THE NATION : POLITICS : Congress Is MIA in Bosnia Debate

Though U.S. troops are now being deployed in Bosnia, a troubling question remains: Why did Congress not more forcefully oppose a policy it has grave misgivings about?

The question remains relevant for three reasons. First, the proper role of Congress in foreign policy-making remains unresolved. Second, Bosnia raises fundamental questions about the nature of U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War world, and Congress is an appropriate forum for such a debate. Finally, Congress still has a key role in overseeing the administration’s Balkans policy.

Congress’ deference to the administration is rooted in a Cold War mind-set that tipped the balance of foreign policy-making power in the executive branch’s favor. Before the 1940s, it was never accepted that the executive branch possessed unconstrained power in foreign affairs. Indeed, as constitutional scholar E. .S. Corwin pointed out, by giving the executive branch and Congress co-equal responsibility for foreign policy, the Constitution “is an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy.”

Before the Cold War, constitutional practice required congressional approval to send U.S. forces overseas in non-emergency situations, such as Bosnia. As the embodiment of the American people’s political will, Congress has a legitimate role in deciding whether U.S. troops participate in peacekeeping operations or humanitarian interventions. Its abdication of responsibility with respect to Bosnia is especially troubling, because many insist the administration has not made a solid case that vital U.S. interests are at stake there.

Indeed, President Bill Clinton seems to have refuted his own argument that the United States has compelling national interests in Bosnia. Reiterating that U.S. troops will leave after one year, he insists the mission of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is to give the warring parties a respite from the conflict.

This raises an obvious question: What becomes of America’s “vital interests” if the war resumes after NATO forces leave? Validating U.S. leadership, reaffirming American values, solidifying NATO, halting aggression, preventing a wider war, stopping atrocities--do these purportedly vital interests, compelling intervention in December 1995, become less than vital in December 1996? If these imperatives are not that compelling, Congress has both the obligation and the duty to oppose the policy that implements them.

Clinton has, in fact, conceded that his policy is driven by idealism. He says that sending U.S. troops to Bosnia is “the right thing to do.” By this standard, however, there are many “right things” for the United States to do. In Europe, for example, the post-Cold War proliferation of new states is due to spawn additional turbulence. The administration’s foreign-policy criteria would logically require U.S. intervention in all such conflicts.

Clinton leaves two issues unresolved. First, where does the obligation to intervene end? Once foreign policy is driven by values, rather than concrete strategic interests, an important threshold of restraint has been crossed. In theory--and practice--U.S. foreign policy becomes open-ended. A foreign policy based on universally applicable principles does not lend itself to selectivity: Intervention is always an option.

Second, what price are Americans willing to pay to “do the right thing”? After Vietnam, Lebanon and Somalia, U.S. policy-makers should have learned the road to hell is paved with good intentions.

The administration’s Bosnia policy thus raises issues that transcend the immediate problem in the Balkans. It poses questions about the nature of America’s world role; specifically, when, where and for what purposes should the United States intervene? The foreign-policy maxims invoked by the administration--America’s credibility and values, concern for “stability,” opposition to “aggression”--are identical to those used to justify every major U.S. overseas initiative since 1947. Whether these Cold War-rooted catch phrases remain valid guideposts merits closer examination.

Congress thus missed an opportunity to conduct a long-overdue debate about America’s appropriate role in international politics. By avoiding serious debate on Bosnia, it permitted Clinton to get away with labeling his critics as “isolationists.” Isolationism, however, is a straw man in the foreign-policy debate.

Rather than engage his critics in serious discussion, Clinton sought to delegitimize them. He would have Congress and the public believe that only his foreign policy bears the imprimatur of legitimacy. But there are choices other than either Clinton’s morally driven interventionism or isolationism; choices other than U.S. leadership or abdication. Indeed, what is at stake in Bosnia is not America’s leadership but its judgment: the ability to differentiate between defending tangible national interests and tilting at windmills; between the world as it is and the world as we would like it to be. Congress has the opportunity to revisit these issues--and should.

Beyond debating the central purposes of U.S. foreign policy, Congress has a con tinuing role in overseeing the administration’s Bosnia policy. Many things may go wrong. Large-scale fighting will probably not resume until peace-keeping forces withdraw. Still, U.S. forces could be targeted by renegades. And, as the exit date approaches, the Bosnian government could stage provocations in an attempt to forestall NATO’s withdrawal.

Also, because strict neutrality is the sine qua non of successful peacekeeping, U.S. forces would be jeopardized if the administration goes forward with its plan to arm and train the Bosnian army.

In the months ahead, Congress must ensure the administration does not engage in mission--or ambition--creep. It should also state now that it will not fund any extension of the deployment beyond the one-year date. Congress should also make clear that it will insist on immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops if Bosnia becomes another Beirut or Belfast.

Finally, Congress must engage in critical self-examination. It was cowed by two frequently invoked executive-branch arguments. First, Congress bought into the argument that, by opposing the administration’s policy, it would be undermining the troops. In the future, Congress should remember that the best way to support the military is to prevent it from being put in harm’s way in pursuit of dubious policies.

Second, Congress acquiesced to the contention that once the president pledges U.S. forces abroad, congressional opposition undercuts America’s leadership role and credibility. Congress needs to validate the principle that the president must seek congressional approval before committing U.S. troops to such places as Bosnia and Somalia. It should not allow any president to create a fait accompli and then claim that lawmakers are obligated to ratify White House policy, no matter how misguided. When Congress believes the president is marching to folly, it has the responsibility to stop him. There is nothing patriotic about marching lock-step over a cliff.