The Downside of Secrecy

It seemed like a good idea at the time. As Bosnia’s Muslim defenders fought desperately in 1994 against better-armed Bosnian Serb forces, President Franco Tudjman of neighboring Croatia posed a question to Washington. Would the United States object if Croatia let Iranian military help for Bosnia pass secretly through its territory? The Clinton administration, sympathetic to the Muslims’ plight but unwilling to break the U.N. arms embargo against the former Yugoslavia, quickly sent its answer.

The U.S. ambassador in Croatia was told to inform Tudjman that he had “no instructions,” a diplomat’s way of giving tacit assent. With that, Iranian weapons along with what were subsequently identified as military advisors, intelligence operatives and terrorist trainers flowed into the country. Bosnia was grateful for the timely help. But the aid also served to anchor Iranian influence firmly in the heart of the Balkans, something that is now a matter not only of ideological but deep practical concern to the United States and its 25,000 peacekeeping troops in Bosnia.

As one senior Clinton administration official this week told Times reporters Doyle McManus and James Risen, the decision to turn a blind eye to the opening of the Iranian military pipeline into Bosnia “was the best of our options at the time.” The Muslim town of Gorazde was under siege and Republican leaders were calling for breaking the U.N. arms embargo. And so, hastily and in great secrecy, the nod was given to opening an Iranian connection that came to include secret police training, teaching terrorists assassination skills and spreading the gospel of the Iranian revolution.

It’s clear, as Times reporters have since found, that this decision suffered from a fateful absence of informed discussion by top officials. In fact, the secretaries of state and defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were told either at the last minute or only after President Clinton had given his approval. As is so often the case when a policy proves to be misbegotten, confining discussion to just a small circle of officials gave possible doubters little chance to be heard, meaning among other things that the implications of letting Iran’s virulently anti-Western regime gain a toehold in southern Europe were largely ignored. Policymakers sometimes can’t avoid choosing among unpalatable options. That doesn’t excuse them from considering in their discussions and planning the full potential consequences of what they are contemplating.