CYBERSPACE : Why Nations Could Fear the Internet
The first shots in what could prove to be the most significant battle of the new global era are being fired: Who controls the emerging international information highway? The struggle pits government officials intent on preserving national authority against “netizens” of an emerging cyber/civil society that refuses to recognize international boundaries. One of the first major battlegrounds is almost certain to be China.
Earlier this month, the Chinese State Council authorized the Xinhua News Agency, the government’s mouthpiece, to supervise the activities of all foreign news agencies selling economic information in China. Shortly thereafter, one senior Chinese official warned that outside information services would be more tightly regulated to protect Chinese secrets, privacy and property rights. It was also reported that the State Council was restricting the number of Internet providers and ordering existing providers to stop processing new-user registrations.
Beijing’s actions should not be surprising. Despite dramatic economic reforms that have enlarged its playing field for Chinese entrepreneurs and international investors, China is the world’s most stubborn defender of state control over civil society--at a time when the Internet is fast becoming global civil society’s chief weapon.
Global civil society consists of two sectors: the private economic, which is dominated by large and increasingly stateless corporations and worldwide investors, and the independent, which is composed of non-governmental organizations, political movements and transnational ethnic groups. In the old world order, both sectors were heavily dependent on the whims and will of national governments.
During the last decade, global civil society has grown exponentially. Two developments--the end of the Cold War and a general crisis of confidence in national governments around the world--created an opportunity for both the corporate and independent sectors to expand. But neither would have grown as rapidly without the communications revolution. For example, the international investment funds and global corporate management and production structures that now exist would have been inconceivable without the advent of computers, faxes and high-speed data transmission. These same technologies enabled human rights activists, women groups and other independent groups to form alliances across national borders.
Both the private and independent sectors have quickly found ways to use the Internet to advance their global interests--and some national governments are beginning to feel threatened by their success. For China, the immediate causes of concern are twofold. The first, and probably foremost, fear in the minds of senior Chinese Communist Party members is that the Internet will weaken their political authority at home and help their opponents attract international support. They are not being paranoid about this. Many experts believe that the fax machine was integral to successful efforts to mobilize international opposition to Beijing following the Tian An Men massacre in 1989. The Internet, which didn’t arrive in China until 1994, is a much more effective means of communication.
Predictably, human rights groups have begun to use the Internet to campaign for more freedom in China.
* The Human Rights Web (www.traveller.com/hrweb) organized e-mail to free dissident Harry Wu from Chinese detention and to protest the imprisonment of democratic activist Wei Jingsheng.
* The Swedish branch of Save the Children recently created a Web page (childhouse.uio.no) to encourage protests against conditions in Chinese orphanages.
* The Free Tibet Home Page (www.manymedia.com/tibet) provides support for Tibet’s struggle for independence from China.
Chinese students and other emigres have established an impressive presence on the Web outside China, including a volunteer-run news electronic service, the China News Digest, that now has its own Web page ( www.cnd.org) and more than 35,000 e-mail subscribers. As Chinese access to the Internet grows, the ability of individuals and groups in China to read alternative news sources and develop connections with counterparts overseas will inevitably expand. As Beijing well understands, in the new global era, information and connections (power) grow out of the barrel of a modem.
The Chinese government is anxious about the private sector’s use of the information highway for different reasons. In today’s world, where capital can move from one locale to another in a key stroke, daily events can affect national economic prospects. Bad news can ravage a currency or dry up financing for a major development project. Censoring such news is a means to exert national control over the economy.
The problem China’s rulers face, however, is that the country’s economic future largely depends upon its ability to attract foreign capital and compete in global markets, both of which will require a rapid upgrade of its national information infrastructure. But, once that infrastructure is in place, it will be difficult to prevent civil society from making use of it. Moreover, if the government were to attempt to impede the spread of computers and telecommunications, it would create tremendous resentment in a population eager to enter the computer age.
The challenge, then, for Chinese officials is to find ways to move into cyberfuture without losing their ability to control society. Their strategy, so far, is to develop their own Internet service provider--a sort of nationalized America Online. Toward this end, the China Internet Corp., based in Hong Kong, was established last fall. Billed as a “no-sex, no-sedition” provider, it would act as a gatekeeper to outside information and enable the government (represented by Xinhua) to capture a hefty share of the profits that would be made by providing online services to China’s potentially enormous market. By monopolizing control over Internet service in China, the bureaucrats in Beijing would also acquire a valuable bargaining chip in their dealings with other major international news and Internet providers. They could ask outside services to restrict their news about China in return for access to the Chinese market.
But can China really control its slice of cyberspace? Most analysts doubt it. The government lacks the technical know-how or manpower necessary to defeat determined cyberdemocrats. Moreover, in China, as in other parts of the world, control over economic development is devolving into the hands of local and provincial leaders--and they are likely to resist attempts by Beijing to cut them out of the potentially lucrative Internet game.
While China’s efforts to control the information highway are heavy-handed, other governments are moving in similar directions. Speaking at the launch of a Malaysian online service, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad warned that unlimited access to the Internet could have a negative impact on society unless people were a “moral fortress’ to withstand undesirable information. Efforts by the German government and the U.S. Congress to keep pornography off the Internet are much more targeted, but the basic clash of principles--freedom of information versus state authority--are the same.
If governments augment their efforts to regulate the Internet, the “netizens” of the independent sector are likely to respond by launching a series of cyber insurrections. The practice of “spamming,” punishing users who violate the norms of cybersociety by swamping their Internet service provider with e-mail, is just one example of how electronic guerrilla war could be waged.
The outcome of this struggle may ultimately depend on which side is able to gain the support of the private sector. While the corporate community is intellectually hostile to government, many businesses will come under pressure to align themselves with governments. For example, most of the emerging information giants, including AT&T;, Microsoft and Oracle, have signed commercial agreements with China. Over time, it is likely that Beijing and other governments with an interest in filtering cyberspace will make such agreements contingent on a company’s willingness to help curb the independent sector. In addition, some transnational companies such as Shell Oil, now a major target of Internet activists because of its failure to prevent the execution of Nigerian writer and activist Ken Daro-Wiya, have their own reasons to want to limit cyberactivism.
Still, the private sector, especially the growing international financial community, has a major stake in ensuring the free flow of information. Many analysts believe that the peso crisis, which cost global investors billions of dollars, was partly caused by the Mexican government’s manipulation of information about the state of the Mexican economy. Over the long run, moreover, as China’s decision to focus on financial news indicates, the private sector is likely to be as much of a target as the independent sector.
In short, despite their differences, both sectors of civil society have a shared interest in preserving the freedom of cyberspace.
