, the need to do something about achieving foreign access to the Japanese market must be achieved, and [that] becomes very contentious . . . . If you look at the experiences of past Administrations, you see that whatever their initial view was . . . trade became important to their policies, and contentious negotiations resulted.

Q: How much of a setback was the Okinawa situation?

A: The act itself was horrible. Here is a 12-year-old girl being abused. . . . We’ve apologized, as we should; we’ve changed the way in which we will handle these matters in the future and tightened up our efforts to control behavior . . . But what [the rape case] did was trigger national attention on the Okinawans’ view that too little attention has been given to them and their concerns. It raised questions about [our] security relationship in the post-Soviet era and how deeply committed the Japanese were to the alliance. The answers that are coming out, or the answers that both the Japanese leadership and ours want [are] a reaffirmation of the security relationship and an understanding of the burdens that flow from that to both of our nations . . .

Q: There has been some discussion of whether the redeployment of U.S. troops from Okinawa should be to other parts of Japan or whether their activities should be redeployed. Those are two very different things.

A: We just had a long study of East Asian strategy with the Japanese. Among other things, we studied that very question: Where should our forces be deployed? What should they be? What kind of supplies do they need? What is readiness? How do we cooperate through special-measures agreements? . . . What we came up with is a need for 100,000 armed-services personnel in this region: 47,000 in Japan; 36,000 in Korea; 8,000 in Guam and most of the others at sea.

When [Defense Secretary William J.] Perry was here, he reaffirmed that, and the Japanese accepted those figures. Now, we have said that, under our relationship, it is for Japan to supply those bases. Where they will be is up to them, but we have to be here in Japan to do our job. There is the further reality, though, that Okinawa is very strategically located for forward deployment. It is inevitable that a substantial number of American forces will be there.

Q: There have been other incidents that have complicated U.S.-Japan relations--the lack of Daiwa disclosures, for example.

A: I don’t think the Daiwa matter, as serious as it is, has had the political repercussions the Okinawan rape has.

Q: What about allegations of CIA eavesdropping during U.S.-Japan trade talks?

A: We don’t comment on those matters from Tokyo. But, once again, I don’s see those allegations as having serious repercussions here. At least, I haven’t to date.

Q: I’ve heard that while these incidents, individually, may not have serious political repercussions, there are concerns about a mood of distrust emerging.

A: I’ve heard that, and we have to take that concern seriously. We’ve just gone through this difficult 50th year. It could have been really damaging, but, basically, we got through it in a very positive way. None of this would be possible--unless there was a basic commitment on the part of both governments to make this relationship work. I have no doubt the Japanese leadership and most Japanese see the importance of a strong U.S.-Japan relationship. I certainly have no doubt that the American view is the same. The test of a relationship is not what people say, in general, but whether things get done that have to get done. . . . We’re getting these things done . . . The relationship between two strong democracies like ours will always involve some frustrations and some differences. If we’re going to measure good relations by the absence of any such difficulties, then, of course, that standard is unrealistic.

Q: So, the popular view shaped by the media is vastly different from reality?

A: I don’t want to seem Pollyannaish here. . . . We’re taking their concerns very seriously. But I have been impressed, practically every day, by . . . the commitment of the Japanese leaders to make this work.

Q: We’ll see a measure of that in the upcoming APEC meeting and summit?

A: That will be the test. The President and the prime minister [will issue] two statements. One, a security declaration; the other on general cooperative efforts. I think you’re going to see very solid, detailed and compelling statements that will speak much more loudly than I can to the effectiveness of the relationship.

Q: Will there be a breakthrough of sorts in this the 50th year of the relationship

A: In a sense, this is a good time--the Okinawan thing sort of interrupted the flow here. But over the past year, we’ve completed the key trade stuff. We have reached a special-measures agreement dealing with the extension of the security relationship here and their support. We will have a successful APEC meeting, I’m sure. . . . The summit can be used to tell the world . . . that the U.S.-Japan relationship is solid and very important.

Q: There is this constant and unsettling churn in Japan’s domestic politics. How difficult is it to deal with that?

A: Japan does not lack stability. But it is going through a basic change in political structure, moving from multi-seat districts to single seats. Elections under the new system will be coming up in the half year or so. Nobody knows. This has got politicians here nervous, because some of them don’t know which seat they will run for. For the first time, they have to run with the view of getting 50% of the vote instead of 25%. Having been a politician all my life, I can sympathize with them. So there is lot of caution built into the system because of that.

Q: What do you see in the next elections?

A: The old hands tell me it will take three or four elections before we really know what this new system means. It is going to have to go through a testing period, a shakedown period, and then some kind of pattern will be develop.

Q: Since the government sometimes does operate on automatic bureaucratic pilot, does that, to some extent, impede progress?

A: On trade, for example, it tends to make the system more rigid, because the career people are looking for consensus in the industries they control. If we did it their way, we would go to the people who might be [facing new] competition and ask them if they would like it. That’s not the quickest way to get a “yes.” I have often said that if we did it their way, we would be the most protectionist nation in the world. In areas of security, general cooperation, the stability of the career service is actually a major source of strength to us.

Q: Do you see any of that changing on the trade front, where the realities of the marketplace are beginning to create different forces?

A: I think the biggest thing is that we’ve been able to open up the market where economic forces play. You see some dramatic changes. For example, cellular phones--on which we reached an agreement two years ago--has been a spectacular success for them, as well as for us. The foreign share of [Japan’s] semiconductor market is about 23%; it was 8% or 9% five years ago. In areas like citrus, beef--across-the-board in general--American imports are soaring.

Q: What about cars?

A: You will see improvement. I just don’t know how much yet. The thing that is new and good is, in addition to the agreement, is the seriousness of American car companies. . . . Because of this agreement, they’re thinking it’s worth the effort and they have made the effort--investing hundreds of millions of dollars to get into this market.

Q: There seems to be a broad consensus here on the need for deregulation, accompanied by a recognition of the costs involved. But there seems to be a lack of clarity on how to get from A to B.

A: You’ve got it. There are voices here--even Keidanren , the business association--calling for deregulation. [But] frankly, there doesn’t seem to be much going on right now. In fact, some scholars say there is more regulating going on than deregulating.

Q: If that is the case, won’t American companies always be at a disadvantage?

A: If our goal in the near future is to get a market just like the United States’ in Japan, we’re doomed to be disappointed . . . . We will have to continue to press the Japanese to give us some decent equivalent to what we offer to them, and to everyone else, in the United States. What I say to the Japanese is, the sooner we can get some of this out of the way so that market forces can play, the better off you will be. Somebody pointed out how would it be possible for the largest creditor nation in the world to pursue policies that resulted in Japanese banks having to pay a premium to borrow money. They did it. The bugaboo here is regulation.*