Dust-Up in Iraq Leaves U.S. Newly Exposed in Region

By JOHN DANISZEWSKI

Oct. 18, 1997 12 AM PT

TIMES STAFF WRITER

CAIRO —

Iran declares it has a “right” to launch attacks inside Iraq against the military bases of Iraqi-sponsored Iranian dissidents. Iraq responds that it has a duty to defend its sovereign territory from Iranian “aggression” despite the international sanctions imposed upon it.

Is there a danger that the United States, the dominant military power in the Persian Gulf, could be drawn into a conflict between the two neighboring powers, historic enemies of each other and deeply hostile to the United States?

That seemed to be the omen this month when the U.S. aircraft carrier Nimitz was rushed to the Persian Gulf as a reminder to both Iran and Iraq that the United States would brook no more violations of the “no-fly” zone in Iraq south of the 33rd parallel.

U.S. Defense Secretary William S. Cohen said anyone foolish enough to fly in spite of the warnings would “bear the consequences,” and indeed there were no repetitions of the Sept. 29 jet fighter attacks by Iran on the base in southern Iraq that prompted the U.S. saber-rattling.

But the incident recalled how only a decade ago, the United States was deeply enmeshed in Iran-Iraq hostilities when the U.S. Navy was called upon to escort neutral ships through the Gulf to ensure the free flow of oil to the world. The so-called tanker wars began when Iraq fired on ships delivering Iranian oil and Iran replied with attacks on tankers from Iraq and other oil-rich Arab states.

While no one expects Iran and Iraq to revert to a full-scale war any time soon, the countries will remain bitter rivals. And the incident has thrown a spotlight on the risks and dangers inherent in the seemingly open-ended U.S. commitment to serve as the region’s policeman. The commitment stems from the dual containment policy the United States adopted after the war with Iraq in 1991--a pledge to contain Iran and Iraq through diplomatic isolation, a strong U.S. military presence and a developing alliance with the small Arab states of the Gulf Cooperation Council.

Faced with hostile regional powers in Baghdad and Tehran, the relatively weak Arab states needed U.S. protection to ensure a stable supply of oil for the world economy, policymakers believed. At the time, however, it was assumed that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein would succumb to a coup from within and that the threat from Iraq would diminish. Obviously, that hasn’t happened, and the result has been a kind of stalemate.

“We are almost at a standstill,” said Egyptian political analyst Abdel-Moneim Said. “Everyone is waiting to see if the United States will get fed up or if the government of Iran or Iraq will change. But I don’t expect any of those things to happen.”

Although shorn of most, if not all, weapons of mass destruction, Iraq still wields a significant military--armed forces with nearly 400,000 members and 2,500 tanks. Since his defeat, Hussein has tested American resolve repeatedly, and U.S. policymakers believe that he would quickly resume his drive to dominate the Persian Gulf if given even half a chance.

Iran, meanwhile, is believed to have regional ambitions and has rearmed steadily since it fought Iraq to a bloody standstill in 1988. It has been showcasing a growing navy with maneuvers in the Gulf this week and, according to some reports, is also on the verge of acquiring long-range ballistic missiles and is working to get nuclear weapons--a charge the government vehemently denies.

With Russian-built submarines, Iran already could stop oil from getting through the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow gap in the Gulf through which one-fifth of the world’s petroleum flows, and would do so if it ever came under attack from the West, Iranian newspapers have said.

But despite such evidence, the United States no longer commands the unquestioned loyalty of the Arab countries it is protecting.

On one hand, Arab public opinion has turned critical of the painful sanctions hurting the Iraqi people. On the other, Arab states increasingly are warming toward Iran, which has been working hard to repair relations partly so that the U.S. presence in the region will no longer be deemed necessary.

Now that moderate cleric Mohammad Khatami has assumed the Iranian presidency, the thaw is quickening. In a major departure, Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, the most important figure in that country after King Fahd, plans to attend a pan-Islamic summit in Tehran in December. Meanwhile, direct air links have been reestablished between Tehran and the Saudi capital, Riyadh; Iranian exhibitors are showing goods at trade fairs in the diplomatic and financial capital, Jidda; and religious pilgrims are finding it easier to move between the two countries.

In Europe as well, support for dual containment seems to be fraying. Several countries have argued for milder measures against Iraq. In the case of Iran, Europe never agreed to the strict economic isolation sought by Washington. The recent $2-billion deal by a French-led consortium to help develop Iranian natural-gas fields was the sharpest rebuff yet to Washington’s anti-Iran policies.

In light of these changing circumstances, former U.S. national security advisors Brent Scowcroft and Zbigniew Brzezinski, among others, have argued that the dual containment policy may not be viable in the long run and should be adjusted.

With the election of Khatami, some observers in the Middle East say they see signs that the U.S. administration already is quietly adopting a less hostile, more nuanced stance toward Iran. One such signal came last week, when the U.S. State Department put an anti-Iranian group, the People’s Moujahedeen, on the list of terrorist organizations that should be banned from entry into the United States.

Will Iran’s new president reciprocate?

“It depends on a struggle for power going on inside Iran now. If [Khatami] can dominate, I think he will do something to open channels with the United States,” predicted Iran-watcher Khairallah Khairallah, managing editor of the Saudi-owned Al Hayat newspaper, in a telephone interview.

But there is also the possibility that relations with Iran could worsen--for instance, if it is finally proved that the Tehran regime indeed initiated or assisted in the June 1996 massive terrorist bombing in Khobar, Saudi Arabia, that killed 19 U.S. military personnel.

If so, President Clinton might be under strong pressure to mount a retaliatory military strike, and today’s precarious power balance in the Gulf would be put to a new, and more dire, test.

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The latest provocation:

On Sept. 29, Iran blasts two sites in Iraq that it says are strongholds of the People’s Moujahedeen, a group that has sought to oust the regime in Tehran.

1) Five Phantom fighters strike base near Al Kut.

2) Four jets hit base 80 miles northeast of Baghdad.

3) The American response: President Clinton, saying the Iranian attacks violate the U.S.-enforced Iraqi “no-fly” zone, dispatches the aircraft carrier Nimitz attack group to the Persian Gulf.

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MILITARY STRENGTH

*--*

IRAN IRAQ Army 345,000 350,000 Navy 18,000 2,500 Air force 30,000 30,000 Revolutionary Guards 120,000 120,000

*--*

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Nimitz is carrying . . .

* 5,000 crew members

* 77 aircraft

* 4.6 million pounds of air-launched missiles and bombs

Sources: The Military Balance, 1996-97; International Institute for Strategic Studies; 1997 Information Please Almanac

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