Expanding NATO--But Diminishing Security for All

Expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization--or, as its advocates now prefer, NATO enlargement--is the most important international issue on the agenda today. Yet, it has received far too little real consideration. Support in Washington and most other NATO capitals seems widespread, but not deep. The issue did not figure in the recent U.S. presidential election, mainly because it was endorsed by both candidates. Yet, in July, NATO will presumably announce its readiness to open negotiations with three Central European countries eager to join NATO and considered most appropriate: Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. A promise will be made that others will follow.

NATO was a great success story of the Cold War, so why not build on that success? For a few years, from 1990 until 1994, it was generally agreed that NATO must transform itself in the post-Cold War world, but that transforming a military alliance inherited from an era of confrontation of opposing blocs was best done by changing its role, rather than by taking in new members.

When the Paris Charter of Europe in 1990 marked the end of the Cold War, NATO had a border running through Central Europe. To create new lines of division by enlarging NATO to the east is not explicable as an inheritance. New security arrangements could best be handled, it was thought, through individual agreements with non-NATO countries--through a Partnership for Peace (PFP) with each country. The PFP was launched in 1994. But before it could prove itself (as indeed it has), the United States, which had sponsored it, suddenly endorsed expansion of NATO membership. Why?

The sudden shift toward enlargement of NATO had three key sources. First, the political leaders of several former communist Central and Eastern European states--above all, in Prague, Warsaw and Budapest--were impatient to join Western Europe, and the road to membership in the European Union looked steep and long. NATO membership seemed the best path. Moreover, they harbored fears of future Russian pressures and wanted NATO’s security assurances.

Second, some German leaders decided that German economic expansion into East-Central Europe would be most palatable in the framework of a multilateral redefinition of relationships. Again, NATO was more feasible than the European Union, and the PFP was irrelevant. Finally, and most decisive, President Bill Clinton was persuaded by those in his administration who favored enlargement of NATO as the best vehicle to revivify and transform the alliance, and thereby preserve and enhance the one institution that gave the American voice in Europe its greatest resonance. That it appealed to a vocal domestic political constituency was an added advantage. Even more important, it offered a potential success story in the alliance and at home.

It was, of course, recognized that the Russians, who were just overcoming doubts and joining the Partnership for Peace, would not like it. But advocates of NATO expansion believed Russians could not really do anything about it and would simply have to reconcile to it. Moreover, we could facilitate that reluctant acceptance by verbal reassurances and various steps to assuage hurt Russian feelings by elaborating cooperative relations between NATO and Russia.

Opposition to NATO expansion is, regrettably, the one thing virtually all Russian politicians can agree on. As they voiced objections, it became necessary to mount counterarguments. One was that enlargement of NATO would enhance stability in East-Central Europe and strengthen political democratization and economic marketization--all in the interests not only of the countries involved, but of the West and Russia, too. Of course, if the main aim was to enhance stability, the first priority should have been to bring Russia and Ukraine into NATO.

The second argument was that, while Russia today is no threat, the Russia of tomorrow is uncertain and enlargement of NATO would reassure its new members against possible future dangers.

The argument that NATO enlargement would be a hedge against aggressive inclinations of a resurgent Russia would appeal to countries brought into NATO, but what of the many East and Central European states not brought in? They were being promised less security by this new dividing line--because rather than a general NATO interest in security for all the countries of the region, a few were to be offered membership and enhanced security, while others were being left out.

Some in the West, especially a few prominent geopoliticians of the Cold War school, such as Henry A. Kissinger, were advocating, on “realist,” geopolitical grounds, rapid and substantial expansion of NATO. They insisted this was vital, not to cultivate democracy in Eastern Europe or to hedge against a possible failure of democracy in Russia, but to take advantage of temporary Russian weakness and establish a counter-Russian military alliance now when we are more easily able.

Such arguments, of course, complete the circle that is exactly what many in Russia fear: The plan is simply an anti-Russian action by NATO and, above all, the United States. Many in Russia harbor anti-Western biases from ingrained Cold-War thinking, and their suspicions were validated by the West’s actions. This line of advocacy by prominent U.S. cold warriors also undercuts Western arguments that NATO expansion was in Russian interests and the Russians had nothing to fear as long as Russia itself had no expansionist designs.

NATO enlargement, as the path to security for Eastern Europe and therefore Europe as a whole, is not directed against Russia. Yet, to many Russians, the renewal of the West’s Cold War political-military alliance by absorbing former members of the defunct Warsaw Pact, when there is no threat from Russia, can only be seen as creating a new threat to Russia. Moreover, many Russians see NATO moving east as a direct military threat. Why else would NATO, with its enormous conventional as well as nuclear superiority, feel it necessary to advance to the border of Russia?

Expansion stirs Russian fears that NATO would, in fact, impinge on legitimate Russian security interests. Expansion of NATO to provide security for Western and Eastern Europe would marginalize, if not exclude, Russia from meaningful participation in European security arrangements. If Russia is not offered membership, it is not being given equal status as a European power. As important as it is to avoid feeding Russian misperceptions of a Western military threat, it is even more important to avoid feeding valid Russian perceptions that their legitimate security interests are not being given appropriate weight. Because this is not the Western purpose, there is all the more reason to seek some other means to meet Western (and Central European) security aims without persisting on a course that can only create a long-term problem with Russia.

NATO enlargement as a hedge against negative policy changes in Russia risks contributing to such changes. Hedging should at the least not risk making political dangers more real. It should, therefore, be a contingent response rather than a pre-emptive initiative.

The danger is not that Russia will angrily react to NATO expansion by precipitous military actions. Rather, the main adverse consequence would be political: diminished Russian confidence in the West and considerable weakening of the influence of those Russians most devoted to cooperation with the West. The first casualty would probably be the unratified START II and prospects for further strategic-arms control, and perhaps also the existing regime of conventional-arms control in Europe.

At worst, Russia would become not a rampaging bear but an isolated nuclear fortress, with little incentive to contribute to the security of a perceived hostile world--for example, by responsible policies of restraint in arms sales and nuclear nonproliferation. This would be a heavy price for expanding NATO.

In 1949, Lord Ismay remarked that NATO’s contribution to security in Europe lay in “keeping America in, the Russians out, the Germans down.” Much has changed in the intervening half century. Today, NATO can serve a useful role in European security only if it does not keep the Russians out. This is not a matter of pandering to unreasonable Russian fears. But we should have learned that no one gains security by creating insecurity for others. If legitimate Russian security interests are not met, neither will the long-run interests of Europe, the United States and the world.

Once the undesirability of the attempt to enlarge NATO becomes clear, we are left with a serious problem: Are the costs of abandoning NATO expansion already too great to change course?

Perhaps the process could be slowed or curtailed--for example, bringing in only three or four new members. Or it could be made clear that membership would be open to all qualified aspirants, not excluding Russia. If that came to pass, it might leave NATO little different from other unwieldy, large organizations, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. We could lose much of NATO’s current value as a functioning security organization. Indeed, many U.S. supporters of NATO oppose any enlargement out of concern over the diluting effect. But proceeding on the present track may be even more destabilizing.

The current course now includes an attempt to negotiate a NATO-Russian “charter” or other agreement, offering a yet undefined security relationship short of membership. Moscow is asking for a formal ratified treaty and objects that unilateral NATO assurances of no current plans to deploy Western forces or nuclear weapons in the territories of new members in the East may change. If NATO enlargement does proceed, it is essential that as strong a NATO-Russian tie as possible be provided--not only because the Russians want it but because we should, too. Agreement on lower levels of conventional forces in Central-Eastern Europe would also help.

Perhaps the answer is really to transform NATO, beginning by extending to any new members the security assurances of Article V and membership in the North Atlantic Council, but without expanding the NATO military organization. Military cooperation could be based on variegated cooperative arrangements under the Partnership for Peace, while the political organization finds a new role. If this is not the answer, at least it helps identify the problem. Above all, we should keep in mind that the objective is broader and deeper security, not expanding an organization for some at the cost of diminishing security for all.