U.S. Bullying Tactics Alienating Asian Allies

The stated goal of the Clinton administration’s policy of “engagement” in Asia is building a “new Pacific community.” But America’s well-intentioned though sanctimonious stance toward Asia’s human-rights record may inadvertently marginalize the United States in the world’s most dynamic region. In Kuala Lumpur for the ASEAN Regional Forum this weekend, Secretary of State Madeline K. Albright may encounter some unexpected turbulence from her Asian counterparts on just what this “engagement” means.

It certainly hasn’t had a friendly face of late. Cambodia’s Second Prime Minister Hun Sen staged a coup, shattering a U.S.-brokered peace agreement. Malaysia’s prime minister blamed U.S. currency traders for Southeast Asia’s currency woes. Beating Congress to the punch, Indonesian President Suharto called off the planned purchase of U.S. F-16 fighter jets and an American military education program. In a patronizing letter to President Bill Clinton canceling the deal, he unexpectedly alluded to U.S. “budget problems” as a reason to end the $1-million training program. And despite finger-wagging admonitions from the administration, the Assn. of Southeast Asian Nations allowed the thuggish rulers of Burma to join their club, which represents nearly 500 million people. All in all, a curious way to build a Pacific community.

These are not prickly, Leninist-inspired, Chinese-sympathesizing governments--they are our friends. Nor is their sharpness toward Washington, as some Asian authoritarian leaders would portray it, the result of a clash of Western versus Asian values. Clearly, no one defends the murderous Khmer Rouge. Few outside Indonesia try to justify the country’s brutish behavior in East Timor, the focus of human rights critics. And in rationalizing its embrace of Burma, ASEAN said it merely seeks “constructive engagement” with Burmese dictators, reasoning that echoes U.S. policy Toward China.

Rather, the malaise in U.S. Asia policy stems from several factors: lingering post-Cold War confusion over America’s role in the world; a misreading of political trends in Asia and a mistaken sense of U.S. leverage there, and clumsy, ham-handed tactics that spotlight a dearth of Asia expertise at senior levels in U.S. government. This is particularly ironic, since many U.S. actions repeat mistakes made earlier by the administration.

Despite some mid-course corrections stemming from a leaked 1994 State Department memo warning against the use of bullying tactics in Asia, the administration has failed to halt the erosion of U.S. influence in the region that the memo worried about. The reason reflects larger concerns about foreign policy. In a quest for national purpose, the United States has frequently resorted to unilateral sanctions in response to behavior that it finds offensive to its values. Ten states and at least a dozen cities, including several in California, have taken congressional legislation banning new investment in Burma one step farther: They won’t do business with anyone who has business in Burma.

Burma, of course, is an easy and deserving target. The brutal SLORC, which usurped power in 1989 after its rejection at the polls, presides over a failing economy with little foreign investment apart from energy. But viewed from Southeast Asia, it looks rather different. Burma is a country of some 50 million people. It shares borders with several ASEAN states, China and India. In its isolation, Burma has drifted toward Beijing, its major arms supplier.

It is this geopolitical fact, coupled with a self-serving desire to do business, that led ASEAN to bring Burma inside its tent. Indeed, those in the United States concerned about balancing the power of an emerging China should take some comfort in an increasingly independent ASEAN.

Still, U.S. disdain for human-rights violators is not limited to Burma. China is regularly scorned. Now there are moves afoot to cut aid and trade with Indonesia, whose authoritarian regime certainly has its share of imperfections. But unlike Burma, Suharto has succeeded in building a successful economy, one that annually grows at a rate of about 7%-8%. One result is that a majority of the 200 million Indonesians have been lifted above the poverty line; the faint outlines of a middle class can be seen. Furthermore, Jakarta is expanding its cooperation with the U.S. 7th Fleet.

None of this is to suggest that human rights should not be an important part of U.S. foreign policy. In cases like South Africa, where the moral imperative was high and the strategic and economic stakes low, and friends in the region supported it, sanctions were the right course. East Asia is more complex. Rarely are there black and white considerations. Not only in the case of China, but in Southeast Asia as well, there are substantial economic and geopolitical considerations to be weighed against human rights.

U.S. two-way trade with the Asia Pacific region exceeds $420 billion a year, nearly twice the value of trade with Europe. ASEAN is our fourth-largest trading partner. Like Japan and Korea, it views a U.S. military presence as critical to maintaining balance in a region where historical rivalry and suspicion still hold the potential for conflict. Moreover, much of East Asia is less dependent on U.S. markets, trade or aid and more dependent on intra-Asian trade and investment, thus reducing U.S. leverage.

Unilateral sanctions have rarely been effective. What is gained if French oil companies replace U.S. ones in Burma or if Indonesia buys fighter jets from Russian? In a global economy, only concerted, multilateral action, coupled with patience and agile diplomacy, produces results.

Rather than repeating hollow rhetoric about creating a Pacific community, the United States needs to build more equal partnerships with ASEAN and other Asia Pacific nations, not as the sole, remaining superpower by more as the first among equals. Unlike Europe, Asia Pacific is not a collection of Western democracies. But East Asia’s economic dynamism over the past three decades has begun to produce urban middle classes from Taiwan to Thailand, which are pushing for more accountable and pluralistic government. Thus, American values are taking root, if not always when and how we want. Albright must demonstrate that there is indeed a learning curve in Washington when it comes to Asia.